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Are Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) sufficiently large

01 Apr 2017-Marine Policy (Pergamon)-Vol. 78, pp 189-195

TL;DR: Empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of T URFs of optimal size.
Abstract: Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) are gaining renewed attention as a potential tool for sustainable fisheries management in small-scale fisheries. This growing popularity comes despite the fact that there are still unresolved questions about the most effective TURF designs. One of the key questions is the role of TURF size in their efficacy both from ecological and social standpoints. This study explores the expected effects of existing TURF sizes on yields for TURF systems in Chile, Mexico and Japan. The expected effect of larval dispersal and adult movement on yields was simulated for TURFs in each system. The results show that the analyzed TURF systems fall into three main categories: (a) TURFs that are of adequate size to eliminate the expected negative effects of both adult and larval movement, (b) TURFs that are large enough to eliminate the expected negative effects of adult movement, but not the effects of larval dispersal, and c) TURFs that are too small to eliminate the expected impacts on yield of both adult and larval movement. These analyses suggest that either existing models of TURF performance are incomplete or that there is significant scope for improved performance with altered TURF designs. Considering these alternatives, empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of TURFs of optimal size.

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Title
Are Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) sufficiently large?
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ct1n1t0
Authors
Aceves-Bueno, E
Cornejo-Donoso, J
Miller, SJ
et al.
Publication Date
2017-04-01
DOI
10.1016/j.marpol.2017.01.024
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Are Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) suciently large?
Eréndira Aceves-Bueno
a,
, Jorge Cornejo-Donoso
b
, Steve J. Miller
c
, Steven D. Gaines
a
a
Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-51312, USA
b
National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS), University of California, 735 State St, Santa Barbara, CA 93101, USA
c
Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN 55108, USA
ARTICLE INFO
Keywords:
Artisanal sheries
Cooperation
Fish spillover
Nash equilibrium
Spatial property rights
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURF)
ABSTRACT
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) are gaining renewed attention as a potential tool for sustainable
sheries management in small-scale sheries. This growing popularity comes despite the fact that there are still
unresolved questions about the most eective TURF designs. One of the key questions is the role of TURF size in
their ecacy both from ecological and social standpoints. This study explores the expected eects of existing
TURF sizes on yields for TURF systems in Chile, México and Japan. The expected eect of larval dispersal and
adult movement on yields was simulated for TURFs in each system. The results show that the analyzed TURF
systems fall into three main categories: (a) TURFs that are of adequate size to eliminate the expected negative
eects of both adult and larval movement, (b) TURFs that are large enough to eliminate the expected negative
eects of adult movement, but not the eects of larval dispersal, and c) TURFs that are too small to eliminate
the expected impacts on yield of both adult and larval movement. These analyses suggest that either existing
models of TURF performance are incomplete or that there is signicant scope for improved performance with
altered TURF designs. Considering these alternatives, empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small
suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social
constraints prevent the construction of TURFs of optimal size.
1. Introduction
Territorial use rights in shing (TURFs) provide one or more
shermen with exclusive access to particular shing grounds. They
have existed for centuries in many coastal areas around the world and
have been shown to be successful as a form of access right, particularly
for small-scale sheries [16, 29, 44]. The successful management of
small-scale sheries is often achieved by co-management arrangements
[8,12], requiring a strong capacity for self-organization [17,28].By
securing exclusive access to marine resources, TURFs can enable the
conditions necessary for the development of successful co-management
schemes [16, 17, 30, 39]. As a result, TURFs are gaining increasing
attention as an instrument for sheries management that could be
applied far more broadly.
Despite these successes, the relationship between specic TURF
characteristics and performance is poorly understood. Theory suggests
that for TURFs to successfully enable the social conditions that lead to
sustainable harvests, shermen should have the necessary security in
the exclusivity of access [39]. This exclusivity is determined to a large
degree by the ratio of TURF size to targeted species movement.
Therefore, TURF size can potentially have large impacts on social
and biological outcomes. Previous eorts [46] have looked at the
theoretical eects of TURF size on yield, showing that larger TURFs
should decrease the spillover of adults and larvae to surrounding areas
and thereby create greater incentives for TURF owners to take actions
that enhance longer term yields. These theoretical projections suggest
that TURFs may need to be tens of kilometers or more in length to
generate robust and sustainable returns. Yet, existing TURF systems
were designed based upon other criteria: e.g., the location of traditional
shing grounds, geographic characteristics, or legal mandates [5,40].
This raises several questions: are existing TURFs consistent with
emerging design theory? If not, does TURF performance vary pre-
dictably with TURF size? Alternatively, can the expected limitations of
small TURFs be overcome through other mechanisms (e.g., coopera-
tion across TURFs)?
To explore these questions, relationships between shery outcomes
and the size of TURFs in Chile, México and Japan were analyzed. The
model from White and Costello [46] was used to simulate the expected
eect of spillover (both larval and adult) on yields for TURFs of varying
size. The results show that existing TURF systems are often large
enough to eliminate the deleterious eects of adult movement, but are
typically too small to fully mitigate the theoretical eects of larval
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.01.024
Received 7 November 2016; Received in revised form 19 January 2017; Accepted 21 January 2017
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: eaceves@bren.ucsb.edu (E. Aceves-Bueno).
Marine Policy 78 (2017) 189–195
0308-597X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
MARK

dispersal. This is often a consequence of the presence of strong social
and geographic constraints when selecting the size of TURFs [31].
However, the modeled losses in yields due to spillovers do not
necessarily align with empirical evidence of successful management.
Two potential reasons for this discrepancy cooperation and imperfect
information are explored, thereby identifying important areas for
extensions to current TURF design theory.
1.1. Case studies
The case studies were selected from the three largest existing
systems of TURFs - México, Japan and Chile (Fig. 1). In all cases,
attention was restricted to TURFs currently in operation. The analysis
examines species that are the main target of the TURFs and therefore
the main drivers of their design.
1.1.1. México
The study is focused on The Pacico Norte sheries and shing
cooperatives, located along the northern part of the Pacic side of Baja
California Sur as well as Cedros and Natividad Islands. These coopera-
tives form part of a larger federation (FEDECOOP) and were granted
exclusive shing zones in 1992 [22]. The TURFs provide the coopera-
tives with exclusive access for 20 years (with the possibility of renewal)
to several resources. Spiny lobster (Panulirus interruptus, Palinuridae)
and abalone (Haliotis fulgens, Haliotidae) are the most economically
important [22]. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certied the
sustainability of the spiny lobster shery in 2004 [21].
1.1.2. Japan
Two dierent TURF systems from Japan were analyzed: the walleye
pollock (Theragra chalcogramma, Gadidae) TURFs in the Hiyama
region, located around southwestern Hokkaido island, and the sakur-
aebi (Sergia lucens, Sergestidae), TURFs in Suruga Bay, central Japan.
The TURFs in the Hiyama region corresponds to the exclusive shing
grounds (or sections) of the Nishi and Esashi-Kaminokuni cities. This
region is the main spawning ground for the northern Japan Sea stock of
walleye pollock. The TURFs in Suruga bay provide exclusive access to
the sakuraebi, a meso-pelagic shrimp [20] that appears to be sedentary
in this region. The TURFs belong to the Yui Harbor Fishery
Cooperative Association (FCA) and the Ohigawamachi FCA. This
shery is one of the most valuable in Japan [44,45].
1.1.3. Chile
TURFs were included in Chile's legal framework for the manage-
ment of benthic resources in 1991, and they have been key in
recovering collapsed sheries. Studies have found a dramatic increase
in abundance and individual size of targeted species compared to open
access areas [16]. Currently Chile has 707 TURFs in dierent stages of
operation. The analysis is focused on TURFs that manage loco
(Concholepas concholepas, Muricidae) one of the most economically
important resources for artisanal shermen [7]
and the main driver of
the
creation of TURFs system [16]. Operative TURFs (estado oper-
ativo) were identied using data from SUBPESCA [43].
2. Methods
The two patch bio-economic model from White and Costello [46] was
applied to each of the case studies. In the model, the patches (i and j)
represent TURFs that are owned by shing cooperatives, each of which
perfectly coordinates its harvest decisions within the TURF, allowing it to
act as a single agent. Each agent selects the escapement level (N)to
maximize the yield within his patch. The agents select harvest simulta-
neously and non-cooperatively, taking the other owner's decision as given.
The analysis is focused on the resulting Nash equilibrium, highlighting the
consequences of competitive behavior expected to result from high levels
of spillover (see [46] for further details).
In order to categorize the performance of TURF systems, the yields
that are expected to arise when each TURF owner harvests non-
cooperatively with respect to the adjacent TURF were calculated. The
expected yields were computed under three spillover scenarios: no
spillover, larval dispersal only, and adult movement only. Comparing
yields in these scenarios permits attribution of losses in yield to the two
spillover sources and allows for categorization of the systems of TURFS
on the basis of that decomposition.
Fig. 1. Location of the case studies analyzed in this study.
E. Aceves-Bueno et al.
Marine Policy 78 (2017) 189–195
190

To evaluate the extent of losses from spillovers of adults and larvae,
a benchmark was established: if one TURF is large enough to eliminate
both types of spillover (
c
m==
0
), no externalities exist, and the Nash
equilibrium produces the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). This
could represent a shery where the entire stock (for highly connected
resources) or microstock (for species with high levels of self-recruit-
ment such as abalone; [33]) is owned by a cooperative. While such a
scenario is likely to be infeasible in many settings, it serves as a useful
point of comparison.
In contrast, when TURFs are smaller, owners must account for
spillover when choosing harvest, and the resulting Nash equilibrium
entails a race to harvest before the resource moves to the other patch.
Those equilibrium yields were subtracted from the MSY to calculate the
expected losses in yield resulting from dierent TURF sizes [46].To
separate the eects of larval dispersal and adult movement, two
scenarios were examined. In the rst scenario spillover is a conse-
quence of adult movement alone by keeping m > 0 in the adult stock
density function and c=0 in the larvae production and dispersion
function. In the second scenario spillover is due exclusively to larval
dispersal by setting c > 0 in the larvae production and dispersion
function and m=0 in the adult stock density function. Setting c and
m to zero in the larvae production/dispersion function and in the adult
stock destiny function respectively results in
SPN M=( +
)
i
t
i
t
i
t
and
M
=0
i
t
.
Using this model, three major TURF systems within Chile, México
and Japan were analyzed. For each case study data on sizes (alongshore
lengths) of the TURFs (Table 1) and the parameters of the species they
manage (Table 2) were collected. For Chile, data on TURF size were
obtained from SUBPESCA [43]. For Japan, the size of TURFs in
Hiyama and home range of walleye pollock were obtained from Uchida
& Watanobe [45]. Data on home range of sakuraebi and the size of the
shing grounds in Suruga Bay were calculated from the maps of
Uchida & Baba [44]. Data on the size of the Mexican FEDECOOP
TURFs were obtained from McCay et al. [22].
Dispersal kernels were created based on the parameters of each
species presented in Table 1. The kernels were estimated using the
model of Siegel et al. [41] that simulates the trajectories of particles
under the dierent conditions of velocity and turbulence generically
characteristic of coastal areas. The result of these simulations is a
Gaussian probability function with a standard deviation
σ
d
=2.238σ
u
T
PLD
1/2
that depends on the root mean square of the
current velocity (σ
u
) and the planktonic larval duration (PLD) of the
species. The distances that larvae disperse depend on many biological
and oceanographic characteristics that are not taken into account in the
model. As a result, these simplied kernels tend to overestimate larval
dispersion, particularly for species with long PLD [41]. Therefore a
highly conservative value for the current velocity of σ
u
=1 was used.
Finally, the fraction of larvae leaving the TURF (c in the larvae
production and dispersion function) was estimated by integrating the
area under the tails of the kernel that disperse a distance greater than
half of the TURF length. Fig. 2 shows the levels of spillover resulting
from dierent sizes of TURFs for each species. The proportion of larvae
exported in each of the case studies in relation to the rounded average
TURF size is presented in Table 3. Adult movement was calculated as
the proportion of adults that move outside the patch based on the
species home range size relative to the length of the patch, using the
model from Kramer and Chapman [19].
Landing statistics and biomass calculations (when available) were
used to quantify performance of the TURF systems in each case study.
Since biomass calculations are not publicly available for Chilean loco, it
was assumed that the assigned TAC [42], which is calculated in
monitoring eorts in each TURF [16], represents 25% of the biomass.
This represents a conservative calculation since the assigned TAC for
TURFs is calculated as 1525% of the available biomass [16]. The
information was gathered from data and gures available in peer
reviewed publications and governmental reports [14, 16, 23, 25, 36, 37,
38, 42] using Web Plot Digitizer [34].
3. Results and discussion
The simulations show that the TURF systems fall into three distinct
categories: (a) TURFs that are of adequate size to eliminate the
expected negative eects of both adult and larval movement, (b)
TURFs that are large enough to eliminate the expected negative eects
of adult movement, but not the eects of larval dispersal (c) TURFs
that are too small to eliminate the expected impacts on yield of both
adult and larval movement.
The Mexican North Pacic FEDECOOP TURFs are the only TURFs
in the rst category with respect to the dispersal capacity of green
abalone. Two groups of TURFS spiny lobster in the FEDECOOP
TURFs and the TURFs from the Chilean system fall into the second
category. They are large relative to adult movement but too small to
retain most larvae produced inside. Finally, TURFs from Japan fall into
Table 1
TURF systems analyzed in this study.
Country TURF System Main targeted
species
Average TURF along
shore length (km)
México Pacífico Norte Green Abalone 44.25
Haliotis fulgens
(Haliotidae)
México Pacífico Norte Spiny Lobster 44.25
Panulirus interruptus
(Palinuridae)
Chile TURFs targeting
loco (operative
state)
Loco 1.63
Concholepas
concholepas
(Muricidae)
Japan Suruga Bay Sakuraebi 27.5
Sergia lucens
(Sergestidae)
Japan Hiyama Walleye Pollock 29
Theragra
chalcogramma
(Gadidae)
Table 2
Life history parameters corresponding to the species targeted within each of the TURF systems analyzed.
Species Adult home range
(meters)
Inverse life span
(years)
Pelagic Larval Duration (PLD;
days)
Sources
H. fulgens 13.52 0.025 3.59 Tegner & Butler 1985; Hobday et al. 2001; Coates
et al. 2013
P. interruptus 100 0.05 210270 [46]
C. concholepas 13.52 0.1 90 Bigatti et al. 2006; [32]
S. lucens 90,000 0.76 52 [44]; Omori & Gluck 1979
T. chalcogramma 446,000 0.066 108 Cohen et al. 1990; Houde & Cruz 1994; [45]
E. Aceves-Bueno et al.
Marine Policy 78 (2017) 189–195
191

the third category, since both the estimated larval dispersal and adult
movement are large relative to the size of the TURFs.
These theoretical projections suggest the biomass of abalone should
trend upward, but the high levels of expected spillover in the Mexican
(for spiny lobster), Japanese and Chilean TURF systems should (a)
increase competition among TURFs leading to a race to sh, and (b)
compromise biomass and yields.
Fig. 4D shows the landing statistics and biomass calculations for
all species of Abalone in the Mexican Pacic, of wh ich g reen abalone
is the m ost abundant [23]. Although landings statistics show a
positive trend on biomass since t hecreationoftheTURFs,astrong
recent drop reects that TURFs have not been as successful as the
model suggests [36]. It is important to consider that t hese s pecies
are slow growing and highly susceptible to environmental distur-
banceandAlleeeects [23], therefore the full recovery of the stock
will take a long time and/or requires complementary management
tools [35].
On the other hand, the model predicts that the expected losses in
yield would be roughly 3080% of maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
for the spiny lobster shery in FEDECOOP TURFs, 80% of MSY for
walleye pollock TURFS, 30% of MSY for sakuraebi TURFs, and more
than 90% of MSY for most TURFs in the Chilean system (Fig. 3). All
these TURF systems are thus too small to eliminate the eects of
spillover. This is unsurprising since the sizes of existing TURFs are
largely determined by the need to match local social, cultural and
geographical conditions to facilitate the development of successful co-
management schemes [1, 2, 7, 10, 13, 48]. This typically involves
creating areas smaller than those needed to eliminate the eect of
spillover [31], which theoretically could lead to a race to sh. Still,
although with the available information it is not possible to calculate
how far all these systems are from MSY in practice, several lines of
evidence suggest that TURFs help avoid both the race to sh and
compromised yields in the case studies analyzed. Fig. 4 shows landing
statistics for all case studies. Although there are no formal calculations
of biomass for the Pink Shrimp stock shery [44] the shery shows
constant landings since the 1970s (Fig. 4A). According to Uchida and
Baba [44] these TURFs have helped achieve within-season price
stabilization by spreading harvest over time and reduce gear and vessel
congestion, both of which suggest a reduced race to sh. In Chile
(Fig. 4E) landings have remained constant after the creation of the rst
TURFs in 1997, and biomass has increased since TURFs became the
only source of legally landed loco in 2001 [42]. Researchers have
observed an increased abundance of loco [6,16]
and long-term analysis
have
found that the catch per unit of eort has increased along with the
value of the resource [12]. In México (Fig. 4C) the establishment of
exclusive rights in 1992 led to an increase in spiny lobster landings and
biomass. Furthermore, this shery was awarded a sustainability
certication [21], indicating that yields are likely not compromised to
the extent suggested by the model.
One hypothesis to reconcile these mismatches between predictions
and practice is that cooperation among TURFs may account for the
better than expected performance of these TURF systems. Numerous
studies in social-ecological systems have shown that the Nash equili-
brium is rarely the observed outcome in social dilemmas, and
cooperation has often been used to solve common pool resource
problems through coordination, public input provision, information
Fig. 2. Proportion of larvae exported for each species if managed using TURFs of 0
100 km of along shore length. Diamonds show the actual level of larval spillover based on
the rounded average TURF size of each case study.
Table 3
Proportion of larvae that move outside of the TURF (c) based on the rounded average
TURF size of each case study.
Case study Proportion of larvae exported (c)
Spiny Lobster 0.507
Abalone 0.0000003
Loco 0.981
Pink Shrimp 0.403
Pollock 0.547
Fig. 3. Eect of spillover on yield. Eects of larval dispersal (solid lines) are separated from the eects of adult movement (dotted lines). Black dots represent the actual average TURF
size for each case study. Bars show the range of TURF sizes within each system.
E. Aceves-Bueno et al.
Marine Policy 78 (2017) 189–195
192

Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
23 Aug 2019-PLOS ONE
TL;DR: It is found that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches, and these reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.
Abstract: Coastal marine ecosystems provide livelihoods for small-scale fishers and coastal communities around the world. Small-scale fisheries face great challenges since they are difficult to monitor, enforce, and manage, which may lead to overexploitation. Combining territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) with no-take marine reserves to create TURF-reserves can improve the performance of small-scale fisheries by buffering fisheries from environmental variability and management errors, while ensuring that fishers reap the benefits of conservation investments. Since 2012, 18 old and new community-based Mexican TURF-reserves gained legal recognition thanks to a regulation passed in 2012; their effectiveness has not been formally evaluated. We combine causal inference techniques and the Social-Ecological Systems framework to provide a holistic evaluation of community-based TURF-reserves in three coastal communities in Mexico. We find that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches. A lack of clear ecological and socioeconomic effects likely results from a combination of factors. First, some of these reserves might be too young for the effects to show (reserves were 6-10 years old). Second, the reserves are not large enough to protect mobile species, like lobster. Third, variable and extreme oceanographic conditions have impacted harvested populations. Fourth, local fisheries are already well managed, and while reserves may protect populations within its boundaries, it is unlikely that reserves might have a detectable effect in catches. However, even small reserves are expected to provide benefits for sedentary invertebrates over longer time frames, with continued protection. These reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.

10 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Examination of equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit sharing finds that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity.
Abstract: Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) are coastal territories assigned to fishermen for the exclusive extraction of marine resources. Recent evidence shows that the incentives that arise from these systems can improve fisheries sustainability. Although research on TURFs has increased in recent years, important questions regarding the social and ecological dynamics underlying their success remain largely unanswered. In particular, in order to create new successful TURFs, it is critical to comprehend how fish movement over different distances affects the development of sustainable fishing practices within a TURF. In theory, excessive spillover outside a TURF will generate incentives to overharvest. However, many TURFs have proven successful even when targeted species move over distances far greater than the TURF's size. A common attribute among some of these successful systems is the presence of inter-TURF cooperation arrangements. This raises the question of how different levels and types of cooperation affect the motivations for overharvesting driven by the movement of fish outside the TURF. In this paper, we examine equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation (from partial to full) and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit-sharing. We find that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity. However, cooperation arrangements are unstable if the sharing agreement and biological asymmetries are misaligned. Remarkably, we find that asymmetry in the system can lead to the creation of voluntary no-take zones.

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Cites methods from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."

  • ...For consistency with previous application of similar models (White and Costello 2011, Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017), we use the inverse life span in years (Maxwell et al. 2007) as a measure of the species natural mortality....

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TL;DR: From all scenarios tested, only those that significantly reduce the high effort of the recreational fishing would allow the recovery of the most exploited stocks in the marine ecosystem in the short and medium-term.
Abstract: In this paper we consider what may happen to the marine ecosystem of Gran Canaria Island within the 2030 horizon, if fishing strategies different from those currently in place were implemented and we evaluate the effect of, for example, reduction of recreational-artisanal fishing, limitation of catches (e.g. total allowable catches, TAC), or spatial distribution of fishing sectors. From all scenarios tested, only those that significantly reduce the high effort of the recreational fishing would allow the recovery of the most exploited stocks in the marine ecosystem in the short and medium-term. Moreover, the best management strategy, in contribution to abundance, was obtained with a scenario that has a spatial partition of exploitation rights between artisanal and recreational fishermen and includes no-fishing zones (NTZ). This work is a first attempt to use spatial and temporal models to assess the effectiveness of alternative fishery policies in the Canary Islands.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results suggest small-scale fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful, as all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcomeThe collective action challenge.
Abstract: Small-scale fisheries collectively have a large ecological footprint and are key sources of food security, especially in developing countries. Many of the data-intensive approaches to fishery management are infeasible in these fisheries, but a strategy that has emerged to overcome these challenges is the establishment of territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs). In this approach, exclusive fishing zones are established for groups of stakeholders, which eliminates the race to fish with other groups. A key challenge, however, is setting the size of TURFs-too large and the number of stakeholders sharing them impedes collective action, and too small and the movement of target fish species in and out of the TURFs effectively removes the community's exclusive access. We assessed the size of 137 TURFs from across the globe relative to this design challenge by applying theoretical models that predict their performance. We estimated that roughly two-thirds of these TURFs were sized ideally to overcome the challenges posed by resource movement and fisher group size. However, for most of the remaining TURFs, all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcome the collective action challenge. Our results suggest these fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful.

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Cites background from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."

  • ...National governments from several countries have turned to such local-level governance institutions because of the potential benefits this strategy can provide to small-scale fishing communities (Agrawal 2005; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017; Nguyen et al. 2017)....

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  • ...To date, there are very few empirical studies of actual TURF performance (González et al. 2006; Gelcich et al. 2012; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017)....

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TL;DR: A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES.
Abstract: A major problem worldwide is the potential loss of fisheries, forests, and water resources Understanding of the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources is limited, because scientific disciplines use different concepts and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (SESs) Without a common framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate Until recently, accepted theory has assumed that resource users will never self-organize to maintain their resources and that governments must impose solutions Research in multiple disciplines, however, has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas some resource users have invested their time and energy to achieve sustainability A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES

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Journal ArticleDOI
Elinor Ostrom1Institutions (1)
Abstract: Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.

2,139 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
17 Feb 2011-Nature
TL;DR: Examining 130 co-managed fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources demonstrates the critical importance of prominent community leaders and robust social capital for successfully managing aquatic resources and securing the livelihoods of communities depending on them.
Abstract: general and multidisciplinary evaluations of co-management regimes and the conditions for social, economic and ecological success within such regimes are lacking. Here we examine 130 comanaged fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources. We identified strong leadership as the most important attribute contributing to success, followed by individual or community quotas, social cohesion and protected areas. Less important conditions included enforcement mechanisms, long-term management policies and life history of the resources. Fisheries were most successful when at least eight co-management attributes were present, showing a strong positive relationship between the number of these attributes and success, owing to redundancy in management regulations. Our results demonstrate the critical importance of

1,032 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Robert S. Pomeroy, Fikret Berkes1Institutions (1)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is discuss the role of government, primarily national government, in fisheries co-management. This paper investigates the critical role of decentralization in a strategy of co-management using a number of international cases. The experiences of co-management and decentralization provide for a number of policy implications to be drawn concerning the role of government.

653 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
John Beddington1, John Beddington2, D. J. Agnew1, D. J. Agnew2  +2 moreInstitutions (2)
22 Jun 2007-Science
TL;DR: The analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.
Abstract: The public perception of fisheries is that they are in crisis and have been for some time. Numerous scientific and popular articles have pointed to the failures of fisheries management that have caused this crisis. These are widely accepted to be overcapacity in fishing fleets, a failure to take the ecosystem effects of fishing into account, and a failure to enforce unpalatable but necessary reductions in fishing effort on fishing fleets and communities. However, the claims of some analysts that there is an inevitable decline in the status of fisheries is, we believe, incorrect. There have been successes in fisheries management, and we argue that the tools for appropriate management exist. Unfortunately, they have not been implemented widely. Our analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.

571 citations


"Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..." refers background in this paper

  • ...This type of measure could maintain harvests at constant levels when designed according to sound scientific information and appropriately enforced [4]....

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