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Journal Article•DOI•

Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

Urs Fischbacher1, Simon Gächter2, Simon Gächter3, Ernst Fehr4•
University of Konstanz1, Center for Economic Studies2, Institute for the Study of Labor3, University of Zurich4
06 Jan 2000-Social Science Research Network-
TL;DR: The authors studied the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method and found that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators.
Abstract: We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators.

Summary (2 min read)

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Working Papers of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics

  • The Working Papers of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics can be downloaded in PDF-format from http://www.unizh.ch/iew/wp/.
  • Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher: Appropriating the Commons – A Theoretical Explanation, September 2000 56.
  • Reiner Eichenberger and Bruno S. Frey: Europe’s Eminent Economists: A Quantitative Analysis, September 2000 58.
  • Simon Gächter and Armin Falk: Work motivation, institutions, and performance, October 2000 63.
  • Random Dynamical Systems in Economics, December 2000 68, also known as Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé.

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University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2001
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public
goods experiment
Fischbacher, U; Gächter, S; Fehr, E
Fischbacher, U; Gächter, S; Fehr, E (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods
experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3):397-404.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Economics Letters 2001, 71(3):397-404.
Fischbacher, U; Gächter, S; Fehr, E (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods
experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3):397-404.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Economics Letters 2001, 71(3):397-404.
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public
goods experiment
Abstract
We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant
of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50%
are conditional cooperators.
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich
Working Paper Series
ISSN 1424-0459
forthcoming: Economics Letters
Working Paper No. 16
Are People Conditionally Cooperative?
Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr
July 2000
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New York University1, University of Chicago2, Mackenzie Presbyterian University3, Middlesex University4, University of Kent5, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń6, Harvard University7, Yale University8, Stanford University9, Northwestern University10, University of Sussex11, Utrecht University12, University of California, San Diego13, University of Maryland, College Park14, McGovern Institute for Brain Research15, University of Queensland16, University of Michigan17, California Institute of Technology18, Lehigh University19, University of Regina20, University of Oregon21, Ohio State University22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology23, University of St Andrews24, University of Cambridge25, University of British Columbia26, University of Illinois at Chicago27, University of California, Berkeley28, Carleton University29, VU University Amsterdam30, Cornell University31
30 Apr 2020-Nature Human Behaviour
TL;DR: Evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics is discussed, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping.
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behaviour with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.

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TL;DR: The authors report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect happiness and how institutional factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization, systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life.
Abstract: Over the past few years, there has been a steadily increasing interest on the part of economists in happiness research. We argue that reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility and that happiness research is able to contribute important insights for economics. We report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect happiness as well as how institutional factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization, systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life. We discuss some of the consequences for economic policy and for economic theory.

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Abstract: In recent years, there has been a steadily increasing interest on the part of economists in happiness research. We argue that reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility and that happiness research is able to contribute important insights for economics. We report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect happiness as well as how institutional factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization, systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life. We discuss some of the consequences for economic policy and for economic theory.

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A Theory of Reciprocity

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01 Apr 2001-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action, and explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games.
Abstract: This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments Finally the theory explains why in bilaterial interactions outcomes tend to be "fair" whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise.

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Journal Article•DOI•
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

[...]

Urs Fischbacher1, Simon Gächter2, Ernst Fehr1•
University of Zurich1, University of St. Gallen2
01 Jun 2001-Economics Letters
TL;DR: This article studied the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method and found that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are conditional cooperators.

2,133 citations

References
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Journal Article•DOI•
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

[...]

Urs Fischbacher
07 Feb 2007-Experimental Economics
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Abstract: z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations.

9,760 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

[...]

Ernst Fehr1•
University of Zurich1
01 Mar 1998-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

6,919 citations

Handbook of Experimental Economics

[...]

John H. Kagel, A. E. Roth
01 Sep 1997

3,623 citations

Book Chapter•DOI•
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

[...]

John O. Ledyard
31 Dec 1995-Research Papers in Economics
TL;DR: In this article, a review is made of various public goods experiments and it is found that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control.
Abstract: Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. A review is made of various public goods experiments. It is found that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.

3,135 citations

"Are People Conditionally Cooperativ..." refers background in this paper

  • ...The decision situation in which the experiment was embedded is a standard linear public goods game (see Ledyard (1995) )....

    [...]

Journal Article•DOI•
Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms

[...]

Margit Osterloh1, Margit Osterloh2, Bruno S. Frey1•
University of Basel1, University of Zurich2
01 Nov 1999-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this article, the authors ask specifically what kinds of motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit knowledge, for knowledge generation and transfer in an organizational form.
Abstract: Employees are motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Intrinsic motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must be transferred. Organizational forms enable different kinds of motivation and have different capacities to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. Since knowledge generation and transfer are essential for a firm's sustainable competitive advantage, we ask specifically what kinds of motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit knowledge.

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The authors study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. The authors find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 % are conditional cooperators.