Authentication via localized names
Citations
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Cites background from "Authentication via localized names"
...As a consequence, in the recent years there have been a number of proposals of formal definitions of security properties (see, for instance, [1,2,8,11,12,17,21,30,44,45,51,53,59,60])....
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...In [19,20,11,12], a new definition of entity authentication, which is based on explicit locations of entities, has been proposed....
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115 citations
Cites result from "Authentication via localized names"
...of authentication, have rarely been given, not widely agreed upon, usually not compared and only recently proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [ 5 ,17,21,26])....
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109 citations
References
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2,188 citations
"Authentication via localized names" refers background in this paper
...For example, ntity authenticationis related to the verification of an entity’s claimed identity [ 8], while message authentication should make it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin [20]....
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1,913 citations
"Authentication via localized names" refers background in this paper
...In this section we briefly recall the -calculus [ 12 ], a model of concurrent communicating processes based on the notion of naming....
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...We recall here the basic ideas of [2] which extend the standard semantics of the -calculus of [ 12 ], in that it handles names locally....
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...The essence of concurrent and mobile computation can be studied in a pure form using the -calculus [ 12 ], a foundational calculus based on the notion of naming....
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1,412 citations
"Authentication via localized names" refers background or methods in this paper
...As an example, we study the way authentication is ensured by encrypting messages in the spi-calculus [1]....
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...The authentication property studied in [1] seems slightly stronger than ours: it requires that if A has to send a message toB, then this should be the only message that B accepts at the end of (a successful run of) the protocol....
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...Not surprisingly, the specification is in the style of [1]....
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...A remarkable example of a process algebra with cryptographic features is given by the spicalculus [1], over which the mechanism of handling names locally carries easily....
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...We plan to apply the proof techniques presented in [1] to our model....
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