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Auctions and Bidding
01 Jan 1986-Journal of Economic Literature (American Economic Association)-Vol. 8601, Iss: 2, pp 699-738
TL;DR: Hayek as mentioned in this paper argued that the problem of rational economic order is determined by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Abstract: ONE PARTY TO AN EXCHANGE often knows something relevant to the transaction that the other party does not know. Such asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic activity: for example, in the relationship between employer and employee when the employee's effort cannot be monitored perfectly; between the stockholders and the manager of a firm; between insurer and insured; between a regulated firm and the regulatory agency; between the supplier and the consumers of a public good; between a socialist firm and the central planner; or (as is the subject of this paper) between buyer and seller when the value of the item is uncertain. Forty years ago, F. A. Hayek criticized theories that purport to describe the price system but start from the assumption that individuals have symmetric information: The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945, p. 519)
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Book•
15 Dec 2008TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
2,068Â citations
Patent•
24 Nov 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a method and apparatus for effectuating bilateral buyer-driven commerce, allowing prospective buyers of goods and services to communicate a binding purchase offer globally to potential sellers, for sellers conveniently to search for relevant buyer purchase offers, and for sellers potentially to bind a buyer to a contract based on the buyer's purchase offer.
Abstract: The present invention is a method and apparatus for effectuating bilateral buyer-driven commerce. The present invention allows prospective buyers of goods and services to communicate a binding purchase offer globally to potential sellers, for sellers conveniently to search for relevant buyer purchase offers, and for sellers potentially to bind a buyer to a contract based on the buyer's purchase offer. In a preferred embodiment, the apparatus of the present invention includes a controller which receives binding purchase offers from prospective buyers. The controller makes purchase offers available globally to potential sellers. Potential sellers then have the option to accept a purchase offer and thus bind the corresponding buyer to a contract. The method and apparatus of the present invention have applications on the Internet as well as conventional communications systems such as voice telephony.
1,979Â citations
Book•
[...]
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: This second edition has been completely revised, capturing the tremendous developments in multiagent systems since the first edition appeared in 1999.
Abstract: Multiagent systems are made up of multiple interacting intelligent agents -- computational entities to some degree autonomous and able to cooperate, compete, communicate, act flexibly, and exercise control over their behavior within the frame of their objectives They are the enabling technology for a wide range of advanced applications relying on distributed and parallel processing of data, information, and knowledge relevant in domains ranging from industrial manufacturing to e-commerce to health care This book offers a state-of-the-art introduction to multiagent systems, covering the field in both breadth and depth, and treating both theory and practice It is suitable for classroom use or independent study This second edition has been completely revised, capturing the tremendous developments in multiagent systems since the first edition appeared in 1999 Sixteen of the book's seventeen chapters were written for this edition; all chapters are by leaders in the field, with each author contributing to the broad base of knowledge and experience on which the book rests The book covers basic concepts of computational agency from the perspective of both individual agents and agent organizations; communication among agents; coordination among agents; distributed cognition; development and engineering of multiagent systems; and background knowledge in logics and game theory Each chapter includes references, many illustrations and examples, and exercises of varying degrees of difficulty The chapters and the overall book are designed to be self-contained and understandable without additional material Supplemental resources are available on the book's Web site Contributors:Rafael Bordini, Felix Brandt, Amit Chopra, Vincent Conitzer, Virginia Dignum, Jurgen Dix, Ed Durfee, Edith Elkind, Ulle Endriss, Alessandro Farinelli, Shaheen Fatima, Michael Fisher, Nicholas R Jennings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Evangelos Markakis, Lin Padgham, Julian Padget, Iyad Rahwan, Talal Rahwan, Alex Rogers, Jordi Sabater-Mir, Yoav Shoham, Munindar P Singh, Kagan Tumer, Karl Tuyls, Wiebe van der Hoek, Laurent Vercouter, Meritxell Vinyals, Michael Winikoff, Michael Wooldridge, Shlomo Zilberstein
1,692Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, Klemperer et al. provide an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.
Abstract: This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.
1,246Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing is presented, where the focus is on dynamic (intertemporal) pricing in the presence of inventory considerations.
Abstract: The benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries, such as airlines, hotels, and electric utilities, where the capacity is fixed in the short-term and perishable. In recent years, there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries, where the sellers have the ability to store inventory. Three factors contributed to this phenomenon: (1) the increased availability of demand data, (2) the ease of changing prices due to new technologies, and (3) the availability of decision-support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing. This paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing. Given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice, our focus is on dynamic (intertemporal) pricing in the presence of inventory considerations.
1,081Â citations
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1,542Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory that price and output can be expected to diverge to a greater extent from their competitive levels the fewer the firms that produce the product for the market.
Abstract: Current economic doctrine offers to its students a basic relationship between the number of firms that produce for a given market and the degree to which competitive results will prevail. Stated explicitly or suggested implicitly is the doctrine that price and output can be expected to diverge to a greater extent from their competitive levels the fewer the firms that produce the product for the market. This relationship has provided the logic that motivates much of the research devoted to studying industrial concentration, and it has given considerable support to utility regulation.2
1,278Â citations