Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Citations
1,994 citations
1,139 citations
1,096 citations
Cites background from "Algorithm for optimal winner determ..."
...(1999), and Sandholm (1999)....
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...(1999) as well as Sandholm (1999) and Andersson et. al....
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...The penultimate section is devoted to incentive issues in the design of combinatorial auctions....
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...Notice that this is large enough to handle the test problems considered in Sandholm (1999) and Fujishima et. al....
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...(Auctions; Combinatorial Optimization ) ∗Zentrum Mathematik, TU München, D-80290 München, Germany. e-mail: devries@ma.tum.de †Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston IL 60208. e-mail: r-vohra@nwu.edu Contents...
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896 citations
Cites background from "Algorithm for optimal winner determ..."
...cases, due to the sparseness of the bids, the auction clearing step can be done optimally and quickly [36], although the resulting allocation is still likely to be suboptimal given that not all task bundles are considered....
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761 citations
Cites methods from "Algorithm for optimal winner determ..."
...The winner determination has been shown to be NP-complete [46], and only heuristic methods [47]–[49] are available....
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References
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"Algorithm for optimal winner determ..." refers methods in this paper
...With a fully expressive bidding language, bidding truthfully can be made incentive compatible (a dominant strategy) by using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [58, 7, 17]....
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4,336 citations
"Algorithm for optimal winner determ..." refers background or methods in this paper
...This linear program at each search node can be solved in polynomial time in the size of the input (which itself is (nm)) using interior point methods, or fast on average using the simplex method [11, 60]....
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...There are several modern books on this approach [11, 60], and good overviews of applying this approach to combinatorial auctions have been written very recently [13, 37]....
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3,347 citations
"Algorithm for optimal winner determ..." refers methods in this paper
...With a fully expressive bidding language, bidding truthfully can be made incentive compatible (a dominant strategy) by using the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism [7,17, 58]....
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