Belief and contextual acceptance
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Citations
Knowledge and lotteries
Knowledge and action
References
Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States
Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach
Knowledge and lotteries
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Frequently Asked Questions (8)
Q2. What are the future works in "Belief and contextual acceptance" ?
40 the authors can reconstruct her inference to the best explanation along the following lines. ( Notice that u clearly excels in both unification power and fertility, insofar as it helps to get a unified picture of two seemingly disparate phenomena – fetus and tumor growth – while it suggests a path of further tests that might ultimately lead to therapies to enhance both tumor survival and reduction of spontaneous abortions. ) In addition, Jill ’ s new epistemic state will have functions P2 ’ and P2 ’ ’ such that: 40 Incidentally, in the course of her research many evidential statements ( such as the observational results of several tests ) have already become full certainties of Jill ; the authors can suppose that they have already helped update the probability of both t and u in every context, in a standard Bayesian manner. 41 A rationale for this suggestion can be found in the thought that, if the authors assume a hypothesis to be false, then no epistemic satisfaction can be obtained from it, and hence eu ( -h ) is 0. P2 ’ ( p ) =P2 ’ ( q ) =P2 ’ ( r1 ) =…= P2 ’ ( rn ) =1 ; P2 ’ ( s ) =0. 99 ; P2 ’ ( t ) =0. 4 ; P2 ’ ( u ) =0. 6 ; and P2 ’ ’ ( p ) =P2 ’ ’ ( q ) =P2 ’ ’ ( r1 ) =…=P2 ’ ’ ( rn ) =1 ; P2 ’ ’ ( s ) =0. 99 ; P2 ’ ’ ( t ) =0. 375 ; P2 ’ ’ ( u ) =
Q3. What is the level of the agent’s attitudes towards statements of her own language?
The agent’s real doubts, beliefs and acceptances, at level (A), are obviously compatible with more than one linguistic manifestation of (at least part of) such states, at level (B); in addition, elements at levels (A) and (B) are compatible with more than one modeling strategy.
Q4. What is the way to conceive of IBE?
In other words, The authorhave suggested that the authors conceive of IBE as a decision theoretic exercise, in which the authors focus on the epistemicattention to other sets
Q5. What is the argument that the present model violates the Bayesian conditionalization principle?
It might be contended that allowing probability functions to be modified in the way The authoram advocating here commit us to a violation of so-called Bayesian conditionalization, and that the authors are therefore in trouble.
Q6. What does the definition require that a full doubt occur?
In other words, in order to be fulfilled this definition requires that some real probability change occur, and that some acceptance set be actuallyenlarged, regardless of whether α had already been in M; on the other hand, if α is a fullbelief of the agent at t, the definition cannot be satisfied: α needs to be, if not a full doubt, at least a contextual doubt.
Q7. What is the way to explain IBE?
In (Cresto, 2006, 2008a) The authorhave argued that conscious, voluntarily implementedexpansions can be paradigmatically illustrated with instances of inferences to the best explanation (IBE), and The authorhave also argued that the concept of IBE is best elucidated with the aid of some brand of cognitive decision theory.
Q8. What does the agent have to say about the possibility of not-p?
if the agent is unable to represent to herself the possibility that such circumstances occur, that means that p is a full belief, rather than a mere contextual acceptance.