Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of IAS/IFRS adoption on the economic consequences of firms' compliance with the new standards, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standard.
Abstract: This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital-market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.
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2,513 citations
TL;DR: The authors discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence, highlighting the challenges with quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies.
Abstract: This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm-specific and market-wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market-wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.
779 citations
673 citations
TL;DR: The authors discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation (including IFRS adoption), drawing on U.S. and international evidence, highlighting the challenges with quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies.
Abstract: This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation (including IFRS adoption), drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with: (i) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (ii) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (iii) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm-specific and market-wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on IFRS adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market-wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.
537 citations
Cites background from "Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in ..."
...Of particular relevance are studies showing that even when firms are subject to the same accounting standards, reporting practices differ considerably across firms and countries (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006; Daske et al., 2013)....
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01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earningsmanagement incentives.
Abstract: Abstract This paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.
533 citations
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TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
10,005 citations
9,341 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate alternative models for detecting earnings management by comparing the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by each model.
Abstract: This paper evaluates alternative models for detecting earnings management. The paper restricts itself to models that assume the construct being managed is discretionary accruals, since such models are commonly used in the extant accounting literature. Existing models range from simple models in which discretionary accruals are measured as total accruals, to more sophisticated models that separate total accruals into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component. Prior to this paper, there had been no systematic evidence bearing on the relative performance of these alternative models at detecting earnings management. This paper evaluates the relative performance of the competing models by comparing the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by each model. The specification of the test statistics is evaluated by examining the frequency with which they generate type I errors for a random sample of firm-years and for samples of firm-years with extreme financial performance. We focus on samples with extreme financial performance because the stimuli investigated in previous research are frequently correlated with financial performance. The first sample of firms are targeted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for allegedly overstating annual earnings and the second sample is created by artificially introducing earnings management into a random sample of firms.
6,217 citations
TL;DR: The model financial economics encompasses finance, micro-investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty as mentioned in this paper, and it has had a direct and significant influence on practice, as is evident from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance, industrial organization and monetary theory.
Abstract: THE SPHERE of model financial economics encompasses finance, micro investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty. As is evident from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance, industrial organization and monetary theory, the boundaries of this sphere are both permeable and flexible. The complex interactions of time and uncertainty guarantee intellectual challenge and intrinsic excitement to the study of financial economics. Indeed, the mathematics of the subject contain some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. But for all its mathematical refinement, the research has nevertheless had a direct and significant influence on practice. ’ It was not always thus. Thirty years ago, finance theory was little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data with an almost exclusive focus on corporate financial management. There is no need in this meeting of the guild to recount the subsequent evolution from this conceptual potpourri to a rigorous economic theory subjected to systematic empirical examination? Nor is there a need on this occasion to document the wide-ranging impact of the research on finance practice.2 I simply note that the conjoining of intrinsic intellectual interest with extrinsic application is a prevailing theme of research in financial economics. The later stages of this successful evolution have however been marked by a substantial accumulation of empirical anomalies; discoveries of theoretical inconsistencies; and a well-founded concern about the statistical power of many of the test methodologies.3 Finance thus finds itself today in the seemingly-paradoxical position of having more questions and empirical puzzles than at the start of its
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