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Augustine's Concept of Volition and Its Significance for the Doctrine of Original Sin

06 Aug 2019-
About: The article was published on 2019-08-06 and is currently open access. It has received 46 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Volition (linguistics) & Doctrine.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Alan R. White1
TL;DR: Davidson as mentioned in this paper argues that the notion of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action, and proposes a formal and ontological framework for those analyses.
Abstract: This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of nonrecurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti-reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels 'anomalous monism'. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the 'constitutive ideal of rationality', if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events. Essays on Actions and Events Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in In memory of Nancy Hirschberg I 2 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © in this collection Donald Davidson 2001 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 1980 This edition first published 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-924626-2 (Hbk.) ISBN 0-19-924627-0 (Pbk.) In memory of Nancy Hirschberg Intention and Action

458 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

306 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

220 citations

References
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Book
28 Oct 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a plan for feedback control in the context of human behavior and its application to problems in living, including the following: 1. Introduction and plan 2. Principles of feedback control 3. Discrepancy reducing feedback processes in behavior and four further issues 4. Disrepancy enlarging loops, and three further issues 5. Goals and behavior 6.
Abstract: 1. Introduction and plan 2. Principles of feedback control 3. Discrepancy reducing feedback processes in behavior 4. Discrepancy enlarging loops, and three further issues 5. Goals and behavior 6. Goals, hierarchicality, and behavior: further issues 7. Public and private aspects of the self 8. Control processes and affect 9. Affect: issues and comparisons 10. Expectancies and disengagement 11. Disengagement: issues and comparisons 12. Applications to problems in living 13. Hierarchicality and problems in living 14. Chaos and dynamic systems 15. Catastrophe theory 16. Further applications to problems in living 17. Is behavior controlled or does it emerge? 18. Goal engagement, life and death.

3,943 citations

BookDOI
16 Feb 2012

500 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Alan R. White1
TL;DR: Davidson as mentioned in this paper argues that the notion of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action, and proposes a formal and ontological framework for those analyses.
Abstract: This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of nonrecurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti-reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels 'anomalous monism'. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the 'constitutive ideal of rationality', if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events. Essays on Actions and Events Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in In memory of Nancy Hirschberg I 2 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © in this collection Donald Davidson 2001 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 1980 This edition first published 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-924626-2 (Hbk.) ISBN 0-19-924627-0 (Pbk.) In memory of Nancy Hirschberg Intention and Action

458 citations

Book
01 Jan 1965

335 citations