Analysis for strategy of closed-loop supply chain with dual recycling channel
TL;DR: The parameter domain is derived which is defined as the set of competing intensities for which the CLSC with dual recycling channel outperforms theCLSC with single recycling channel from the perspectives of the manufacturer and the consumers, respectively.
About: This article is published in International Journal of Production Economics.The article was published on 2013-08-01. It has received 296 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Supply chain.
Citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the performance of different closed-loop supply chains under different channel leadership is investigated. And the authors find that the retailer-led model gives the most effective CLSC and analytically reveal that the remanufacturing system's efficiency is highly related to a supply chain agent's proximity to the market.
364Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain where a manufacturer can distribute new products through an independent retailer and sell remanufactured products via a third-party firm or platform (3P) in the presence of possible government subsidy.
240Â citations
TL;DR: This paper considers a two-echelon reverse supply chain with dual-recycling channels where the recyclable dealer acts as a Stackelberg game leader and the recycler act as a follower and proposes two complementary contracts which succeed in coordinating the reverse supplychain system and create a win-win situation.
220Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, a Stackelberg game model is used to investigate the optimal decisions of local advertising, used-product collection and pricing in centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chains.
215Â citations
TL;DR: This work considers a manufacturer, as the patent holder, who produces new and remanufactured products and, simultaneously, he and a remanufacturer (as the licensee), competitively collects used products from the market in a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC).
185Â citations
Cites background or methods from "Analysis for strategy of closed-loo..."
...Consistent with Huang et al. (2013), we call as the competing intensity, which has a symmetric influence between the two reverse channels. i jI I ( , ,i j m r , i j ) represents the effective investment of reverse channel member i ....
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...To our knowledge, Huang et al. (2013) and Wu (2015) are the only theoretical papers that have investigated the competition in the reverse channels of a CLSC....
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...One can find similar forms of this modified function were used in Huang et al. (2013)....
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References
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TL;DR: This paper addresses the problem of choosing the appropriate reverse channel structure for the collection of used products from customers and shows that simple coordination mechanisms can be designed such that the collection effort of the retailer and the supply chain profits are attained at the same level as in a centrally coordinated system.
Abstract: The importance of remanufacturing used products into new ones has been widely recognized in the literature and in practice. In this paper, we address the problem of choosing the appropriate reverse channel structure for the collection of used products from customers. Specifically, we consider a manufacturer who has three options for collecting such products: (1) she can collect them herself directly from the customers, (2) she can provide suitable incentives to an existing retailer (who already has a distribution channel) to induce the collection, or (3) she can subcontract the collection activity to a third party. Based on our observations in the industry, we model the three options described above as decentralized decision-making systems with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. When considering decentralized channels, we find that ceteris paribus, the agent, who is closer to the customer (i.e., the retailer), is the most effective undertaker of product collection activity for the manufacturer. In addition, we show that simple coordination mechanisms can be designed such that the collection effort of the retailer and the supply chain profits are attained at the same level as in a centrally coordinated system.
1,863Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the reader to the field of closed-loop supply chains with a strong business perspective, i.e., they focus on profitable value recovery from returned products.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to introduce the reader to the field of closed-loop supply chains with a strong business perspective, i.e., we focus on profitable value recovery from returned products. It recounts the evolution of research in this growing area over the past 15 years, during which it developed from a narrow, technically focused niche area to a fully recognized subfield of supply chain management. We use five phases to paint an encompassing view of this evolutionary process for the reader to understand past achievements and potential future operations research opportunities.
1,201Â citations
TL;DR: This paper examines how the allocation of product collection to retailers impacts their strategic behavior in the product market, and discusses the economic trade-offs the manufacturer faces while choosing an optimal reverse channel structure.
Abstract: The economical and environmental benefits of product remanufacturing have been widely recognized in the literature and in practice. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between a manufacturers reverse channel choice to collect postconsumer goods and the strategic product pricing decisions in the forward channel when retailing is competitive. To this end, we model a direct product collection system, in which the manufacturer collects used products directly from the consumers (e.g., print and copy cartridges) and an indirect product collection system, in which the retailers act as product return points (e.g., single-use cameras, cellular phones). We first examine how the allocation of product collection to retailers impacts their strategic behavior in the product market, and we discuss the economic trade-offs the manufacturer faces while choosing an optimal reverse channel structure. When a direct collection system is used, channel profits are driven by the impact of scale of returns on collection effort, whereas in the indirect reverse channel, supply chain profits are driven by the competitive interaction between the retailers. Subsequently, we show that the buy-back payments transfered to the retailers for postconsumer goods provide a wholesale pricing flexibility that can be used to price discriminate between retailers of different profitability.
780Â citations
TL;DR: It is found that if remanufacturing is very profitable, the original-equipment manufacturer may forgo some of the first-period margin by lowering the price and selling additional units to increase the number of cores available for remanufactured in future periods.
Abstract: We study a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to offer remanufactured products, along with new products, in future periods. We introduce the monopoly environment in two-period and multiperiod scenarios to identify thresholds in remanufacturing operations. Next, we focus our attention on the duopoly environment where an independent operator (IO) may intercept cores of products made by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to sell remanufactured products in future periods. We characterize the production quantities associated with self-selection and explore the effect of various parameters in the Nash equilibrium. Among other results, we find that if remanufacturing is very profitable, the original-equipment manufacturer may forgo some of the first-period margin by lowering the price and selling additional units to increase the number of cores available for remanufacturing in future periods. Further, as the threat of competition increases, the OEM is more likely to completely utilize all available cores, offering the remanufactured products at a lower price.
699Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a two-period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition, where an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items.
Abstract: We present a two-period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition. In our model, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items. After establishing the Nash Equilibrium in the second period sub-game, we use numerical experiments for comparative statics. OEM wants to increase L'S remanufacturing cost. Surprisingly, while L competes in the sales market, she has incentives to reduce oem's remanufacturing cost. A social planner who wants to increase remanufacturing can give incentives to the OEM to increase the fraction available for remanufacturing, or reduce his remanufacturing costs.
520Â citations