TL;DR: Empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of T URFs of optimal size.
Abstract: Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) are gaining renewed attention as a potential tool for sustainable fisheries management in small-scale fisheries. This growing popularity comes despite the fact that there are still unresolved questions about the most effective TURF designs. One of the key questions is the role of TURF size in their efficacy both from ecological and social standpoints. This study explores the expected effects of existing TURF sizes on yields for TURF systems in Chile, Mexico and Japan. The expected effect of larval dispersal and adult movement on yields was simulated for TURFs in each system. The results show that the analyzed TURF systems fall into three main categories: (a) TURFs that are of adequate size to eliminate the expected negative effects of both adult and larval movement, (b) TURFs that are large enough to eliminate the expected negative effects of adult movement, but not the effects of larval dispersal, and c) TURFs that are too small to eliminate the expected impacts on yield of both adult and larval movement. These analyses suggest that either existing models of TURF performance are incomplete or that there is significant scope for improved performance with altered TURF designs. Considering these alternatives, empirical evidence from the TURFs deemed too small suggests that complementary management tools can enhance TURF performance when natural or social constraints prevent the construction of TURFs of optimal size.
TL;DR: It is found that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches, and these reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.
Abstract: Coastal marine ecosystems provide livelihoods for small-scale fishers and coastal communities around the world. Small-scale fisheries face great challenges since they are difficult to monitor, enforce, and manage, which may lead to overexploitation. Combining territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) with no-take marine reserves to create TURF-reserves can improve the performance of small-scale fisheries by buffering fisheries from environmental variability and management errors, while ensuring that fishers reap the benefits of conservation investments. Since 2012, 18 old and new community-based Mexican TURF-reserves gained legal recognition thanks to a regulation passed in 2012; their effectiveness has not been formally evaluated. We combine causal inference techniques and the Social-Ecological Systems framework to provide a holistic evaluation of community-based TURF-reserves in three coastal communities in Mexico. We find that, overall, reserves have not yet achieved their stated goals of increasing the density of lobster and other benthic invertebrates, nor increasing lobster catches. A lack of clear ecological and socioeconomic effects likely results from a combination of factors. First, some of these reserves might be too young for the effects to show (reserves were 6-10 years old). Second, the reserves are not large enough to protect mobile species, like lobster. Third, variable and extreme oceanographic conditions have impacted harvested populations. Fourth, local fisheries are already well managed, and while reserves may protect populations within its boundaries, it is unlikely that reserves might have a detectable effect in catches. However, even small reserves are expected to provide benefits for sedentary invertebrates over longer time frames, with continued protection. These reserves may provide a foundation for establishing additional, larger marine reserves needed to effectively conserve mobile species.
TL;DR: Examination of equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit sharing finds that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity.
Abstract: Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) are coastal territories assigned to fishermen for the exclusive extraction of marine resources. Recent evidence shows that the incentives that arise from these systems can improve fisheries sustainability. Although research on TURFs has increased in recent years, important questions regarding the social and ecological dynamics underlying their success remain largely unanswered. In particular, in order to create new successful TURFs, it is critical to comprehend how fish movement over different distances affects the development of sustainable fishing practices within a TURF. In theory, excessive spillover outside a TURF will generate incentives to overharvest. However, many TURFs have proven successful even when targeted species move over distances far greater than the TURF's size. A common attribute among some of these successful systems is the presence of inter-TURF cooperation arrangements. This raises the question of how different levels and types of cooperation affect the motivations for overharvesting driven by the movement of fish outside the TURF. In this paper, we examine equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation (from partial to full) and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit-sharing. We find that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity. However, cooperation arrangements are unstable if the sharing agreement and biological asymmetries are misaligned. Remarkably, we find that asymmetry in the system can lead to the creation of voluntary no-take zones.
Cites methods from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."
...For consistency with previous application of similar models (White and Costello 2011, Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017), we use the inverse life span in years (Maxwell et al. 2007) as a measure of the species natural mortality....
TL;DR: From all scenarios tested, only those that significantly reduce the high effort of the recreational fishing would allow the recovery of the most exploited stocks in the marine ecosystem in the short and medium-term.
Abstract: In this paper we consider what may happen to the marine ecosystem of Gran Canaria Island within the 2030 horizon, if fishing strategies different from those currently in place were implemented and we evaluate the effect of, for example, reduction of recreational-artisanal fishing, limitation of catches (e.g. total allowable catches, TAC), or spatial distribution of fishing sectors. From all scenarios tested, only those that significantly reduce the high effort of the recreational fishing would allow the recovery of the most exploited stocks in the marine ecosystem in the short and medium-term. Moreover, the best management strategy, in contribution to abundance, was obtained with a scenario that has a spatial partition of exploitation rights between artisanal and recreational fishermen and includes no-fishing zones (NTZ). This work is a first attempt to use spatial and temporal models to assess the effectiveness of alternative fishery policies in the Canary Islands.
TL;DR: The results suggest small-scale fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful, as all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcomeThe collective action challenge.
Abstract: Small-scale fisheries collectively have a large ecological footprint and are key sources of food security, especially in developing countries. Many of the data-intensive approaches to fishery management are infeasible in these fisheries, but a strategy that has emerged to overcome these challenges is the establishment of territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs). In this approach, exclusive fishing zones are established for groups of stakeholders, which eliminates the race to fish with other groups. A key challenge, however, is setting the size of TURFs-too large and the number of stakeholders sharing them impedes collective action, and too small and the movement of target fish species in and out of the TURFs effectively removes the community's exclusive access. We assessed the size of 137 TURFs from across the globe relative to this design challenge by applying theoretical models that predict their performance. We estimated that roughly two-thirds of these TURFs were sized ideally to overcome the challenges posed by resource movement and fisher group size. However, for most of the remaining TURFs, all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcome the collective action challenge. Our results suggest these fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful.
Cites background from "Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..."
...National governments from several countries have turned to such local-level governance institutions because of the potential benefits this strategy can provide to small-scale fishing communities (Agrawal 2005; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017; Nguyen et al. 2017)....
...To date, there are very few empirical studies of actual TURF performance (González et al. 2006; Gelcich et al. 2012; Aceves-Bueno et al. 2017)....
TL;DR: A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES.
Abstract: A major problem worldwide is the potential loss of fisheries, forests, and water resources Understanding of the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources is limited, because scientific disciplines use different concepts and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (SESs) Without a common framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate Until recently, accepted theory has assumed that resource users will never self-organize to maintain their resources and that governments must impose solutions Research in multiple disciplines, however, has found that some government policies accelerate resource destruction, whereas some resource users have invested their time and energy to achieve sustainability A general framework is used to identify 10 subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of self-organization in efforts to achieve a sustainable SES
"Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..." refers background in this paper
...The successful management of small-scale fisheries is often achieved by co-management arrangements [8,12], requiring a strong capacity for self-organization [17,28]....
Abstract: Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.
TL;DR: Examining 130 co-managed fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources demonstrates the critical importance of prominent community leaders and robust social capital for successfully managing aquatic resources and securing the livelihoods of communities depending on them.
Abstract: general and multidisciplinary evaluations of co-management regimes and the conditions for social, economic and ecological success within such regimes are lacking. Here we examine 130 comanaged fisheries in a wide range of countries with different degrees of development, ecosystems, fishing sectors and type of resources. We identified strong leadership as the most important attribute contributing to success, followed by individual or community quotas, social cohesion and protected areas. Less important conditions included enforcement mechanisms, long-term management policies and life history of the resources. Fisheries were most successful when at least eight co-management attributes were present, showing a strong positive relationship between the number of these attributes and success, owing to redundancy in management regulations. Our results demonstrate the critical importance of
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is discuss the role of government, primarily national government, in fisheries co-management. This paper investigates the critical role of decentralization in a strategy of co-management using a number of international cases. The experiences of co-management and decentralization provide for a number of policy implications to be drawn concerning the role of government.
TL;DR: The analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.
Abstract: The public perception of fisheries is that they are in crisis and have been for some time. Numerous scientific and popular articles have pointed to the failures of fisheries management that have caused this crisis. These are widely accepted to be overcapacity in fishing fleets, a failure to take the ecosystem effects of fishing into account, and a failure to enforce unpalatable but necessary reductions in fishing effort on fishing fleets and communities. However, the claims of some analysts that there is an inevitable decline in the status of fisheries is, we believe, incorrect. There have been successes in fisheries management, and we argue that the tools for appropriate management exist. Unfortunately, they have not been implemented widely. Our analysis suggests that management authorities need to develop legally enforceable and tested harvest strategies, coupled with appropriate rights-based incentives to the fishing community, for the future of fisheries to be better than their past.
"Are Territorial Use Rights in Fishe..." refers background in this paper
...This type of measure could maintain harvests at constant levels when designed according to sound scientific information and appropriately enforced ....