Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
01 Jun 1983-Journal of Political Economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)-Vol. 91, Iss: 1, pp 401-419
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Abstract: This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders, and presented a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary.
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.
7,982 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first-order relationship between financial development and economic growth, and that financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth.
Abstract: The author argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth. There is evidence that the financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case-style, industry level and firm-level analysis document extensive periods when financial development crucially affects the speed and pattern of economic development. The author explains what the financial system does and how it affects, and is affected by, economic growth. Theory suggests that financial instruments, markets and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs. A growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems reduce information and transaction costs influence savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, and long-run growth rates. A less developed theoretical literature shows how changes in economic activity can influence financial systems. The author advocates a functional approach to understanding the role of financial systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality of the functions provided by the financial systems. The author discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, or a particular institution. Instead, the author addresses the more comprehensive question: What is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system?
5,967 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: It is argued that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.
Abstract: An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.
5,412 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades, where an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information.
Abstract: An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.
4,731 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate whether the level of development of financial intermediaries exerts a casual influence on economic growth, and they find that financial intermediary development has a large causal impact on growth.
Abstract: Legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth. Levine, Loayza, and Beck evaluate: Whether the level of development of financial intermediaries exerts a casual influence on economic growth. Whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (such as creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences in the level of financial development. Using both traditional cross-section, instrumental-variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, they find that development of financial intermediaries exerts a large causal impact on growth. The data also show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help determine differences in financial development. Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth. This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth. Thorsten Beck may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org.
4,149 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders, and presented a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary.
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.
7,982 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1963
TL;DR: The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement as discussed by the authors, and the treatment of innumerable issues, large and small, have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.
Abstract: Writing in the June issue of the Economic Journal, Harry G. Johnson begins with a sentence seemingly calibrated to the scale of the book he set himself to review: “The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement—monumental in its sheer bulk, monumental in the definitiveness of its treatment of innumerable issues, large and small . . . monumental, above all, in the theoretical and statistical effort and ingenuity that have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues.” Friedman and Schwartz marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to support the claim that monetary policy—steady control of the money supply—matters profoundly in the management of the nation’s economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. In their influential chapter , “The Great Contraction”—which Princeton published in as a separate paperback—they address the central economic event of the century, the Depression. According to Hugh Rockoff, writing in January : “If Great Depressions could be prevented through timely actions by the monetary authority (or by a monetary rule), as Friedman and Schwartz had contended, then the case for market economies was measurably stronger.” Milton Friedman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in for work related to A Monetary History as well as to his other Princeton University Press book, A Theory of the Consumption Function ().
3,800 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper examined the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s on the path of aggregate output during that period and argued that the financial disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process; and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand.
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period. Our approach is complementary to that of Friedman and Schwartz, who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures; we focus on non-monetary (primarily credit-related) aspects of the financial sector--output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system. We argue that the financial disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process; and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand. Evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the Great Depression.
2,200 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a formula is derived to evaluate the cost of issuing a guarantee of a loan by a third party, and the method used is to demonstrate an isomorphic correspondence between loan guarantees and common stock put options and then to use the well developed theory of option pricing to derive the formula.
Abstract: It is not uncommon in the arrangement of a loan to include as part of the financial package a guarantee of the loan by a third party. Examples are guarantees by a parent company of loans made to its subsidiaries or government guarantees of loans made to private corporations. Also included would be guarantees of bank deposits by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. As with other forms of insurance, the issuing of a guarantee imposes a liability or cost on the guarantor. In this paper, a formula is derived to evaluate this cost. The method used is to demonstrate an isomorphic correspondence between loan guarantees and common stock put options, and then to use the well developed theory of option pricing to derive the formula.
1,983 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper examined the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s on the path of aggregate output during that period and argued that the financial disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process; and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand.
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period. Our approach is complementary to that of Friedman and Schwartz, who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures; we focus on non-monetary (primarily credit-related) aspects of the financial sector--output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system. We argue that the financial disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process; and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand. Evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the Great Depression.
1,820 citations