Journal ArticleDOI
Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters
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This article proved Arrow's impossibility theorem for social choice theory by showing that his other conditions imply the contradictory of the condition that the set of individuals is nonempty and finite, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the sets of individuals are infinite.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 1970-03-01. It has received 217 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Arrow's impossibility theorem & Unrestricted domain.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
TL;DR: A recent survey of social choice theory can be found in this article, where a categorization of interpersonal aggregation problems into four distinct types that seem to require varying treatment but typically do not receive it is discussed.
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Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of collective preference aggregation in a voting system, where the individual preferences take the form of (total) orderings of the alternatives, and the collective preference is to be expressed as a total weak ordering (i.e., ties allowed).
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Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators☆
Alan Kirman,Dieter Sondermann +1 more
Book
Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation
TL;DR: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is applied to single-valued and multi-valued elections and shows that elections with variable agendas are more likely to be fraudulent than those with fixed outcomes.
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Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle
TL;DR: A version of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is proved without assuming either the Pareto Principle or its antecedents, the Positive Association of Social and Individual Values, and Citizens' Sovereignty as discussed by the authors.
References
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Book
Social Choice and Individual Values
TL;DR: Saari as mentioned in this paper introduced Arrow's Theorem and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science, and introduced a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, introducing Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
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Social Choice and Individual Values.
Leo A. Goodman,Kenneth J. Arrow +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a destination search and find the appropriate manuals for their products, providing you with many Social Choice And Individual Values. You can find the manual you are interested in in printed form or even consider it online.
Book
Utility theory for decision making
TL;DR: This book presents a concise yet mathematically complete treatment of modern utility theories that covers nonprobabilistic preference theory, the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility theory and its extensions, and the joint axiomatization of utility and subjective probability.
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The existence of social welfare functions
TL;DR: The problem of aggregating individual preference orderings to form a social ordering took a new turn when Arrow organized the subject abstractly as mentioned in this paper, and his celebrated theorem that five plausible conditions on the method of aggregation are inconsistent.
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Arrow's proof and the logic of preference
TL;DR: In this article, a critique of Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution is presented, arguing that the transitivity of indifference is untenable and that it does not serve Arrow's purposes.