Accentuating the rank positions in an agreement index with reference to a consensus order
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...In approaches that are related to multicriteria decision analysis, we found that, in the late 1970s, Saaty (1977, 1980) developed the analytic hierarchy process, which became an important approach to multicriteria decision making....
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"Accentuating the rank positions in ..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Although ordinal rankings play an important role in voting and elections, an added challenge is Arrow’s fundamental “impossibility” theorem (Arrow, 1963), stating that no voting scheme can guarantee five natural fairness properties: universal domain, transitivity, unanimity, independence with respect to irrelevant alternatives (referred in the Kemeny and Snell’s model as rank reversal), and nondictatorship....
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...…generated by the different algorithms is largely unknown (Tavana et al., 2008), this happens because, according to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963), there is no aggregate ranking that satisfies simultaneously several necessary fair representation conditions, where the concept of…...
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..., 2008), this happens because, according to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963), there is no aggregate ranking that satisfies simultaneously several necessary fair representation conditions, where the concept of “fair” elude precise and formal definition, which accounts for the numerous alternative models and interpretations that exist for group decision making....
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..., 2008), this happens because, according to Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963), there is no aggregate ranking that satisfies simultaneously several necessary fair representation conditions, where the concept of “fair” elude precise and formal definition, which accounts for the numerous alternative models and interpretations that exist for group decision making. In the aggregation of ordinal preferences to form a consensus, Cook (2006) examines the main issue of consensus among ordinal rankings of a set of alternatives and the various ad hoc procedures developed over time. The problem of deriving a “consensus ranking” from preferences provided in pairwise formats was first examined by Kemeny and Snell (1962). They studied the group ranking problem with ordinal preferences only, and proposed an axiomatic approach for dealing with ordinal preferences. Their model seeks an optimal group ranking that minimizes the number of reversed preferences. This model, however, has an important drawback: It is computationally prohibitive to solve (NPhard; Hochbaum and Levin, 2006). Although ordinal rankings play an important role in voting and elections, an added challenge is Arrow’s fundamental “impossibility” theorem (Arrow, 1963), stating that no voting scheme can guarantee five natural fairness properties: universal domain, transitivity, unanimity, independence with respect to irrelevant alternatives (referred in the Kemeny and Snell’s model as rank reversal), and nondictatorship. Garcı́a-Lapresta and Pérez-Román (2011) use the Kemeny metric to measure distance between orders and introduce a class of consensus measures based on the distances among individual weak orders....
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...Arrow and Raynaud (1986) considered the problem in which rankings that were provided, for example, by a group of evaluators, must be combined into a common group ranking....
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