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Journal ArticleDOI

Are Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) sufficiently large

TL;DR: Empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of T URFs of optimal size.
About: This article is published in Marine Policy.The article was published on 2017-04-01 and is currently open access. It has received 16 citations till now.

Summary (3 min read)

1. Introduction

  • Territorial use rights in fishing provide one or more fishermen with exclusive access to particular fishing grounds.
  • The relationship between specific TURF characteristics and performance is poorly understood.
  • Theory suggests that for TURFs to successfully enable the social conditions that lead to sustainable harvests, fishermen should have the necessary security in the exclusivity of access [39] .
  • Previous efforts [46] have looked at the theoretical effects of TURF size on yield, showing that larger TURFs should decrease the spillover of adults and larvae to surrounding areas and thereby create greater incentives for TURF owners to take actions that enhance longer term yields.
  • Two potential reasons for this discrepancycooperation and imperfect informationare explored, thereby identifying important areas for extensions to current TURF design theory.

1.1. Case studies

  • The case studies were selected from the three largest existing systems of TURFs -México, Japan and Chile (Fig. 1 ).
  • In all cases, attention was restricted to TURFs currently in operation.
  • The analysis examines species that are the main target of the TURFs and therefore the main drivers of their design.

1.1.1. México

  • The study is focused on The Pacifico Norte fisheries and fishing cooperatives, located along the northern part of the Pacific side of Baja California Sur as well as Cedros and Natividad Islands.
  • These cooperatives form part of a larger federation and were granted exclusive fishing zones in 1992 [22] .
  • The TURFs provide the cooperatives with exclusive access for 20 years (with the possibility of renewal) to several resources.
  • Spiny lobster (Panulirus interruptus, Palinuridae) and abalone (Haliotis fulgens, Haliotidae) are the most economically important [22] .
  • The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certified the sustainability of the spiny lobster fishery in 2004 [21].

1.1.2. Japan

  • Two different TURF systems from Japan were analyzed: the walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma, Gadidae) TURFs in the Hiyama region, located around southwestern Hokkaido island, and the sakuraebi (Sergia lucens, Sergestidae), TURFs in Suruga Bay, central Japan.
  • The TURFs in the Hiyama region corresponds to the exclusive fishing grounds (or sections) of the Nishi and Esashi-Kaminokuni cities.
  • This region is the main spawning ground for the northern Japan Sea stock of walleye pollock.
  • The TURFs in Suruga bay provide exclusive access to the sakuraebi, a meso-pelagic shrimp [20] that appears to be sedentary in this region.
  • The TURFs belong to the Yui Harbor Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA) and the Ohigawamachi FCA.

1.1.3. Chile

  • TURFs were included in Chile's legal framework for the management of benthic resources in 1991, and they have been key in recovering collapsed fisheries.
  • Studies have found a dramatic increase in abundance and individual size of targeted species compared to open access areas [16] .
  • Currently Chile has 707 TURFs in different stages of operation.
  • The analysis is focused on TURFs that manage loco (Concholepas concholepas, Muricidae) one of the most economically important resources for artisanal fishermen [7] and the main driver of the creation of TURFs system [16] .
  • Operative TURFs ("estado operativo") were identified using data from SUBPESCA [43] .

2. Methods

  • The two patch bio-economic model from White and Costello [46] was applied to each of the case studies.
  • In the model, the patches (i and j) represent TURFs that are owned by fishing cooperatives, each of which perfectly coordinates its harvest decisions within the TURF, allowing it to act as a single agent.
  • Separate the effects of larval dispersal and adult movement, two scenarios were examined.
  • The kernels were estimated using the model of Siegel et al.
  • Fig. 2 shows the levels of spillover resulting from different sizes of TURFs for each species.

3. Results and discussion

  • TURFs are the only TURFs in the first category with respect to the dispersal capacity of green abalone.
  • These theoretical projections suggest the biomass of abalone should trend upward, but the high levels of expected spillover in the Mexican (for spiny lobster), Japanese and Chilean TURF systems should (a) increase competition among TURFs leading to a race to fish, and (b) compromise biomass and yields.
  • Still, although with the available information it is not possible to calculate how far all these systems are from MSY in practice, several lines of evidence suggest that TURFs help avoid both the race to fish and compromised yields in the case studies analyzed.
  • In Chile (Fig. 4E ) landings have remained constant after the creation of the first TURFs in 1997, and biomass has increased since TURFs became the only source of legally landed loco in 2001 [42] .

Case study

  • Proportion of larvae exported (c) sharing and stewardship [11, 27] .
  • In Suruga Bay the cooperatives have developed an income pooling arrangement that has helped this fishery become one of the most profitable in Japan [38] .
  • In Chile, although some cooperation among TURFs exists [7] , it is unlikely that it will solve the spillover problem for two main reasons.
  • Therefore, although cooperation and catch limits may be resolving many problems associated with spillover in several settings, the success of TURFs in the face of extensive larval dispersal into areas of open access fisheries, such as the case studies from Chile, remains unresolved.
  • First, fishermen may not be aware of the effects of larval movement.

4. Conclusion

  • The expected effects of fish dispersal capacity on yields suggest that the analyzed TURFs are small relative to both adult and larval movement.
  • In some cases, this spillover and its consequent incentives for fishermen behavior may be driving overharvesting.
  • In several other settings small TURFs may still be successful because of inter-TURF cooperation.
  • Ignoring such complications can lead to a poor understanding of these systems and therefore lead to inefficient designs.
  • As such, further development and extension of these models is warranted so that they can play a more important and beneficial role in guiding decisions on marine spatial planning.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
23 Aug 2019-PLOS ONE
TL;DR: It is found that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches, and these reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.
Abstract: Coastal marine ecosystems provide livelihoods for small-scale fishers and coastal communities around the world. Small-scale fisheries face great challenges since they are difficult to monitor, enforce, and manage, which may lead to overexploitation. Combining territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) with no-take marine reserves to create TURF-reserves can improve the performance of small-scale fisheries by buffering fisheries from environmental variability and management errors, while ensuring that fishers reap the benefits of conservation investments. Since 2012, 18 old and new community-based Mexican TURF-reserves gained legal recognition thanks to a regulation passed in 2012; their effectiveness has not been formally evaluated. We combine causal inference techniques and the Social-Ecological Systems framework to provide a holistic evaluation of community-based TURF-reserves in three coastal communities in Mexico. We find that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches. A lack of clear ecological and socioeconomic effects likely results from a combination of factors. First, some of these reserves might be too young for the effects to show (reserves were 6-10 years old). Second, the reserves are not large enough to protect mobile species, like lobster. Third, variable and extreme oceanographic conditions have impacted harvested populations. Fourth, local fisheries are already well managed, and while reserves may protect populations within its boundaries, it is unlikely that reserves might have a detectable effect in catches. However, even small reserves are expected to provide benefits for sedentary invertebrates over longer time frames, with continued protection. These reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.

17 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Examination of equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit sharing finds that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity.
Abstract: Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) are coastal territories assigned to fishermen for the exclusive extraction of marine resources. Recent evidence shows that the incentives that arise from these systems can improve fisheries sustainability. Although research on TURFs has increased in recent years, important questions regarding the social and ecological dynamics underlying their success remain largely unanswered. In particular, in order to create new successful TURFs, it is critical to comprehend how fish movement over different distances affects the development of sustainable fishing practices within a TURF. In theory, excessive spillover outside a TURF will generate incentives to overharvest. However, many TURFs have proven successful even when targeted species move over distances far greater than the TURF's size. A common attribute among some of these successful systems is the presence of inter-TURF cooperation arrangements. This raises the question of how different levels and types of cooperation affect the motivations for overharvesting driven by the movement of fish outside the TURF. In this paper, we examine equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation (from partial to full) and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit-sharing. We find that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity. However, cooperation arrangements are unstable if the sharing agreement and biological asymmetries are misaligned. Remarkably, we find that asymmetry in the system can lead to the creation of voluntary no-take zones.

10 citations


Cites methods from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."

  • ...For consistency with previous application of similar models (White and Costello 2011, Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017), we use the inverse life span in years (Maxwell et al. 2007) as a measure of the species natural mortality....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results suggest small-scale fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful, as all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcomeThe collective action challenge.
Abstract: Small-scale fisheries collectively have a large ecological footprint and are key sources of food security, especially in developing countries. Many of the data-intensive approaches to fishery management are infeasible in these fisheries, but a strategy that has emerged to overcome these challenges is the establishment of territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs). In this approach, exclusive fishing zones are established for groups of stakeholders, which eliminates the race to fish with other groups. A key challenge, however, is setting the size of TURFs-too large and the number of stakeholders sharing them impedes collective action, and too small and the movement of target fish species in and out of the TURFs effectively removes the community's exclusive access. We assessed the size of 137 TURFs from across the globe relative to this design challenge by applying theoretical models that predict their performance. We estimated that roughly two-thirds of these TURFs were sized ideally to overcome the challenges posed by resource movement and fisher group size. However, for most of the remaining TURFs, all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcome the collective action challenge. Our results suggest these fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful.

9 citations


Cites background from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."

  • ...National governments from several countries have turned to such local-level governance institutions because of the potential benefits this strategy can provide to small-scale fishing communities (Agrawal 2005; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017; Nguyen et al. 2017)....

    [...]

  • ...To date, there are very few empirical studies of actual TURF performance (González et al. 2006; Gelcich et al. 2012; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the institutional robustness (e.g., presence of nested and decentralized enterprises as indicators of resilience to shocks) of over 40 years of fisheries management in Belize.

7 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
24 Jul 2009-Science
TL;DR: A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES.
Abstract: A major problem worldwide is the potential loss of fisheries, forests, and water resources Understanding of the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources is limited, because scientific disciplines use different concepts and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (SESs) Without a common framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate Until recently, accepted theory has assumed that resource users will never self-organize to maintain their resources and that governments must impose solutions Research in multiple disciplines, however, has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas some resource users have invested their time and energy to achieve sustainability A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES

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"Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..." refers background in this paper

  • ...The successful management of small-scale fisheries is often achieved by co-management arrangements [8,12], requiring a strong capacity for self-organization [17,28]....

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Journal ArticleDOI
Elinor Ostrom1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are better than rational by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest.
Abstract: Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.

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17 Feb 2011-Nature
TL;DR: Examining 130 co-managed fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources demonstrates the critical importance of prominent community leaders and robust social capital for successfully managing aquatic resources and securing the livelihoods of communities depending on them.
Abstract: general and multidisciplinary evaluations of co-management regimes and the conditions for social, economic and ecological success within such regimes are lacking. Here we examine 130 comanaged fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources. We identified strong leadership as the most important attribute contributing to success, followed by individual or community quotas, social cohesion and protected areas. Less important conditions included enforcement mechanisms, long-term management policies and life history of the resources. Fisheries were most successful when at least eight co-management attributes were present, showing a strong positive relationship between the number of these attributes and success, owing to redundancy in management regulations. Our results demonstrate the critical importance of

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22 Jun 2007-Science
TL;DR: The analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.
Abstract: The public perception of fisheries is that they are in crisis and have been for some time. Numerous scientific and popular articles have pointed to the failures of fisheries management that have caused this crisis. These are widely accepted to be overcapacity in fishing fleets, a failure to take the ecosystem effects of fishing into account, and a failure to enforce unpalatable but necessary reductions in fishing effort on fishing fleets and communities. However, the claims of some analysts that there is an inevitable decline in the status of fisheries is, we believe, incorrect. There have been successes in fisheries management, and we argue that the tools for appropriate management exist. Unfortunately, they have not been implemented widely. Our analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.

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"Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..." refers background in this paper

  • ...This type of measure could maintain harvests at constant levels when designed according to sound scientific information and appropriately enforced [4]....

    [...]

Frequently Asked Questions (11)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "Are territorial use rights in fisheries (turfs) sufficiently large?" ?

This study explores the expected effects of existing TURF sizes on yields for TURF systems in Chile, México and Japan. These analyses suggest that either existing models of TURF performance are incomplete or that there is significant scope for improved performance with altered TURF designs. Considering these alternatives, empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of TURFs of optimal size. 

One hypothesis to reconcile these mismatches between predictions and practice is that cooperation among TURFs may account for the better than expected performance of these TURF systems. 

The successful management of small-scale fisheries is often achieved by co-management arrangements [8,12], requiring a strong capacity for self-organization [17,28]. 

The analysis is focused on the resulting Nash equilibrium, highlighting the consequences of competitive behavior expected to result from high levels of spillover (see [46] for further details). 

By securing exclusive access to marine resources, TURFs can enable the conditions necessary for the development of successful co-management schemes [16, 17, 30, 39]. 

They have existed for centuries in many coastal areas around the world and have been shown to be successful as a form of access right, particularly for small-scale fisheries [16, 29, 44]. 

Since larval export only affects future yields, and the delay can be quite substantial for slowly maturing species, the perceived costs may be greatly discounted relative to the immediate costs of adult dispersal. 

Since biomass calculations are not publicly available for Chilean loco, it was assumed that the assigned TAC [42], which is calculated in monitoring efforts in each TURF [16], represents 25% of the biomass. 

A lack of knowledge about larval dispersal may reduce the resulting incentives for overharvesting since, by ignoring the connection with outside areas, fishermen might not feel the need to rush for fish. 

Since the model explored here does not include age structure in the fish population, the impacts of larval dispersal have no lag and therefore may be greatly overestimated. 

Previous efforts [46] have looked at the theoretical effects of TURF size on yield, showing that larger TURFs should decrease the spillover of adults and larvae to surrounding areas and thereby create greater incentives for TURF owners to take actions that enhance longer term yields.