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Behavioural Asset Pricing Determinants in a Factor and Style Investing Framework
01 Jan 2018-Vol. 26, Iss: 2, pp 32-52
TL;DR: In this paper, a quasi-rational multifactor asset pricing determinants model with fundamental and behavioural risk factors is introduced, and the risk and return analysis is performed in a factors and style investing framework.
Abstract: This paper offers an alternative perspective on determinants of equity risk using behavioural asset pricing ideology in a factor and style investing framework. First, a quasi-rational multifactor asset pricing determinants model with fundamental and behavioural risk factors is introduced. Then, the risk and return analysis is performed in a factors and style investing framework. The empirical tests are performed on a sample of 238 Malaysian firm stock returns and multifactor risk proxies with monthly frequency using the panel regression method. The baseline and robustness analyses provide evidence to support the dynamic of risk and returns relationships due to quasi-rational risk determinants and given different characteristics of sub-samples analysed. As a potential industry application, this research suggested the behavioural style quadrant as a diversification strategy. In specific, the risk and return analysis is organized in the multistyle sub-samples (i.e. firm, industry, and market states) to examine equity groups that are resilient on the influence of behavioural risks. Briefly, this paper offers valuable applications in investment practice on how to measure and manage behavioural risks.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a time-frequency multi-Betas model with ARMA-EGARCH errors (Auto Regressive Moving Average Exponential AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity).
Abstract: Exposure to market risk is a core objective of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with a focus on systematic risk. However, traditional OLS Beta model estimations (Ordinary Least Squares) are plagued with several statistical issues. Moreover, the CAPM considers only one source of risk and supposes that investors only engage in similar behaviors. In order to analyze short and long exposures to different sources of risk, we developed a Time–Frequency Multi-Betas Model with ARMA-EGARCH errors (Auto Regressive Moving Average Exponential AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity). Our model considers gold, oil, and Fama–French factors as supplementary sources of risk and wavelets decompositions. We used 30 French stocks listed on the CAC40 (Cotations Assistees Continues 40) within a daily period from 2005 to 2015. The conjugation of the wavelet decompositions and the parameters estimates constitutes decision-making support for managers by multiplying the interpretive possibilities. In the short-run, (“Noise Trader” and “High-Frequency Trader”) only a few equities are insensitive to Oil and Gold fluctuations, and the estimated Market Betas parameters are scant different compared to the Model without wavelets. Oppositely, in the long-run, (fundamentalists investors), Oil and Gold affect all stocks but their impact varies according to the Beta (sensitivity to the market). We also observed significant differences between parameters estimated with and without wavelets.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develop an alternative model, called prospect theory, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
Abstract: This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE
35,067 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Bhandari et al. found that the relationship between market/3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable, and when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size.
Abstract: Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market 3, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size, the relation between market /3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable. THE ASSET-PRICING MODEL OF Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average returns and risk. The central prediction of the model is that the market portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). The efficiency of the market portfolio implies that (a) expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market O3s (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return), and (b) market O3s suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns. There are several empirical contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model. The most prominent is the size effect of Banz (1981). He finds that market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by market Os. Average returns on small (low ME) stocks are too high given their f estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. Another contradiction of the SLB model is the positive relation between leverage and average return documented by Bhandari (1988). It is plausible that leverage is associated with risk and expected return, but in the SLB model, leverage risk should be captured by market S. Bhandari finds, howev er, that leverage helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns in tests that include size (ME) as well as A. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity, BE, to its market value, ME. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find that book-to-market equity, BE/ME, also has a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks.
14,517 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the different methods used in the literature and explain when the different approaches yield the same (and correct) standard errors and when they diverge, and give researchers guidance for their use.
Abstract: In both corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. Corporate finance has relied on clustered standard errors, while asset pricing has used the Fama-MacBeth procedure to estimate standard errors. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and correct) standard errors and when they diverge. The intent is to provide intuition as to why the different approaches sometimes give different answers and give researchers guidance for their use.
7,647 citations
TL;DR: Scholes et al. as discussed by the authors examined the relationship between the total market value of the common stock of a firm and its return and found that small firms had higher risk adjusted returns than large firms.
5,997 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns.
Abstract: We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a result, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk. Moreover, bearing a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves create enables noise traders to earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. The model sheds light on a number of financial anomalies, including the excess volatility of asset prices, the mean reversion of stock returns, the underpricing of closed-end mutual funds, and the Mehra-Prescott equity premium puzzle.
5,703 citations