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About Capital in the Twenty-First Century

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present three key facts about income and wealth inequality in the long run emerging from my book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and seek to sharpen and refocus the discussion about those trends.
Abstract: In this article, I present three key facts about income and wealth inequality in the long run emerging from my book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and seek to sharpen and refocus the discussion about those trends. In particular, I clarify the role played by r > g in my analysis of wealth inequality. I also discuss some of the implications for optimal taxation, and the relation between capital-income ratios and capital shares.
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01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology the authors require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

4,670 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Why COVID-19 is an analogue to the ongoing climate crisis, and why there is a need to question the volume growth tourism model advocated by UNWTO, ICAO, CLIA, WTTC and other tourism organizations are discussed.
Abstract: The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is challenging the world. With no vaccine and limited medical capacity to treat the disease, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI) are the main strategy to contain ...

2,508 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An emergent logic of accumulation in the networked sphere, ‘surveillance capitalism,’ is described and its implications for ‘information civilization’ are considered and a distributed and largely uncontested new expression of power is christened: ‘Big Other.’
Abstract: This article describes an emergent logic of accumulation in the networked sphere, ‘surveillance capitalism,’ and considers its implications for ‘information civilization.’ The institutionalizing practices and operational assumptions of Google Inc. are the primary lens for this analysis as they are rendered in two recent articles authored by Google Chief Economist Hal Varian. Varian asserts four uses that follow from computer-mediated transactions: ‘data extraction and analysis,’ ‘new contractual forms due to better monitoring,’ ‘personalization and customization,’ and ‘continuous experiments.’ An examination of the nature and consequences of these uses sheds light on the implicit logic of surveillance capitalism and the global architecture of computer mediation upon which it depends. This architecture produces a distributed and largely uncontested new expression of power that I christen: ‘Big Other.’ It is constituted by unexpected and often illegible mechanisms of extraction, commodification, and control that effectively exile persons from their own behavior while producing new markets of behavioral prediction and modification. Surveillance capitalism challenges democratic norms and departs in key ways from the centuries-long evolution of market capitalism.

1,624 citations


Cites background from "About Capital in the Twenty-First C..."

  • ...Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2594754 Keywords: surveillance capitalism; big data; Google; information society; privacy; internet of everything...

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The SSP narratives as discussed by the authors is a set of five qualitative descriptions of future changes in demographics, human development, economy and lifestyle, policies and institutions, technology, and environment and natural resources, which can serve as a basis for integrated scenarios of emissions and land use, as well as climate impact, adaptation and vulnerability analyses.
Abstract: Long-term scenarios play an important role in research on global environmental change. The climate change research community is developing new scenarios integrating future changes in climate and society to investigate climate impacts as well as options for mitigation and adaptation. One component of these new scenarios is a set of alternative futures of societal development known as the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs). The conceptual framework for the design and use of the SSPs calls for the development of global pathways describing the future evolution of key aspects of society that would together imply a range of challenges for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Here we present one component of these pathways: the SSP narratives, a set of five qualitative descriptions of future changes in demographics, human development, economy and lifestyle, policies and institutions, technology, and environment and natural resources. We describe the methods used to develop the narratives as well as how these pathways are hypothesized to produce particular combinations of challenges to mitigation and adaptation. Development of the narratives drew on expert opinion to (1) identify key determinants of these challenges that were essential to incorporate in the narratives and (2) combine these elements in the narratives in a manner consistent with scholarship on their inter-relationships. The narratives are intended as a description of plausible future conditions at the level of large world regions that can serve as a basis for integrated scenarios of emissions and land use, as well as climate impact, adaptation and vulnerability analyses.

1,606 citations


Cites background from "About Capital in the Twenty-First C..."

  • ..., 2008; Lansing and Markiewicz, 2012) or capital returns (Piketty, 2014)....

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  • ...…feature of rising inequality is assumed to arise from a number of factors discussed in the inequality literature, including skill-biased technology development (where technology replaces many low-skill jobs; Jaumotte et al., 2008; Lansing and Markiewicz, 2012) or capital returns (Piketty, 2014)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work aims to demonstrate the efforts towards in-situ applicability of EMMARM, which aims to provide real-time information about concrete mechanical properties such as E-modulus and compressive strength.

1,480 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors showed that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the Great Depression and World War II have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes and argued that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks.
Abstract: This paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the United States using individual tax returns data. Top income and wages shares display a U-shaped pattern over the century. Our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the Great Depression and World War II have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes. We argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks. Top wage shares were flat before World War II, dropped precipitously during the war, and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before World War II. As a result, the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution.

3,263 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: A recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics as discussed by the authors, and the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series, including income definition and comparability over time and across countries, tax avoidance and tax evasion.
Abstract: A recent literature has constructed top income shares time series over the long run for more than twenty countries using income tax statistics. Top incomes represent a small share of the population but a very significant share of total income and total taxes paid. Hence, aggregate economic growth per capita and Gini inequality indexes are sensitive to excluding or including top incomes. We discuss the estimation methods and issues that arise when constructing top income share series, including income definition and comparability over time and across countries, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. We provide a summary of the key empirical findings. Most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the twentieth century in general due to shocks to top capital incomes during the wars and depression shocks. Top income shares do not recover in the immediate postwar decades. However, over the last thirty years, top income shares have increased substantially in English speaking countries and in India and China but not in continental European countries or Japan. This increase is due in part to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes. As a result, wage income comprises a larger fraction of top incomes than in the past. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and empirical models that have been proposed to account for the facts and the main questions that remain open.

1,647 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors combine income tax returns with Flow of Funds data to estimate the distribution of household wealth in the United States since 1913, showing that wealth concentration has followed a U-shaped evolution over the last 100 years: it was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then.
Abstract: This paper combines income tax returns with Flow of Funds data to estimate the distribution of household wealth in the United States since 1913. We estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers, accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income. We successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth: the Survey of Consumer Finance, linked estate and income tax returns, and foundations’ tax records. Wealth concentration has followed a U-shaped evolution over the last 100 years: It was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then. The rise of wealth inequality is almost entirely due to the rise of the top 0.1% wealth share, from 7% in 1979 to 22% in 2012|a level almost as high as in 1929. The bottom 90% wealth share rst increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined. The increase in wealth concentration is due to the surge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality. Top wealth-holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of total labor income in the economy. We explain how our ndings can be reconciled with Survey of Consumer Finances and estate tax data.

1,219 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the distribution of incomes between an enumerable infinity of income ranges is assumed to develop by means of a stochastic process and that the Pareto curve of the equilibrium distribution will be asymptotic to a straight line.
Abstract: JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. A MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY IN the models discussed in this paper the distribution of incomes between an enumerable infinity of income ranges is assumed to develop by means of a stochastic process. In most models the stochastic matrix is assumed to remain constant through time. Under these circumstances, and provided certain other conditions are satisfied, the distribution will tend towards a unique equilibrium distribution dependent upon the stochastic matrix but not on the initial distribution. It is found that under fairly general conditions, provided the prospects of change of income as described by the matrix are in a certain sense independent of income for incomes above some limit then the Pareto curve of the equilibrium distribution will be asymptotic to a straight line. This result is preserved even when some of the effects of age on income are allowed for, and also when allowance is made for the effect of an occupational stratification of the population. Some consideration is also given to the fact that changes in the income distribution may cause the stochastic matrix itself to change. Some discussion is also given of cases where the Pareto curve of the equilibrium distribution is not asymptotic to a straight line. ? 1. INTRODUCTION In a recent article 1 instructions were given for graduating the distribution of personal incomes before tax by means of the distribution function (1.1) F(t)= =N tan' sin G '~0 Cos 6 + (t/t0)a-where F(t) is the number of incomes exceeding t, and N, a, to and 0 are fitted parameters. For high incomes this formula closely approximates the, form (1.2) F(t) Ct-= with = too, sin 0 which is the form predicted by Pareto's law. It has been frequently claimed that actual distributions do 1 Champernowne [3]. See references at the end of this article. JUNE 1953] A MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 319 approximate closely to this form for high income levels, and it is the purpose of this note to seek theoretical reasons for this. I am indebted to Mr. M. Crum of New College, Oxford, for critical advice and enabling me to correct …

710 citations

Posted Content
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: This Review presents basic facts regarding the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality in Europe and the United States and discusses possible interpretations and lessons for the future.
Abstract: This Review presents basic facts regarding the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality in Europe and the United States. Income and wealth inequality was very high a century ago, particularly in Europe, but dropped dramatically in the first half of the 20th century. Income inequality has surged back in the United States since the 1970s so that the United States is much more unequal than Europe today. We discuss possible interpretations and lessons for the future.

580 citations