Beneath rationalization: Elias, Foucault, and the body1
Citations
128 citations
12 citations
10 citations
4 citations
References
17,729 citations
15,638 citations
"Beneath rationalization: Elias, Fou..." refers background or methods in this paper
...In 1951, Foucault aggregated in philosophy from the École Normale. For obvious reasons, revealing their intellectual sources requires that we take seriously the subtle play of philosophical ideas in which they were steeped during highly formative years of their lives. We have to start with the ‘father of phenomenology’. Husserl argued that it is impossible to separate consciousness itself from the objects towards which it is directed. To return to the ‘things themselves’ was, as he put it, to enact a useful ‘phenomenological reduction’ based on this insight. This reduction allowed, Husserl argued, for the systematic interrogation of how consciousness is – for the most part tacitly, and here he spoke of the ‘natural attitude’ –directed towards, for example, time. Anticipating later developments in sociology and other disciplines (thanks to intermediaries like Alfred Schütz), Husserl claimed that his method revealed for the first time the basic (empathic or inter-subjective yet essentially ego-based) mental structures allowing the objects spontaneously taken for granted in one’s everyday lifeworld to ‘constitute themselves’ in consciousness. Innovative as his approach was, Husserl remained within a framework positing separate subjects knowing external objects. It is precisely this subject/object and internal/ external duality against which Husserl’s most (in)famous student reacted. With the publication of Being and Time, which was dedicated ‘in friendship and admiration’ to Husserl when originally published in German in 1927, Heidegger rebelled against the notion that analyses of actual ways of being should begin with – or be based on – isolated, selfenclosed subjects standing over against external objects (that are being contemplated). Instead of positing the centrality of subject/object dichotomies to the human situation, Heidegger developed the more thoroughly relational and processual notion of ‘always already’ situationally enmeshed, socially familiarized, and affectively predisposed beings forced to cope in real time (cf. Dreyfus, 1991).(4) The conspicuous hyphens connecting the term ‘being-in-the-world’ signify Heidegger’s escape from the subject/object duality and his attempt to grasp the meaning of being through concepts suitable for a holistic analysis of a unitary phenomenon. ‘Philosophy’, as Collins (1998: 748) remarks, was ‘set on a new course’. Cagey as Foucault evidently felt he needed to be on this subject, it has been well known for some time that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl had an enormous influence on him. As Miller (1993: 50–1) illustrates, Foucault’s first publication (in 1954) was warmly sympathetic to the ‘great Heideggerian psychiatrist’ Ludwig Binswanger; Foucault’s The Order of Things ([1966] 1994) ‘clearly alludes to without explicitly naming’ Heidegger; and on his deathbed it seems Foucault confessed to having been a Heideggerian all along. More importantly, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) detail exactly how Foucault’s mature works were grounded in Heidegger’s brand of existential phenomenology....
[...]
...Here it must immediately be added that some of Foucault’s ([1984] 1988; [1984] 1990) final...
[...]
...In 1951, Foucault aggregated in philosophy from the École Normale. For obvious reasons, revealing their intellectual sources requires that we take seriously the subtle play of philosophical ideas in which they were steeped during highly formative years of their lives. We have to start with the ‘father of phenomenology’. Husserl argued that it is impossible to separate consciousness itself from the objects towards which it is directed. To return to the ‘things themselves’ was, as he put it, to enact a useful ‘phenomenological reduction’ based on this insight. This reduction allowed, Husserl argued, for the systematic interrogation of how consciousness is – for the most part tacitly, and here he spoke of the ‘natural attitude’ –directed towards, for example, time. Anticipating later developments in sociology and other disciplines (thanks to intermediaries like Alfred Schütz), Husserl claimed that his method revealed for the first time the basic (empathic or inter-subjective yet essentially ego-based) mental structures allowing the objects spontaneously taken for granted in one’s everyday lifeworld to ‘constitute themselves’ in consciousness. Innovative as his approach was, Husserl remained within a framework positing separate subjects knowing external objects. It is precisely this subject/object and internal/ external duality against which Husserl’s most (in)famous student reacted. With the publication of Being and Time, which was dedicated ‘in friendship and admiration’ to Husserl when originally published in German in 1927, Heidegger rebelled against the notion that analyses of actual ways of being should begin with – or be based on – isolated, selfenclosed subjects standing over against external objects (that are being contemplated). Instead of positing the centrality of subject/object dichotomies to the human situation, Heidegger developed the more thoroughly relational and processual notion of ‘always already’ situationally enmeshed, socially familiarized, and affectively predisposed beings forced to cope in real time (cf. Dreyfus, 1991).(4) The conspicuous hyphens connecting the term ‘being-in-the-world’ signify Heidegger’s escape from the subject/object duality and his attempt to grasp the meaning of being through concepts suitable for a holistic analysis of a unitary phenomenon. ‘Philosophy’, as Collins (1998: 748) remarks, was ‘set on a new course’. Cagey as Foucault evidently felt he needed to be on this subject, it has been well known for some time that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl had an enormous influence on him. As Miller (1993: 50–1) illustrates, Foucault’s first publication (in 1954) was warmly sympathetic to the ‘great Heideggerian psychiatrist’ Ludwig Binswanger; Foucault’s The Order of Things ([1966] 1994) ‘clearly alludes to without explicitly naming’ Heidegger; and on his deathbed it seems Foucault confessed to having been a Heideggerian all along....
[...]
...While the administrators of Foucault’s expansive ‘apparatuses’ genuinely believed that they were increasingly ‘reasonable’ technicians of ‘souls’, unbeknown to themselves they were most basically enmeshed in interlocking sets of ‘normalizing’ practices targeting human bodies. So the secret, Foucault tried to demonstrate, is that the most fundamental dimension of life involved in the shift towards the disciplinary society is not at all shrouded in secrecy. ‘Discipline is a political anatomy of detail’, he declared ([1975] 1979: 139), and once you see how this works – within the bodily structure at the most basic level – you see what players in the heat of the game’s action cannot possibly see....
[...]
...On Foucault’s unpublished translation of Elias’s ([1979] 1985) The Loneliness of Dying, see...
[...]
9,648 citations
7,353 citations