Avoiding Counterfeit Electronic Components
19 Mar 2007-IEEE Transactions on Components and Packaging Technologies (IEEE)-Vol. 30, Iss: 1, pp 187-189
TL;DR: The most effective approach to avoiding counterfeit electronic components is to purchase product directly from the original component manufacturer, or from a distributor, reseller or aftermarket supplier who is franchised or authorized by the original manufacturer.
Abstract: In today's supply chain environment, electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users must be vigilant in order to avoid counterfeit electronic components. The vast majority of counterfeit cases reported are associated with purchases through independent distributors. The most effective approach to avoiding counterfeit electronic components is to purchase product directly from the original component manufacturer, or from a distributor, reseller or aftermarket supplier who is franchised or authorized by the original manufacturer. Because many components needed to produce and support defense electronics are no longer in current production, independent distributors are often used to fill this gap. While independent distributors provide a necessary function within the electronic component supply chain, they are not all created equal. Electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users need to understand the independent distributor's operations and business processes. When considering purchases through independent distributors, electronic equipment manufacturers and Government users should also apply mitigation methods and strategic approaches, such as those discussed in this paper, to reduce the potential for acquiring counterfeit parts
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04 Nov 2013
TL;DR: The results and analysis demonstrate that SST can effectively prevent counterfeited ICs from untrusted foundries or assemblies as well as its resilience to attacks and circumvention.
Abstract: Counterfeit ICs can have a major impact on the security and reliability of critical applications. This paper presents a method called Secure Split-Test (SST) for securing the manufacturing process to prevent counterfeits, allowing intellectual property (IP) owners to protect and meter their IPs. This is done by requiring test results to be verified by the IP owner and by requiring the IP owner to provide a “key” to unlock the IPs correct functionality. The results and analysis demonstrate that SST can effectively prevent counterfeited ICs from untrusted foundries or assemblies as well as its resilience to attacks and circumvention.
86 citations
TL;DR: A framework for modeling enterprise transformation applied to complex analysis of defense in an era of technology globalization is presented and recommended for further work in validating the modeling approach and application to a sample policy flight simulator representing counterfeit parts policy in military systems.
43 citations
TL;DR: An overview of the complexities of the electronics supply chain is provided, and enhanced traceability capabilities to track and trace parts at risk through various stages of the supply chain are called for.
Abstract: Within the microelectronics industry, there is a growing concern regarding the introduction of counterfeit electronic parts into the supply chain. Even though this problem is widespread, there have been limited attempts to implement risk-based approaches for testing and supply chain management. Supply chain risk management tends to focus on the highly visible disruptions of the supply chain instead of the covert entrance of counterfeits; thus counterfeit risk is difficult to mitigate. This article provides an overview of the complexities of the electronics supply chain, and highlights some gaps in risk assessment practices. In particular, this article calls for enhanced traceability capabilities to track and trace parts at risk through various stages of the supply chain. Placing the focus on risk-informed decision making through the following strategies is needed, including prioritization of high-risk parts, moving beyond certificates of conformance, incentivizing best supply chain management practices, adoption of industry standards, and design and management for supply chain resilience.
41 citations
Cites background from "Avoiding Counterfeit Electronic Com..."
...tation, distributor selection, obsolescence management, incident reporting and information sharing, and electronic waste disposal methods.(17,18) Critically, research gaps still remain, primarily in the area of risk analysis(19,20) and technology solutions that enable more cost-effective solutions to counterfeit avoidance and detection....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the role of part manufacturers in building trust in the supply chain is identified and part manufacturers, as the brand owners and trademark holders, play a critical role in enhancing trust in electronic part supply chain.
Abstract: One of the major problem areas in the electronic part supply chain is the issue of counterfeit electronic parts and the risks associated with them. Guidelines are needed for detecting, avoiding, and preventing the use of counterfeits in order to mitigate the risks associated with such parts. As part of this effort, we have identified the role of part manufacturers in building trust in the supply chain. Part manufacturers, as the brand owners and trademark holders, play a critical role in enhancing trust in the electronic part supply chain.
34 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a general understanding of the principles that increase the difficulty or investment required to reverse engineer mechanical products would be helpful for everyone affected by reverse engineering activities is presented, after reviewing examples from the literature and from our own experience.
Abstract: Reverse engineering is a common design strategy in industry. It is a term that has come to encompass a large array of engineering and design activities in the literature; however, in its basic form, reverse engineering is simply the process of extracting information about a product from the product itself. Depending on its use, it may or may not be advantageous to utilize a reverse engineering strategy. As with any rational decision, reverse engineering is only favorable when the benefits from its use outweigh the investment. Therefore, a general understanding of the principles that increase the difficulty or investment required to reverse engineer mechanical products would be helpful for everyone affected by reverse engineering activities. In this paper, we articulate and explore these fundamental principles after reviewing examples from the literature and from our own experience. We then use the principles as a basis for the development of a methodology to build barriers to reverse engineering into new products.
30 citations
Cites background from "Avoiding Counterfeit Electronic Com..."
...…that require multiple disciplines that are typically not coupled (Reed and DeFillippi 1990) • Design a component to appear, or have the performance, of another component (Livingston 2007) • Design a critical component to look like an insignificant component (Livingston 2007) or vice versa…...
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...…1990) • Design a component to appear, or have the performance, of another component (Livingston 2007) • Design a critical component to look like an insignificant component (Livingston 2007) or vice versa (McLoughlin 2008) • Design components that look different but have the same function…...
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...• Design a component to appear, or have the performance, of another component (Livingston 2007) • Design a critical component to look like an insignificant component (Livingston 2007) or vice versa (McLoughlin 2008) • Design components that look different but have the same function (Harston and Mattson 2010a) or vice versa (Naumovich and Memon 2003) • Design and implement multiple functionally-equivalent configurations of the same product (Dube et al....
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the growing concern over the counterfeiting of electronics components and systems and identify three key factors as the root cause of this problem: the shift of manufacturing to China where intellectual property laws are not strictly enforced and supply chains are convoluted; the growing sophistication of technology that enables cheaper and more convincing fakes.
Abstract: This paper discusses the growing concern over the counterfeiting of electronics components and systems. Three key factors are identified as the root cause of this problem: the shift of manufacturing to China where intellectual property laws are not strictly enforced and supply chains are convoluted; the growing sophistication of technology that enables cheaper and more convincing fakes; and the rise of the Internet as a marketplace, allowing buyers and sellers make fast trades without ever meeting face to face. As many companies are learning the hard way, counterfeiting requires a constant, deliberate, and multifaceted effort, vigorous monitoring of potential trouble spots, and judicious use of anticounterfeiting technologies.
157 citations
"Avoiding Counterfeit Electronic Com..." refers background in this paper
...Parts brokers, for example, frequently act as scouting agencies for hard-to-find components as the need arises, rather than maintaining an inventory [1]....
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...feiting and intellectual property theft [1]....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors make recommendations to ensure that trusted supply chains are available for policy decisions of the DoD: 1) The DoD and DoD contractors must buy direct from manufacturers or authorized distributors only.
Abstract: The DoD is concerned about having trusted sources for manufacturing leading-edge new microchips. It is just as important, if not more so, to maintain high quality standards and traceability of all microchips, including legacy chips, which form the backbone of our fighting and defensive hardware in all the services. The business models for brokers are not compatible with the need for a trusted supply chain for national security applications. Not all brokers are unscrupulous or offer substandard or counterfeit parts. However, it is impossible for the DoD to make an a priori judgment of the parts bought through brokers. It is too risky to include brokers in the supply chain. Some recommendations follow to ensure that trusted supply chains are available for policy decisions of the DoD: 1) The DoD and DoD contractors must buy direct from manufacturers or authorized distributors only. 2) Rules need to be implemented that force the DKSP to only list manufacturers and distributors who exhibit proper authorizations and certifications. 3) Action must be taken to insure government agencies and contractors buy certified parts from certified suppliers for quality, traceability, and safety reasons. 4) All requirements must be removed that demand part purchases from small, disadvantaged businesses when they are not authorized by an original manufacturer. 5) All unauthorized brokers must be excluded from attending and marketing at government sponsored conferences. Following these policies will help in mitigating the risk on inclusion of counterfeit and other substandard parts in the national security systems at the system integrator level. To tackle the problem of counterfeiting at the sources, other parallel technical, legislative, law enforcement, and logistical measures need to be undertaken
71 citations
"Avoiding Counterfeit Electronic Com..." refers background in this paper
...Independent distributors, however, do not have such agreements with the original component manufacturer and, therefore, have limited means to ensure product integrity and traceability [3]....
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