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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptosystem Design Using Modified Fuzzy Vault Scheme

20 Aug 2006-Vol. 4, pp 537-540
TL;DR: The use of invariant features as a key to producing a hierarchical security system where the same key (fingerprint) can be used to generate encrypted messages at different levels of security.
Abstract: We propose a novel biometrics cryptosystem where one can send and receive secure information using just the fingerprints. This cryptosystem is a judicious blend of the asymmetric cryptosystem like RSA and the symmetric fuzzy vault scheme having the advantages of both the aforementioned crypto systems. We have proposed a modification of the fuzzy vault scheme to make it more robust against variations in the values of biometric features. Finally, we propose the use of invariant features as a key to producing a hierarchical security system where the same key (fingerprint) can be used to generate encrypted messages at different levels of security
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work presents a high-level categorization of the various vulnerabilities of a biometric system and discusses countermeasures that have been proposed to address these vulnerabilities.
Abstract: Biometric recognition offers a reliable solution to the problem of user authentication in identity management systems. With the widespread deployment of biometric systems in various applications, there are increasing concerns about the security and privacy of biometric technology. Public acceptance of biometrics technology will depend on the ability of system designers to demonstrate that these systems are robust, have low error rates, and are tamper proof. We present a high-level categorization of the various vulnerabilities of a biometric system and discuss countermeasures that have been proposed to address these vulnerabilities. In particular, we focus on biometric template security which is an important issue because, unlike passwords and tokens, compromised biometric templates cannot be revoked and reissued. Protecting the template is a challenging task due to intrauser variability in the acquired biometric traits. We present an overview of various biometric template protection schemes and discuss their advantages and limitations in terms of security, revocability, and impact on matching accuracy. A template protection scheme with provable security and acceptable recognition performance has thus far remained elusive. Development of such a scheme is crucial as biometric systems are beginning to proliferate into the core physical and information infrastructure of our society.

1,119 citations


Cites methods from "Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..."

  • ...The fuzzy vault scheme proposed by Juels and Sudan [58] has become one of the most popular approaches for biometric template protection and its implementations for fingerprint [66]–[70], face [71], iris [72] and signature [73] modalities have been proposed....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comprehensive survey of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics is presented and state-of-the-art approaches are reviewed based on which an in-depth discussion and an outlook to future prospects are given.
Abstract: Form a privacy perspective most concerns against the common use of biometrics arise from the storage and misuse of biometric data. Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics represent emerging technologies of biometric template protection addressing these concerns and improving public confidence and acceptance of biometrics. In addition, biometric cryptosystems provide mechanisms for biometric-dependent key-release. In the last years a significant amount of approaches to both technologies have been published. A comprehensive survey of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics is presented. State-of-the-art approaches are reviewed based on which an in-depth discussion and an outlook to future prospects are given.

620 citations


Cites background from "Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..."

  • ...Nagar and Chaudhury [64] arrange encoded keys and biometric data of fingerprints in the same order into separate grids, which form the vault....

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01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: This thesis proposes a scheme for securing multibiometric templates as a single entity using the fuzzy vault framework and develops fully automatic implementations of a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault that secures minutiae templates and an iris cryptosystem that Secures iriscode templates.
Abstract: Multibiometric systems, which consolidate information from multiple biometric sources, are gaining popularity because they are able to overcome limitations such as non-universality, noisy sensor data, large intra-user variations and susceptibility to spoof attacks that are commonly encountered in unibiometric systems. In this thesis, we address two critical issues in the design of a multibiometric system, namely, fusion methodology and template security. First, we propose a fusion methodology based on the Neyman-Pearson theorem for combination of match scores provided by multiple biometric matchers. The likeli-hood ratio (LR) test used in the Neyman-Pearson theorem directly maximizes the genuine accept rate (GAR) at any desired false accept rate (FAR). The densities of genuine and impostor match scores needed for the LR test are estimated using finite Gaussian mixture models. We also extend the likelihood ratio based fusion scheme to incorporate the quality of the biometric samples. Further, we also show that the LR framework can be used for designing sequential multibiometric systems by constructing a binary decision tree classifier based on the marginal likelihood ratios of the individual matchers. The LR framework achieves consistently high recognition rates across three different multibiometric databases without the need for any parameter tuning. For instance, on the WVU-Multimodal database, the GAR of the LR fusion rule is 85.3% at a FAR of 0.001%, which is significantly higher than the corresponding GAR of 66.7% provided by the best single modality (iris). The use of image quality information further improves the GAR to 90% at a FAR of 0.001%. Next, we show that the proposed likelihood ratio based fusion framework is also applicable to a multibiometric system operating in the identification mode. We further investigate rank level fusion strategies and propose a hybrid scheme that utilizes both ranks and scores to perform fusion in the identification scenario. While fusion of multiple biometric sources significantly improves the recognition accuracy, it requires storage of multiple templates for the same user corresponding to the individual biometric sources. Template security is an important issue in biometric systems because unlike passwords, stolen biometric templates cannot be revoked. Hence, we propose a scheme for securing multibiometric templates as a single entity using the fuzzy vault framework. We have developed fully automatic implementations of a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault that secures minutiae templates and an iris cryptosystem that secures iriscode templates. We also demonstrate that a multibiometric vault achieves better recognition performance and higher security compared to a unibiometric vault. For example, our multibiometric vault implementation based on fingerprint and iris achieves a GAR of 98.2% at a FAR of less than 0.01% and provides approximately 49 bits of security. The corresponding GAR values of the individual iris and fingerprint vaults are 88% and 78.8%, respectively. When the iris and fingerprint vaults are stored separately, the security of the system is only 41 bits.

118 citations


Cites methods from "Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..."

  • ...A modified fuzzy vault scheme was used for designing an asymmetric cryptosystem in [141]....

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  • ...The fuzzy vault scheme proposed by Juels and Sudan [102] has become one of the most popular approaches for biometric template protection and its implementations for fingerprint [41, 42, 141, 196, 209], face [62], iris [117] and signature [68] modalities have been proposed....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A method is proposed to generate a revocable fingerprint template in terms of bit-string from a set of minutiae points via a polar grid based 3-tuple quantization technique.
Abstract: Recently, biometric template protection has received great attention from the research community due to the security and privacy concerns for biometric template. Although a number of biometric template protection methods have been reported, it is still a challenging task to devise a scheme which satisfies all of the four template protection criteria namely diversity, revocability, non-invertibility and performance. In this paper, a method is proposed to generate a revocable fingerprint template in terms of bit-string from a set of minutiae points via a polar grid based 3-tuple quantization technique. Two merits of the proposed method are outlined, namely alignment-free and performance. Four publicly available benchmark datasets: FVC2002 DB1, DB2 and FVC2004 DB1, DB2 are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Besides, the diversity, revocability, non-invertibility criteria are also analyzed.

103 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The possible usage of palmprint in fuzzy vault is investigated to develop a user friendly and reliable crypto system and the use of both symmetric and asymmetric approach for the encryption is suggested.
Abstract: The combination of cryptology and biometrics has emerged as promising component of information security. Despite the current popularity of palmprint biometric, there has not been any attempt to investigate its usage for the fuzzy vault. This paper therefore investigates the possible usage of palmprint in fuzzy vault to develop a user friendly and reliable crypto system. We suggest the use of both symmetric and asymmetric approach for the encryption. The ciphertext of any document is generated by symmetric cryptosystem; the symmetric key is then encrypted by asymmetric approach. Further, Reed and Solomon codes are used on the generated asymmetric key to provide some error tolerance while decryption. The experimental results from the proposed approach on the palmprint images suggest its possible usage in an automated palmprint-based key generation system.

52 citations

References
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
30 Jun 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a fuzzy vault construction that allows Alice to place a secret value /spl kappa/ in a secure vault and lock it using an unordered set A of elements from some public universe U. If Bob tries to "unlock" the vault using B, he obtains the secret value if B is close to A, i.e., only if A and B overlap substantially.
Abstract: We describe a simple and novel cryptographic construction that we call a fuzzy vault. Alice may place a secret value /spl kappa/ in a fuzzy vault and "lock" it using an unordered set A of elements from some public universe U. If Bob tries to "unlock" the vault using an unordered set B, he obtains /spl kappa/ only if B is close to A, i.e., only if A and B overlap substantially.

1,481 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A filter-based fingerprint matching algorithm which uses a bank of Gabor filters to capture both local and global details in a fingerprint as a compact fixed length FingerCode and is able to achieve a verification accuracy which is only marginally inferior to the best results of minutiae-based algorithms published in the open literature.
Abstract: Biometrics-based verification, especially fingerprint-based identification, is receiving a lot of attention. There are two major shortcomings of the traditional approaches to fingerprint representation. For a considerable fraction of population, the representations based on explicit detection of complete ridge structures in the fingerprint are difficult to extract automatically. The widely used minutiae-based representation does not utilize a significant component of the rich discriminatory information available in the fingerprints. Local ridge structures cannot be completely characterized by minutiae. Further, minutiae-based matching has difficulty in quickly matching two fingerprint images containing a different number of unregistered minutiae points. The proposed filter-based algorithm uses a bank of Gabor filters to capture both local and global details in a fingerprint as a compact fixed length FingerCode. The fingerprint matching is based on the Euclidean distance between the two corresponding FingerCodes and hence is extremely fast. We are able to achieve a verification accuracy which is only marginally inferior to the best results of minutiae-based algorithms published in the open literature. Our system performs better than a state-of-the-art minutiae-based system when the performance requirement of the application system does not demand a very low false acceptance rate. Finally, we show that the matching performance can be improved by combining the decisions of the matchers based on complementary (minutiae-based and filter-based) fingerprint information.

1,207 citations


"Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..." refers background or methods in this paper

  • ...We have tested our Modified Fuzzy Vault on fingerprint features extracted using the gabor feature based filterbank as proposed by A.K. Jain et al. [ 3 ]....

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  • ...Anil. K. Jain et al. [ 3 ] for our system but this approach is not limited to fingerprints, in fact other biometrics like iris data, face features etc can also be used with minor calibrations....

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Journal ArticleDOI
18 May 2004
TL;DR: This work presents various methods that monolithically bind a cryptographic key with the biometric template of a user stored in the database in such a way that the key cannot be revealed without a successful biometric authentication.
Abstract: In traditional cryptosystems, user authentication is based on possession of secret keys; the method falls apart if the keys are not kept secret (i.e., shared with non-legitimate users). Further, keys can be forgotten, lost, or stolen and, thus, cannot provide non-repudiation. Current authentication systems based on physiological and behavioral characteristics of persons (known as biometrics), such as fingerprints, inherently provide solutions to many of these problems and may replace the authentication component of traditional cryptosystems. We present various methods that monolithically bind a cryptographic key with the biometric template of a user stored in the database in such a way that the key cannot be revealed without a successful biometric authentication. We assess the performance of one of these biometric key binding/generation algorithms using the fingerprint biometric. We illustrate the challenges involved in biometric key generation primarily due to drastic acquisition variations in the representation of a biometric identifier and the imperfect nature of biometric feature extraction and matching algorithms. We elaborate on the suitability of these algorithms for digital rights management systems.

942 citations


"Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...Finally we propose the use of invariant features as a key to producing a hierarchical security system where the same key (fingerprint) can be used to generate encrypted messages at different levels of security....

    [...]

Proceedings ArticleDOI
08 Nov 2003
TL;DR: The fundamental insecurities hampering a scalable, wide-spread deployment of biometric authentication are examined, and a cryptosystem capable of using fingerprint data as its key is presented.
Abstract: In this paper, the fundamental insecurities hampering a scalable, wide-spread deployment of biometric authentication are examined, and a cryptosystem capable of using fingerprint data as its key is presented. For our application, we focus on situations where a private key stored on a smartcard is used for authentication in a networked environment, and we assume an attacker can launch o -line attacks against a stolen card.Juels and Sudan's fuzzy vault is used as a starting point for building and analyzing a secure authentication scheme using fingerprints and smartcards called a figerprint vault. Fingerprint minutiae coordinates mi are encoded as elements in a nite eld F and the secret key is encoded in a polynomial f(x) over F[x]. The polynomial is evaluated at the minutiae locations, and the pairs (mi, f(mi)) are stored along with random (ci, di) cha points such that di ≠ f(ci). Given a matching fingerprint, a valid user can seperate out enough true points from the cha points to reconstruct f(x), and hence the original secret key.The parameters of the vault are selected such that the attacker's vault unlocking complexity is maximized, subject to zero unlocking complexity with a matching fingerprint and a reasonable amount of error. For a feature location measurement variance of 9 pixels, the optimal vault is 269 times more difficult to unlock for an attacker compared to a user posessing a matching fingerprint, along with approximately a 30% chance of unlocking failure.

472 citations


"Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...We have presented the design of a novel asymmetric cryptosystem based on biometrics having features like hierarchical group security and which eliminates the use of passwords and smart cards as opposed to earlier cryptosystems like [5, 6 ] though it requires special hardware support which is present with any other biometrics system....

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Proceedings ArticleDOI
20 Sep 2004
TL;DR: This paper proposes a novel scheme that encrypts the training images used to synthesize the single minimum average correlation energy filter for biometric authentication, and shows analytically that the recognition performance remains invariant to the proposed encryption scheme, while retaining the desired shift-invariance property of correlation filters.
Abstract: In this paper, we address the issue of producing cancelable biometric templates; a necessary feature in the deployment of any biometric authentication system. We propose a novel scheme that encrypts the training images used to synthesize the single minimum average correlation energy filter for biometric authentication. We show theoretically that convolving the training images with any random convolution kernel prior to building the biometric filter does not change the resulting correlation output peak-to-sidelobe ratios, thus preserving the authentication performance. However, different templates can be obtained from the same biometric by varying the convolution kernels thus enabling the cancelability of the templates. We evaluate the proposed method using the illumination subset of the CMU pose, illumination, and expressions (PIE) face dataset. Our proposed method is very interesting from a pattern recognition theory point of view, as we are able to 'encrypt' the data and perform recognition in the encrypted domain that performs as well as the unencrypted case, regardless of the encryption kernel used; we show analytically that the recognition performance remains invariant to the proposed encryption scheme, while retaining the desired shift-invariance property of correlation filters.

297 citations


"Biometrics based Asymmetric Cryptos..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...Finally we propose the use of invariant features as a key to producing a hierarchical security system where the same key (fingerprint) can be used to generate encrypted messages at different levels of security....

    [...]