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An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma
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In this paper, the authors model the negative self-characterizations of welfare recipients as a form of social stigma, and use a utility maximization model to predict the impact of welfare programs on the low-income population.Abstract:
Perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that "more is better than less." Virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can, in a certain sense, be derived from the assumption that "goods are good." Interestingly, however, this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low-income population, for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls. For example, it has been estimated that in 1970, only about 69 percent of the families eligible for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) participated in the program (see Richard Michel, 1980). The corresponding percentage for AFDC-U, the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible, was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the Food Stamp Program was only 38 percent (see Maurice McDonald, 1977). This phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets. Consequently, most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior. In this paper, this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma -that is, from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se.1 The existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature (Patrick Horan and Patricia Austin, 1974; Lee Rainwater, 1979), where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self-respect and " negative self-characterizations" from participation in welfare. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been modeled, and many questions consequently remain. When is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation? Shouldn't we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions? What is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit? Also, in a slightly different vein, how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma? These questions have been given scant attention by economists, yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population. Here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility-maximizing decision. The model is developed and estimated for the AFDC program.2 The model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income, butread more
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References
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Changes in AFDC Tax Rates, 1967-1971
TL;DR: The authors presented new measures of the implicit marginal tax rate on earnings in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program for 1967 and 1971, and found that while federal policy caused tax rates to decline in most states, some states counteracted the federal initiative by altering AFDC program parameters.