Algorithmic Mechanism Design
TL;DR: This work considers algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest, and suggests a framework for studying such algorithms.
About: This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior.The article was published on 2001-04-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1301 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Distributed algorithmic mechanism design & Algorithmic game theory.
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15 Dec 2008TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
2,068 citations
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01 Jan 2007TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
Abstract: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.
1,994 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system.
1,346 citations
09 Jul 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks is proposed, which does not require any tamper-proof hardware at any node.
Abstract: Mobile ad hoc networking has been an active research area for several years. How to stimulate cooperation among selfish mobile nodes, however, is not well addressed yet. In this paper, we propose Sprite, a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. Our system provides incentive for mobile nodes to cooperate and report actions honestly. Compared with previous approaches, our system does not require any tamper-proof hardware at any node. Furthermore, we present a formal model of our system and prove its properties. Evaluations of a prototype implementation show that the overhead of our system is small. Simulations and analysis show that mobile nodes can cooperate and forward each other's messages, unless the resource of each node is extremely low.
1,330 citations
06 Jul 2001
TL;DR: If the Internet is the next great subject for Theoretical Computer Science to model and illuminate mathematically, then Game Theory, and Mathematical Economics more generally, are likely to prove useful tools.
Abstract: If the Internet is the next great subject for Theoretical Computer Science to model and illuminate mathematically, then Game Theory, and Mathematical Economics more generally, are likely to prove useful tools. In this talk I survey some opportunities and challenges in this important frontier.
1,113 citations
Additional excerpts
...[22, 7], and further opportunities abound....
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7,666 citations
"Algorithmic Mechanism Design" refers background in this paper
...7The mechanism can be viewed as auctioning each task separately in a Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961)....
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...We note that a similar proof can be found in Vickrey (1961) for the analysis of the famous Vickrey auction....
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...Arguably the most important positive result in mechanism design is what is usually called the generalized Vickrey–Groves–Clarke (VGC) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Groves, 1973; Clarke, 1971)....
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Book•
01 Jan 1994TL;DR: A Course in Game Theory as discussed by the authors presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.
Abstract: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
7,018 citations
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
Abstract: This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.
6,003 citations
TL;DR: The Albanian Generals Problem as mentioned in this paper is a generalization of Dijkstra's dining philosophers problem, where two generals have to come to a common agreement on whether to attack or retreat, but can communicate only by sending messengers who might never arrive.
Abstract: I have long felt that, because it was posed as a cute problem about philosophers seated around a table, Dijkstra’s dining philosopher’s problem received much more attention than it deserves. (For example, it has probably received more attention in the theory community than the readers/writers problem, which illustrates the same principles and has much more practical importance.) I believed that the problem introduced in [41] was very important and deserved the attention of computer scientists. The popularity of the dining philosophers problem taught me that the best way to attract attention to a problem is to present it in terms of a story. There is a problem in distributed computing that is sometimes called the Chinese Generals Problem, in which two generals have to come to a common agreement on whether to attack or retreat, but can communicate only by sending messengers who might never arrive. I stole the idea of the generals and posed the problem in terms of a group of generals, some of whom may be traitors, who have to reach a common decision. I wanted to assign the generals a nationality that would not offend any readers. At the time, Albania was a completely closed society, and I felt it unlikely that there would be any Albanians around to object, so the original title of this paper was The Albanian Generals Problem. Jack Goldberg was smart enough to realize that there were Albanians in the world outside Albania, and Albania might not always be a black hole, so he suggested that I find another name. The obviously more appropriate Byzantine generals then occurred to me. The main reason for writing this paper was to assign the new name to the problem. But a new paper needed new results as well. I came up with a simpler way to describe the general 3n+1-processor algorithm. (Shostak’s 4-processor algorithm was subtle but easy to understand; Pease’s generalization was a remarkable tour de force.) We also added a generalization to networks that were not completely connected. (I don’t remember whose work that was.) I also added some discussion of practical implementation details.
5,208 citations
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TL;DR: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team and exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.
3,347 citations
"Algorithmic Mechanism Design" refers background in this paper
...1 (Groves, 1973)....
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...Arguably the most important positive result in mechanism design is what is usually called the generalized Vickrey–Groves–Clarke (VGC) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Groves, 1973; Clarke, 1971)....
[...]