Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing
01 Jul 2003-Vol. 3561, pp 1-37
TL;DR: A logging instrument contains a pulsed neutron source and a pair of radiation detectors spaced along the length of the instrument to provide an indication of formation porosity which is substantially independent of the formation salinity.
Abstract: The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is intended for use by mobile nodes in an ad hoc network. It offers quick adaptation to dynamic link conditions, low processing and memory overhead, low network utilization, and determines unicast routes to destinations within the ad hoc network. It uses destination sequence numbers to ensure loop freedom at all times (even in the face of anomalous delivery of routing control messages), avoiding problems (such as "counting to infinity") associated with classical distance vector protocols.
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Book•
15 Jun 2007TL;DR: The author reveals how the design of the IPSec architecture and components changed over time from simple to complex, and how the architecture of the VPN itself changed over the course of development.
Abstract: Preface. Contributors. 1. Computer Network Security: Basic Background and Current Issues (Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou and Christos Douligeris). 1.1 Some Terminology on Network Security. 1.2 ISO/OSI Reference Model for Networks. 1.3 Network Security Attacks. 1.4 Mechanisms and Controls for Network Security: Book Overview and Structure. References. Part One Internet Security. 2. Secure Routing (Ioannis Avramopoulos, Hisashi Kobayashi, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Randy Wang). 2.1 Introduction. 2.2 Networking Technologies. 2.3 Attacks in Networks. 2.4 State of the Art. 2.5 Conclusion and Research Issues. References. 3. Designing Firewalls: A Survey (Angelos D. Keromytis and Vassilis Prevelakis). 3.1 Introduction. 3.2 Firewall Classifi cation. 3.3 Firewall Deployment: Management. 3.4 Conclusions. References. 4. Security in Virtual Private Networks (Srinivas Sampalli). 4.1 Introduction. 4.2 VPN Overview. 4.3 VPN Benefi ts. 4.4 VPN Terminology. 4.5 VPN Taxonomy. 4.6 IPSec. 4.7 Current Research on VPNs. 4.8 Conclusions. References. 5. IP Security (IPSec) (Anirban Chakrabarti and Manimaran Govindarasu). 5.1 Introduction. 5.2 IPSec Architecture and Components. 5.3 Benefi ts and Applications of IPSec. 5.4 Conclusions. References. 6. IDS for Networks (John C. McEachen and John M. Zachary). 6.1 Introduction. 6.2 Background. 6.3 Modern NIDSs. 6.4 Research and Trends. 6.5 Conclusions. References. 7. Intrusion Detection Versus Intrusion Protection (Luis Sousa Cardoso). 7.1 Introduction. 7.2 Detection Versus Prevention. 7.3 Intrusion Prevention Systems: The Next Step in Evolution of IDS. 7.4 Architecture Matters. 7.5 IPS Deployment. 7.6 IPS Advantages. 7.7 IPS Requirements: What to Look For. 7.8 Conclusions. References. 8. Denial-of-Service Attacks (Aikaterini Mitrokotsa and Christos Douligeris). 8.1 Introduction. 8.2 DoS Attacks. 8.3 DDoS Attacks. 8.4 DDoS Defense Mechanisms. 8.5 Conclusions. References. 9. Secure Architectures with Active Networks (Srinivas Sampalli, Yaser Haggag, and Christian Labonte). 9.1 Introduction. 9.2 Active Networks. 9.3 SAVE Test bed. 9.4 Adaptive VPN Architecture with Active Networks. 9.5 (SAM) Architecture. 9.6 Conclusions. References. Part Two Secure Services. 10. Security in E-Services and Applications (Manish Mehta, Sachin Singh, and Yugyung Lee). 10.1 Introduction. 10.2 What Is an E-Service? 10.3 Security Requirements for EServices and Applications. 10.4 Security for Future EServices. References. 11. Security in Web Services (Christos Douligeris and George P. Ninios). 11.1 Introduction. 11.2 Web Services Technologies and Standards. 11.3 Web Services Security Standard. 11.4 Conclusions. References. 12. Secure Multicasting (Constantinos Boukouvalas and Anthony G. Petropoulos). 12.1 Introduction 205 12.2 IP Multicast. 12.3 Application Security Requirements. 12.4 Multicast Security Issues. 12.5 Data Authentication. 12.6 Source Authentication Schemes. 12.7 Group Key Management. 12.8 Group Management and Secure Multicast Routing. 12.9 Secure IP Multicast Architectures. 12.10 Secure IP Multicast Standardization Efforts. 12.11 Conclusions. References. 13. Voice Over IP Security (Son Vuong and Kapil Kumar Singh). 13.1 Introduction. 13.2 Security Issues in VoIP. 13.3 Vulnerability Testing. 13.4 Intrusion Detection Systems. 13.5 Conclusions. References. 14. Grid Security (Kyriakos Stefanidis, Artemios G. Voyiatzis, and Dimitrios N. Serpanos). 14.1 Introduction. 14.2 Security Challenges for Grids. 14.3 Grid Security Infrastructure. 14.4 Grid Computing Environments. 14.5 Grid Network Security. 14.6 Conclusions and Future Directions. References. 15. Mobile Agent Security (Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou, Christos Douligeris, Rosa Mavropodi, and Vassilios Chrissikopoulos). 15.1 Introduction. 15.2 Taxonomy of Solutions. 15.3 Security Mechanisms for Mobile Agent Systems. References Part Three Mobile and Security. 16. Mobile Terminal Security (Olivier Benoit, Nora Dabbous, Laurent Gauteron, Pierre Girard, Helena Handschuh, David Naccache, Stephane Socie, and Claire Whelan). 16.1 Introduction. 16.2 WLAN and WPAN Security. 16.3 GSM and 3GPP Security. 16.4 Mobile Platform Layer Security. 16.5 Hardware Attacks on Mobile Equipment. 16.6 Conclusion. References. 17. IEEE 802.11 Security (Daniel L. Lough, David J. Robinson, and Ian G. Schneller). 17.1 Introduction. 17.2 Introduction to IEEE 802.11. 17.3 Wired Equivalent Privacy. 17.4 Additional IEEE 802.11 Security Techniques. 17.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems. 17.6 Practical IEEE 802.11 Security Measures. 17.7 Conclusions. References. 18. Bluetooth Security (Christian Gehrmann). 18.1 Introduction. 18.2 Bluetooth Wireless Technology. 18.3 Security Architecture. 18.4 Security Weaknesses and Countermeasures. 18.5 Bluetooth Security: What Comes Next? References. 19. Mobile Telecom Networks (Christos Xenakis and Lazaros Merakos). 19.1 Introduction. 19.2 Architectures Network. 19.3 Security Architectures. 19.4 Research Issues. 19.5 Conclusions. References. 20. Security in Mobile Ad HocNetworks (Mike Burmester, Panayiotis Kotznanikolaou, and Christos Douligeris). 20.1 Introduction. 20.2 Routing Protocols. 20.3 Security Vulnerabilities. 20.4 Preventing Attacks in MANETs. 20.5 Trust in MANETs. 20.6 Establishing Secure Routes in a MANET. 20.7 Cryptographic Tools for MANETs. References. 21. Wireless Sensor Networks (Artemios G. Voyiatzis and Dimitrios N. Serpanos). 21.1 Introduction. 21.2 Sensor Devices. 21.3 Sensor Network Security. 21.4 Future Directions. 21.5 Conclusions. References. 22. Trust (Lidong Chen). 22.1 Introduction. 22.2 What Is a trust Model? 22.3 How Trust Models Work? 22.4 Where Trust Can Go Wrong? 22.5 Why Is It Diffi cult to Defi ne Trust? 22.6 Which Lessons Have We Learned? References. Part Four Trust, Anonymity, and Privacy. 23. PKI Systems (Nikos Komninos). 23.1 Introduction. 23.2 Origins of Cryptography. 23.3 Overview of PKI Systems. 23.4 Components of PKI Systems. 23.5 Procedures of PKI Systems. 23.6 Current and Future Aspects of PKI Systems. 23.7 Conclusions. References. 24. Privacy in Electronic Communications (Alf Zugenmaier and Joris Claessens). 24.1 Introduction. 24.2 Protection from Third Party: Confidentiality. 24.3 Protection from Communication Partner. 24.4 Invasions of Electronic Private Sphere. 24.5 Balancing Privacy with Other Needs. 24.6 Structure of Privacy. 24.7 Conclusion and Future Trends. References. 25. Securing Digital Content (Magda M. Mourad and Ahmed N. Tantawy). 25.1 Introduction. 25.2 Securing Digital Content: Need and Challenges. 25.3 Content Protection Techniques. 25.4 Illustrative Application: EPublishing of E-Learning Content. 25.5 Concluding Remarks. References. Appendix A. Cryptography Primer: Introduction to Cryptographic Principles and Algorithms (Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou and Christos Douligeris). A.1 Introduction. A.2 Cryptographic Primitives. A.3 Symmetric-Key Cryptography. A.4 Asymmetric-Key Cryptography. A.5 Key Management. A.6. Conclusions and Other Fields of Cryptography. References. Appendix B. Network Security: Overview of Current Legal and Policy Issues (Andreas Mitrakas). B.1 Introduction. B.2 Network Security as a Legal Requirement. B.3 Network Security Policy Overview. B.4 Legal Aspects of Network Security. B.5 Self-Regulatory Security Frameworks. B.6 Conclusions. References. Appendix C. Standards in Network Security (Despina Polemi and Panagiotis Sklavos). C.1 Introduction. C.2 Virtual Private Networks: Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). C.3 Multicast Security (MSEC). C.4 Transport Layer Security (TLS). C.5 Routing Security. C.6 ATM Networks Security. C.7 Third-Generation (3G) Mobile Networks. C.8 Wireless LAN (802.11) Security. C.9 E-Mail Security. C.10 Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509). Index. About the Editors and Authors.
63 citations
TL;DR: By using this low-budget system, the number of casualties during the triage stage of an emergency is expected to drop off, and the feasibility of the proposal is shown.
63 citations
03 Nov 2011
TL;DR: The results of this investigation reveal that for scenarios where bi-directional traffic flows are predominant, LOAD provides similar data delivery ratios as RPL, while incurring less overhead and being simultaneously less constrained in the types of topologies supported.
Abstract: Routing protocols for sensor networks are often designed with explicit assumptions, serving to simplify design and reduce the necessary energy, processing and communications requirements. Different protocols make different assumptions - and this paper considers those made by the designers of RPL - an IPv6 routing protocol for such networks, developed within the IETF. Specific attention is given to the predominance of bi-directional traffic flows in a large class of sensor networks, and this paper therefore studies the performance of RPL for such flows. As a point of comparison, a different protocol, called LOAD, is also studied. LOAD is derived from AODV and supports more general kinds of traffic flows. The results of this investigation reveal that for scenarios where bi-directional traffic flows are predominant, LOAD provides similar data delivery ratios as RPL, while incurring less overhead and being simultaneously less constrained in the types of topologies supported.
63 citations
TL;DR: A global view of WSNs security approaches based on game theory is provided, and to the best knowledge of knowing, it is the first paper centrally focusing ongame theory in WSNS security.
Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are becoming an integral part of our lives. There are not widespread applications of WSNs without ensuring WSNs security. Due to the limited capabilities of sensor nodes in terms of computation, communication, and energy, providing security to WSNs is challenging. In fact, the process of implementing WSNs security is adaptive and dynamic, which evolves continually. The essence of attack-defend in WSNs security can be expressed by mutual strategies of interdependence while game theory can be used for the purpose of accounting for interactions among strategies of rational decision makers. Therefore, studying WSNs security with game theory has higher scientificity and rationality. This paper presents a survey of security approaches based on game theory in WSNs. According to different applications, a taxonomy is proposed, which divides current existing typical game-theoretic approaches for WSNs security into four categories: preventing Denial of Services (DoS) attacks, intrusion detection, strengthening security, and coexistence with malicious sensor nodes. The main ideas of each approach are overviewed while advantages and disadvantages of various approaches are discussed. Then, this paper overviews related work and highlights the difference from other surveys, and points out some future research areas for ensuring WSNs security based on game theory, including Base Station (BS) credibility, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) efficiency, WSNs mobility, WSNs Quality of Service (QoS), real-world applicability, energy consumption, sensor nodes learning, and expanding game theory applications and different games. Thus, a global view of WSNs security approaches based on game theory is provided. To our best knowledge of knowing, it is the first paper centrally focusing on game theory in WSNs security. It will make the researchers a better understanding of game-theoretic solutions to WSNs security and further research directions.
63 citations
Book Chapter•
01 Jan 2009TL;DR: This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of attacks against a specific type of target, namely the routing protocols used by MANETs, and presents a detailed classification of the attacks/attackers against these complex distributed systems.
Abstract: Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are one of the fastest growing areas of research. They are an attractive technology for many applications, such as rescue and tactical operations, due to the flexibility provided by their dynamic infrastructure. However, this flexibility comes at a price and introduces new security threats. Furthermore, many conventional security solutions used for wired networks are ineffective and inefficient for the highly dynamic and resource-constrained environments where MANET use might be expected. To develop suitable security solutions for such new environments, we must first understand how MANETs can be attacked. This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of attacks against a specific type of target, namely the routing protocols used by MANETs. We introduce the security issues specific to MANETs and present a detailed classification of the attacks/attackers against these complex distributed systems. Then we discuss various proactive and reactive solutions proposed for MANETs. We outline secure routing solutions to avoid some attacks against the routing protocols based on cooperation between nodes. We also give an overview of intrusion detection in MANETs and indicate the nature of IDSs that have been proposed for MANETs in the past decade.
63 citations
References
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TL;DR: This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents as well as providing guidelines for authors to incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document.
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3,501 citations
12 Nov 2001
TL;DR: In this article, a logging instrument contains a pulsed neutron source and a pair of radiation detectors spaced along the length of the instrument to provide an indication of formation porosity which is substantially independent of the formation salinity.
Abstract: A logging instrument contains a pulsed neutron source and a pair of radiation detectors spaced along the length of the instrument. The radiation detectors are gated differently from each other to provide an indication of formation porosity which is substantially independent of the formation salinity. In the preferred embodiment, the electrical signals indicative of radiation detected by the long-spaced detector are gated for almost the entire interval between neutron pulses and the short-spaced signals are gated for a significantly smaller time interval which commences soon after the termination of a given neutron burst. The signals from the two detectors are combined in a ratio circuit for determination of porosity.
574 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss issues that should be considered in formulating a policy for assigning values to a name space and provide guidelines to document authors on the specific text that must be included in documents that place demands on the IANA.
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TL;DR: Many protocols make use of identifiers consisting of constants and other well-known values that must be administered by a central authority to insure that such quantities have consistent values and interpretations in different implementations.
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334 citations
01 Jun 2004
TL;DR: This document defines terms for mobility related terminology out of work done in the Seamoby Working Group but has broader applicability for terminology used in IETF-wide discourse on technology for mobility and IP networks.
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207 citations
"Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (A..." refers methods in this paper
...This section defines other terminology used with AODV that is not already defined in [3]....
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