As Wind, Thunder and Lightning: Local Resistance to China’s Resource-led Diplomacy in the Christian Philippines

TL;DR: In this article, the authors focused on a mineral-rich region in the Greater China region and focused on the mining of coal and gold in the region, where transnational Chinese investors from the region have been seeking natural and mineral resources in foreign countries.

Abstract: In recent years, transnational Chinese investors from the Greater China region have been seeking natural and mineral resources in foreign countries. This paper focuses on a mineral-rich region in t...

Summary

Introduction

• In the following pages, the paper will answer this question by first engaging with the debate on China’s globalization versus South East Asian sovereignty.
• (1) Executive Order No 270, 16 January 2004, ‘National policy agenda on revitalizing mining in the Philippines’, Office of the President, Manila, also known as 8 Sources.

As wind, thunder and lightning: forms of resistance against magnetite

• (black sand) mining19 in the Cagayan Valley In the Cagayan Valley, the Regional Development Council of Region 2 (RDC02) held a mining forum in Tuguegarao city in September 2005 on emerging developments and public concerns.
• The forum concluded that it was necessary for the Philippine state authorities to study carefully ways to ‘address the environmental threats of mining’ and be prepared to respond to the ‘impact of mining on affected communities’ before fully involving local ‘Bishop slams government’s mining policy’, Community Struggle, 30 December 2008.
• (13) ‘Chinese businessmen look for mining investments’, Business World, 29 December 2009.
• Since magnetite is widely found in the black sand beaches along the seashores of northern Luzon and the Cagayan River banks, it is known locally as ‘black sand mining’.
• As with wind, thunder and lightning, the authors like to chase them, but they will never be able to hold them – democratic struggle is by nature ‘ever-contesting’ and ‘never-ending’ (Ronas, 2011; Wong, 2009).

As wind: airing public criticisms

• Due to the absence of a well maintained public knowledge base for the mining industry (Israel, 2010), mining in the Philippines has been criticized by the civic sector for causing environmental destruction, corruption, human rights violations and sidelining the interests of locally affected communities (Asuncion, 2005; Doyle et al, 2007; Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment and Defend Patrimony!.
• (1) ‘22 Koreans rescued after ship loaded with minerals sinks off Cagayan’, GMANews, also known as 34 Sources.
• (1) ‘Ship carrying magnetite stokes fear on Cagayan mining’, Inquirer Northern Luzon, 2 January 2010, also known as 37 Sources.
• The foreign magnetite mining activities along the Cagayan riverbanks and seashores had been a major source of controversy due to public concerns over environmental destruction, threats to the livelihoods of local farmers and fishermen, allegations of illegal mineral extraction and the collaborative plundering of foreign mining companies with government officials.

As thunder: organizing public protests against extrajudicial killings

• On 1 March 2010, while Taruc was running against Juan Ponce Enrile Jr (son of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile) for congressman in the first district of Cagayan province, one of Taruc’s aides was shot dead by two motorcycle-riding gunmen.
• On 30 November 2009, Pedrito Tabaco and his relative Alfredo Rabit were gunned down together in Buguey.
• 41 Environmental groups and the Catholic Church urged the Philippine government and the wider public to address the extrajudicial killings of the anti-mining 38 Source: ‘Mayor denies Aparri as source of magnetite sand’, Philippine Information Agency press release, 5 January 2010. (3) ‘Gov’t asked: probe Cagayan anti-mining activist killings’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 May 2010.
• They urged the government to ban mining – to no avail.43 Consequently, the newly elected President Benigno Aquino III was criticized for being either irresponsive or a supporter of foreign mining.

As lightning: Philippine communist guerrillas strike back

• While warning the Philippine public against the foreign mining companies who 42 Sources: (1) ‘Justice to all human rights victims and anti-mining martyrs!’.
• Through the social networks of these individuals, the authors further contacted the targeted communities to conduct the interviews discreetly in non-public areas – for example, inside residences during the late afternoon and evening.
• First, it is an undeniable fact that China has launched a resource-led global diplomacy and encroached into resource-rich areas in the developing world (Acharya, 2008; Downs, 2007; Gill et al, 2007; Li, 2007).

Figures

Table 2. Feature summary of interviews held in Barangay Rio, San Antonio, Cagayan province.

Table 1. Feature summary of interviews held in Barangay Mares, San Antonio, Cagayan province.

Full text

Citation for published version:
Wong, PN, Aquino, K, Lara-De Leon, K & So, SYF 2013, 'As Wind, Thunder and Lightning: Local Resistance to
China’s Resource-led Diplomacy in the Christian Philippines', South East Asia Research, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 281-
302. https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2013.0150
DOI:
10.5367/sear.2013.0150
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2013
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South East Asia Research, 21, 2, pp 281–302 doi: 10.5367/sear.2013.0150
As wind, thunder and lightning: local
resistance to China’s resource-led
diplomacy in the Christian Philippines
1
Pak Nung Wong, Kathlene Aquino, Kristinne
Lara-De Leon and Sylvia Yuen Fun So
Abstract: In recent years, transnational Chinese investors from the Greater
China region have been seeking natural and mineral resources in foreign coun-
tries. This paper focuses on a mineral-rich region in the Philippines where
China’s resource-led diplomacy was first launched in 2007. Although foreign
Chinese mining companies have made inroads into mineral-rich local commu-
nities, they have also encountered resistance from non-state actors, causing
their operations to be disrupted and suspended. The authors argue that the
local reception of China’s resource-led diplomacy can be attributed to two
factors. First, in light of the debate on ‘China’s globalization versus South
East Asian state sovereignty’, the growing strength of the Philippine state in
resisting transnational mining endeavours hinges on the democratic space
constituted by both state and non-state actors, resulting from political decen-
tralization and active social activism. Second, it shows that the transnational
Chinese actors have an insufficient knowledge base, in which they privilege a
top-down state-centric approach that reinforces the patrimonial rule of the
Philippine politicians. The authors conclude, first, that such patrimonial rule
is largely made possible through the provincial governor as the key agent con-
necting the national state authority, local government units, mining operators/
investors and the affected villagers. Second, local resistance to resource-led
patrimonial rule hinges on the formation of Philippine democratic space. This
space remains transient and unpredictable in nature, and so cannot be assimi-
lated into the patrimonial character of the Philippine state. Such democratic
struggle is like wind, thunder and lightning – hard to chase, hard to catch.
Keywords: security studies; black sand (magnetite) mining; China’s resource-
led diplomacy; Chinese foreign investments; Philippines
Author details: Dr Pak Nung Wong (corresponding author) is with the Department
of Applied Social Studies of the City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue,
Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR. E-mail: pnwong@cityu.edu.hk. Kathlene Aquino is
with the College of Business, Entrepreneurship and Accountancy at Cagayan State
University, Andrews Campus, Tuguegarao City, Philippines. E-mail: darkcloudsheavy
rain@yahoo.com. Kristinne Lara-De Leon is with the College of Arts and Sciences
at Cagayan State University, Carig Campus, Tuguegarao City, Philippines. E-mail:
kristinnejoyce@gmail.com. Dr Sylvia Yuen Fun So is with the Community College
of City University at the City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR. E-mail:
sylsoyf@yahoo.com.hk.
1
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the Editor of South East Asia
Research and of the anonymous reviewers. This research is supported by General Research Fund
(Grant No 456610) of the Research Grant Council, Hong Kong.

282 South East Asia Research
From 2 to 17 December 2007, Chen Laiping, Consul and Head of Post of the
Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag city, led a historic diplo-
matic delegation to the once communist-insurgent-infested Cagayan Valley. There
he visited the Cagayan Provincial Governor, Alvaro Antonio, and the Tuguegarao
City Mayor, Delfin Ting. He came to ‘explore and promote the prospects for bilat-
eral exchange and cooperation in terms of agriculture, mining industry and etc’.
2
Afterwards, Consul Chen proceeded to other provinces in the northern Philip-
pines, including the grain-rich Isabela province where Governor Grace Padaca
‘introduced the vantage of rice and corn producing’ to the Chinese diplomatic
delegation.
3
In the following months, various Chinese and Taiwanese joint min-
ing and agro-business ventures landed in the Cagayan Valley.
The above ethnographic snapshots raise a timely research question for scholars
of global Chinese studies who are concerned about China’s reach into various
parts of the world: how could we account for China’s resource-led local diplo-
macy and transnational Chinese mining investments in the Philippines? This
question will set the terrain of this paper. In the following pages, the paper will
answer this question by first engaging with the debate on China’s globalization
versus South East Asian sovereignty. Here we argue that a more comprehensive
understanding of China’s resource-led diplomacy and transnational endeavours is
not possible without approaching them from the perspectives of local dynamics
and resistance, which constitute a democratic space in which a range of societal
forces compete for legitimacy with state officials. In light of the various agendas
and concerns of these forces, the paper draws on the grass-roots voices from two
mining-affected villages in Cagayan province to show how foreign Chinese min-
ing ventures have operated and have been locally resisted. In conclusion, we suggest
that local resistance to China’s resource-led diplomacy in the Christian Philip-
pines can largely be attributed to two factors. First, the top-down policy
implementation approach adopted by Philippine government officials caused much
unrest and conflict among local populations. Second, there was a shortage of know-
ledge about local politics on the part of the Chinese state actors and investors.
China’s economic globalization and South East Asian state sovereignty
China’s post-Second Word War political and economic relations with the Philip-
pines and South East Asia as a whole have largely been driven by its national
agenda to promote internal political unity and economic development. With a
gradual incorporation into the global capitalist system and vibrant economic de-
velopment, China’s progress into South East Asia signals a new era, starting from
the end of the millennium (Harvey, 2006; Ong, 2006). During the Mao period
(1950s–70s), China exported various types of support to the peasant insurgency
2
Source: ‘Chen Laiping visited the province of Cagayan’, news release of the Consulate of the
People’s Republic of China in Laoag, 5 December 2007.
3
Sources: (1) ‘Chen Laiping visited province of Isabela’, news release of the Consulate of the
People’s Republic of China in Laoag, 5 December 2007. (2) ‘Chen Laiping visited the province
of Pangasinan’, news release of the Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, 18
December 2007. (3) ‘Chen Laiping visited the province of La Union’, news release of the Consu-
late of the People’s Republic of China in Laoag, 18 December 2007. (4) ‘Chen Laiping inspected
PNP Force of Region One’, news release of the Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in
Laoag, 18 December 2007.

Local resistance to China’s diplomacy in the Philippines 283
and communist movements in the Philippines and South East Asia in general
(Appleton, 1959; Landsdale, 1972; Macmillan, 2007). In an attempt to rescue its
devastated domestic economy in the 1980s and 1990s, China aimed to absorb
South East Asian Chinese capital to facilitate its own economic development with
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘open door policy’ (Wong, 2002). Large overseas Chinese busi-
nesses were particularly encouraged to conduct foreign direct investment in their
own ancestral provinces in China, with Special Economic Zones (SEZs) deliber-
ately being set up in the southern regions, such as Fujian and Guangdong provinces
(Howell, 2000; Wang, 2001). However, following the ASEAN–China Free Trade
Agreement signed in 2002, recent trends show that China has been engaging in
bilateral trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) coun-
tries in order to fuel its industrialization and modernization programmes. According
to ASEAN statistics, China was consistently among the top four largest trading
partners in 2008 and 2009.
4
In 2008, China was even the largest exporting country
to ASEAN.
5
In the post-millennial era, China’s outreaching interactions with
ASEAN countries are expected to flourish (Yeung, 2006). In short, China has
become a major foreign direct investor in South East Asia in its own right.
Furthermore, one prominent aspect of China’s economic globalization is that of
its strategy on resource security. The continuous growth of the country since its
economic reform in 1978 has exerted increasingly large demands on various kinds
of resources including minerals, oil and agricultural products. The internal de-
mand accelerated by the encouragement of industrialization in the last two decades
has heavily exceeded the national supply and has made China one of the leading
consumers of these resources internationally (Alden, 2011, pp 179–181). The sig-
nificance of a resource-led diplomacy was further marked by the publication of a
White Paper on Energy and a White Paper on Diplomacy in 2007 and 2008 re-
spectively. In order to secure its consumption of minerals in the long run, China
has strategically developed diplomatic relations with Africa and many South East
Asian countries.
In the context of this regional background, this paper engages with the ‘globali-
zation versus sovereignty’ debate. On the one hand, proponents of economic
globalization have suggested that transnational capitalistic endeavours undermine
state sovereignty by weakening the control of the state over its population and
territory, eroding policy-making autonomy, undermining law enforcement capa-
bility, challenging political legitimacy and even altering its body politic. On the
other hand, proponents of state sovereignty have suggested that the state may act
autonomously in relation to globalizing forces and actively collaborate with and
utilize them to further its own governance, development and state-building agenda.
By putting this scholarly debate in the context of the Philippine mining industry,
this paper will examine whether Philippine state sovereignty has been compro-
mised by transnational Chinese mining ventures. Before embarking upon the case
study, a review of the relevant existing literature will be provided.
Does China’s economic globalization undermine South East Asian state sover-
eignty? On the one hand, various scholars have argued that intensifying global
capital flows, advancing mass communications technology and proliferating
4
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2010), ‘ASEAN Statistics’, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Tables 19
& 20, website: http://aseansec.org/19230.htm (last accessed 29 June 2010).
5
Ibid, Table 21.

284 South East Asia Research
transnational movements of migrants and commodities have made the territorial
boundaries of nation-states more transparent and porous (Ohmae, 1999; Sklair,
2001). Conceivably, state sovereignty is weakened by globalizing actors and
transnational forces. Apart from the blurring of territorial borders, the legal and
policy measures and body politic of states have been compromised and altered by
transnational forces. On the other hand, confronted by competing arrays of global-
ization processes, it is argued that nation-states have been successfully reaffirming
their sovereignty, not just by defending their territorial intactness, but also by
reasserting political legitimacy and control over their economies and societies
(Ong, 2005; Sassen, 1996; Vertovec, 1999). Many scholars do not view globaliza-
tion as a process that weakens or strengthens states; instead, they have pointed out
that there are regional variations and local culturally specific practices by which
the states can adapt to complex global changes without compromising their sov-
ereignty (Agnew, 2009, pp 212–216; Taylor and Flint, 2000, pp 288–309; Yeung,
2000, pp 11–12). In short, globalization involves complex processes in which
transnational networks may constitute ethnicity-based transnational circuits for a
new global division of labour. Various scholars have therefore suggested that South
East Asia may be considered a transnational field where the transnational Chinese
circuits meet the sovereign states (Castells, 1996, pp 106–115; Mittelman, 2000,
pp 49–54). In his analysis of the dynamics between China and ASEAN, Shambaugh
(2005, pp 16–17) further argues that a ‘multi-textured and multi-layered hybrid
system’ characterizes the era of accelerating globalization. The system is consti-
tuted by the webs of various non-state actors operating at the societal level, which
‘bind societies together in complex and interdependent ways’.
An effective and informed response to this debate would not be possible with-
out conducting contextualized case study research in a South East Asian country,
such as the northern Philippines. The following pages will argue that China’s
globalization does not undermine Philippine state sovereignty. In contrast, Philip-
pine state sovereignty at the local level has even been reinforced through resisting
foreign Chinese transnational investments. Moreover, it is determined that post-
Marcos/1986 Philippine political decentralization measures – through state-building
instruments such as the Local Government Code (Philippines Republic, 1991) –
made such sovereignty-reinforcing resistance possible in three respects (Wong,
2006).
First, although the president sets the overall policy for mining, post-Marcos/
1986 political decentralization has largely delegated the legal and executive au-
thority to broker mining investment and to grant mining licences to the provincial
governor at the local level. The Philippine Mining Act and the Local Government
Code give provincial governors the authority to issue mining permits for large or
small-scale mining and quarrying, after coordinating with the responsible national
and local government offices.
6
In other words, the provincial governor is the key
collaborative agent of domestic and foreign mining investments in the Philip-
pines.
Second, such a clearly stipulated legal framework of political decentralization
6
Local Government Code of 1991 does not include specific provisions regarding mining arrange-
ments (either domestic or foreign). However, it states that it is the within the authority of the
provincial governor to issue mining permits (Section 465) and determine tax shares (Section
138).

Frequently asked questions

Q1. How many representatives from the Cagayan Valley were invited to the forum?

An estimated 120 representatives from local government units, the Catholic Church, the legal sector, private sector and various people’s organizations were invited to exchange views. 

Q2. Why is the anti-mining movement criticized by the civic sector?

Due to the absence of a well maintained public knowledge base for the mining industry (Israel, 2010), mining in the Philippines has been criticized by the civic sector for causing environmental destruction, corruption, human rights violations and sidelining the interests of locally affected communities (Asuncion, 2005; Doyle et al, 2007; Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment and Defend Patrimony! 

Q3. What are the main forms of anti-mining resistance?

Within the anti-mining democratic space, there are three main forms of anti-mining resistance, which are symbolized by wind, thunder and lightning, which the authors attempted to follow (Miranda et al, 2011). 

Q4. What are the main themes of the case studies?

Although foreign mining ventures from the Greater China region in the provincial Philippines seem to have stirred up state–society conflicts, case studies rather revealingly suggest that Chinese magnetite mining has reactivated two different and competing forms of Philippine governance repertoires: democratic and patrimonial. 

Q5. What was the main argument for magnetite mining in the Philippines?

Proponents of magnetite mining in the Philippines claimed that it would generate benefits for local communities and foster national economic development. 

Q6. What happened to the residents of Barangay Mares?

When the residents of Barangay Mares gradually realized that the black sand mining would eventually submerge the beaches and their farmlands, they protested against the magnetite mining operation. 

Q7. How many North Korean seamen were rescued?

Twenty-two North Korean seamen were successfully rescued by Philippine coastguards after their ship ran aground outside the seawaters of the coastal municipality of Claveria in Cagayan province. 

Q8. What was the main reason for the removal of the black sands?

The vessels would transport the black sands either southwards to a point somewhere along the Cagayan River for industrial processing, or ship them to a foreign destination through the South China Sea. 

Q9. How many people staged a rally in Gonzaga on 12 March 2011?

Shortly after a step-up statement issued by the NPA to fight the foreign mining and quarrying firms in all towns in Cagayan province, on 12 March 2011, some 2,000 people staged a rally in Gonzaga’s town centre against Huaxia’s entry and expressed their disappointment in the political leadership. 

Q10. What was the primary stakeholder in the establishment of Barangay Rio?

It also became a burden for them to organize a unified resistance against the municipal mayor, who was seen as the primary stakeholder in maintaining Barangay Rio as a major mining site for higher-ranking officials and foreign investors. 

Q11. Why were some residents told to move to another place?

some residents were even told that they would be asked to move to another place because there were black sands underneath their houses. 

Q12. What was the main reason for the residents’ disapproval?

Even though the residents denied that the mining would benefit them in the long run, a major reason for this common self-restraint in expressing an anti-mining opinion to the mayor was that the mining operations indeed brought some employment opportunities to the people of Barangay Rio, where the recent decade has witnessed a significant decline in the fishing harvests in the river and the sea.61 Nonetheless, a resident also aired his grievances against the provincial governor and the mayor to us:‘Governor ken Mayor ke binayadan da ti million tapnu makamina da ditoy eh baybayan da met nga madadael awan bibyang da. 

Q13. What was the MGB’s response to the residents?

In view of the continued opposition from the residents, the MGB again issued a stoppage order in June 2010 to San You to refrain from mining and processing activities. 

Q14. Why did the residents of Barangay Mares express an anti-mining stance?

Although the residents were aware that more than 30 locals were employed as workers at the mining site, they all expressed an anti-mining stance because of the same fear that they shared with the residents of Barangay Mares – submerging of the riverbank and seashores, which would, in56 Source: Interviewee No 4, Barangay Mares, San Antonio, Cagayan province, Philippines, April– May 2011. 

Q15. How many votes did the barangay chief get?

Despite the fact that the opinions of the barangay councillors were divided (four votes for and four votes against mining), because of the view that the barangay would receive monetary shares and additional taxes from the mining company, the barangay chief eventually came up with a resolution and permitted the operation to take place. 

Q16. What did the residents feel was deflected by the municipal leadership?

The residents also felt that their wishes and intentions to express their views (to stop the mining) were either consistently deflected or implicitly discouraged by the municipal leadership. 

Q17. Why did the mayor frequently conduct meetings with the residents of Barangay Mares?

In response to the concerns of the local people and in defence of the mining operation, he frequently conducted meetings with the Barangay Rio residents. 

Q18. What was the source of the rift in Cagayan?

(2) ‘Foreign, local firms raid Cagayan for magnetite’, Alyansa Tigil Mina, 5 April 2011.28 Source: ‘Mining rift in Cagayan intensifies’, GMANews.TV, 14 February 2009. 

Q19. What is the main difference between the case study and the one from the northern Philippine province?

The above case study from a mineral-rich northern Philippine province further confirms that the state actors and business enterprises from the Greater China region have indeed started to invest in South East Asia for a new phase of development: that is, the procurement of natural resources such as minerals.