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Journal ArticleDOI

An additive model for sequential decision making.

James Shanteau
- 01 Aug 1970 - 
- Vol. 85, Iss: 2, pp 181-191
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This article is published in Journal of Experimental Psychology.The article was published on 1970-08-01. It has received 119 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Additive model.

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Journal ArticleDOI

Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness

TL;DR: In this paper, the subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population and reflects the salient features of the process by which it was generated.
Journal ArticleDOI

Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment.

TL;DR: This work examines the models that have been developed for describing and prescribing the use of information in decision making, the major experimental paradigms, and the major empirical results and conclusions of these two approaches.
Journal ArticleDOI

Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model

TL;DR: A theory of belief updating that explicitly accounts for order-effect phenomena as arising from the interaction of information-processing strategies and task characteristics is presented and shown both to account for much existing data and to make novel predictions for combinations of task characteristics where current data are sparse.
Journal ArticleDOI

Judging probable cause.

TL;DR: Les auteurs ont passe en revue et complete diverses theories de la causalite proposees par des psychologues, des philosophes, des statisticiens et d'autres auteur, cherchant a expliquer les processus qui sous-tendent le jugement de causalite as discussed by the authors.
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Book ChapterDOI

Conservatism in human information processing

Ward Edwards
Abstract: … An abundance of research has shown that human beings are conservative processors of fallible information. Such experiments compare human behavior with the outputs of Bayes's theorem, the formally optimal rule about how opinions (that is, probabilities) should be revised on the basis of new information. It turns out that opinion change is very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes's theorem – but it is insufficient in amount. A convenient first approximation to the data would say that it takes anywhere from two to five observations to do one observation's worth of work in inducing a subject to change his opinions. A number of experiments have been aimed at an explanation for this phenomenon. They show that a major, probably the major, cause of conservatism is human misaggregation of the data. That is, men perceive each datum accurately and are well aware of its individual diagnostic meaning, but are unable to combine its diagnostic meaning well with the diagnostic meaning of other data when revising their opinions. … Probabilities quantify uncertainty. A probability, according to Bayesians like ourselves, is simply a number between zero and one that represents the extent to which a somewhat idealized person believes a statement to be true. The reason the person is somewhat idealized is that the sum of his probabilities for two mutually exclusive events must equal his probability that either of the events will occur.
Journal ArticleDOI

Man as an intuitive statistician.

TL;DR: Results indicate that probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models that integrate and account for human performance in a wide range of inferential tasks.
Journal ArticleDOI

Orthogonal Main-Effect Plans for Asymmetrical Factorial Experiments

TL;DR: In this paper, the main effect plans for asymmetric factorial experiments are described, which permit uncorrelated estimates of all main effects when the interactions are negligible, and the possibilities of blocking these main-effect plans, the randomization procedure and the method of analysis are presented.