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Journal ArticleDOI

Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan

01 Feb 1997-Pacific Historical Review (University of California Press Journals)-Vol. 66, Iss: 1, pp 53-79
TL;DR: It is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Abstract: Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. USSBS, Summary Report (Pacific War) (1946)
Citations
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Book
Nina Tannenwald1
22 Sep 2009
TL;DR: Tannenwald as discussed by the authors traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence on US leaders, and analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991).
Abstract: Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.

258 citations

Book
06 Apr 2015
TL;DR: O'Brien as discussed by the authors argued that the war was a contest of air and sea power rather than land supremacy, and showed how the Allies developed a predominance of air-and sea-power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan's entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific.
Abstract: World War II is usually seen as a titanic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. Phillips Payson O'Brien shows us the war in a completely different light. In this compelling new history of the Allied path to victory, he argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than of land supremacy. He shows how the Allies developed a predominance of air and sea power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan's entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half of the Axis' equipment before it had even reached the traditional 'battlefield'. Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did.

43 citations

Book ChapterDOI
09 Jun 2022
TL;DR: The role of ideology in mass killing is discussed in this article , where a comparative theory of ideology's role in mass killings is presented. But it is argued that rational self-interest or powerful social pressures are more important drivers of violence than ideology.
Abstract: In research on ‘mass killings’ such as genocides and campaigns of state terror, the role of ideology is hotly debated. For some scholars, ideologies are crucial in providing the extremist goals and hatreds that motivate ideologically committed killers. But other scholars are sceptical, contending that perpetrators of mass killing rarely seem ideologically committed, and that rational self-interest or powerful social pressures are more important drivers of violence than ideology. In Ideology and Mass Killing, Jonathan Leader Maynard challenges both these prevailing views, advancing an alternative ‘neo-ideological’ perspective which fundamentally retheorizes the ideological foundations of violence against civilians and synthesizes an emphasis of ideologies, strategic interests, and social pressures. Integrating research from political science, political psychology, history, and sociology, the book demonstrates that ideological justifications are central to the explanation of mass killings, but in ways that go beyond committed belief. Such ideological justifications revolve, moreover, not around extraordinary political goals or hatreds, but radicalized versions of conventional, widely accepted ideas that underpin the politics of security in ordinary societies across the world. Ideology and Mass Killing then substantiates this account through four contrasting case studies of mass killing—Stalinist repression in the USSR 1930-38, the Allied area bombing of Germany and Japan 1940-45, mass atrocities in the Guatemalan civil war 1978-83, and the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. This represents the first volume to offer a dedicated, comparative theory of ideology’s role in mass killing, while also developing a powerful new account of how ideology affects violence and politics more generally.

14 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1959
TL;DR: The authors discusses the origins of air power, its cornerstone position in the evolution of Cold War era nuclear strategy, and its treatment of preventive and preemptive attacks, deterrence, and the economics of strategy.
Abstract: Classic work from 1959 that discusses the origins of air power, its cornerstone position in the evolution of Cold War era nuclear strategy, and its treatment of preventive and preemptive attacks, deterrence, and the economics of strategy.

447 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The untold story of the small group of men who have devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the bomb is explored in this article, which explores the secret world of these strategists of the nuclear age and brings to light a chapter in American political and military history never before revealed.
Abstract: This is the untold story of the small group of men who have devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the Bomb. The book (first published in 1983) explores the secret world of these strategists of the nuclear age and brings to light a chapter in American political and military history never before revealed.

283 citations

Book
01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: The untold story of the small group of men who have devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the bomb is explored in this paper, which explores the secret world of these strategists of the nuclear age and brings to light a chapter in American political and military history never before revealed.
Abstract: This is the untold story of the small group of men who have devised the plans and shaped the policies on how to use the Bomb. The book (first published in 1983) explores the secret world of these strategists of the nuclear age and brings to light a chapter in American political and military history never before revealed.

252 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Sherry explores the growing appeal of air power in America before World War II, the ideas, techniques, personalities, and organizations that guided air attacks during the war, and the devastating effects of American and British "conventional" bombing.
Abstract: This prizewinning book is the first in-depth history of American strategic bombing. Michael S. Sherry explores the growing appeal of air power in America before World War II, the ideas, techniques, personalities, and organizations that guided air attacks during the war, and the devastating effects of American and British "conventional" bombing. He also traces the origins of the dangerous illusion that the bombing of cities would be so horrific that nations would not dare let it occur - an illusion that has sanctioned the growth of nuclear arsenals.

188 citations