Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments
01 Jan 1983-pp 199-203
TL;DR: Automation of the way the authors pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers.
Abstract: Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.
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Book•
01 Jan 1996TL;DR: A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols.
Abstract: From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.
13,597 citations
18 Aug 1996
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
Abstract: By carefully measuring the amount of time required tm perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against, a valnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevenl timing attacks.
3,989 citations
Proceedings Article•
01 Jan 1996
3,526 citations
TL;DR: It is proved that a very slight variation of the well-known El Gamal signature scheme resists existential forgeries even against an adaptively chosen-message attack and an appropriate notion of security related to the setting of electronic cash is defined.
Abstract: Since the appearance of public-key cryptography in the seminal Diffie--Hellman paper, many new schemes have been proposed and many have been broken. Thus, the simple fact that a cryptographic algorithm withstands cryptanalytic attacks for several years is often considered as a kind of validation procedure. A much more convincing line of research has tried to provide ``provable'' security for cryptographic protocols. Unfortunately, in many cases, provable security is at the cost of a considerable loss in terms of efficiency. Another way to achieve some kind of provable security is to identify concrete cryptographic objects, such as hash functions, with ideal random objects and to use arguments from relativized complexity theory. The model underlying this approach is often called the ``random oracle model.'' We use the word ``arguments'' for security results proved in this model. As usual, these arguments are relative to well-established hard algorithmic problems such as factorization or the discrete logarithm.
In this paper we offer security arguments for a large class of known signature schemes. Moreover, we give for the first time an argument for a very slight variation of the well-known El Gamal signature scheme. In spite of the existential forgery of the original scheme, we prove that our variant resists existential forgeries even against an adaptively chosen-message attack. This is provided that the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve.
Next, we study the security of blind signatures which are the most important ingredient for anonymity in off-line electronic cash systems. We first define an appropriate notion of security related to the setting of electronic cash. We then propose new schemes for which one can provide security arguments.
2,016 citations
Cites background from "Blind Signatures for Untraceable Pa..."
...As early as 1982, Chaum’s [13] pioneering work aimed at creating an electronic version of money....
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...Motivation: Electronic Cash As early as 1982, Chaum’s [13] pioneering work aimed at creating an electronic version of money....
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Book•
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: In almost 600 pages of riveting detail, Ross Anderson warns us not to be seduced by the latest defensive technologies, never to underestimate human ingenuity, and always use common sense in defending valuables.
Abstract: Gigantically comprehensive and carefully researched, Security Engineering makes it clear just how difficult it is to protect information systems from corruption, eavesdropping, unauthorized use, and general malice. Better, Ross Anderson offers a lot of thoughts on how information can be made more secure (though probably not absolutely secure, at least not forever) with the help of both technologies and management strategies. His work makes fascinating reading and will no doubt inspire considerable doubt--fear is probably a better choice of words--in anyone with information to gather, protect, or make decisions about. Be aware: This is absolutely not a book solely about computers, with yet another explanation of Alice and Bob and how they exchange public keys in order to exchange messages in secret. Anderson explores, for example, the ingenious ways in which European truck drivers defeat their vehicles' speed-logging equipment. In another section, he shows how the end of the cold war brought on a decline in defenses against radio-frequency monitoring (radio frequencies can be used to determine, at a distance, what's going on in systems--bank teller machines, say), and how similar technology can be used to reverse-engineer the calculations that go on inside smart cards. In almost 600 pages of riveting detail, Anderson warns us not to be seduced by the latest defensive technologies, never to underestimate human ingenuity, and always use common sense in defending valuables. A terrific read for security professionals and general readers alike. --David Wall Topics covered: How some people go about protecting valuable things (particularly, but not exclusively, information) and how other people go about getting it anyway. Mostly, this takes the form of essays (about, for example, how the U.S. Air Force keeps its nukes out of the wrong hands) and stories (one of which tells of an art thief who defeated the latest technology by hiding in a closet). Sections deal with technologies, policies, psychology, and legal matters.
1,852 citations