Breastfeeding, brain activation to own infant cry, and maternal sensitivity
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...Furthermore, regardless of delivery type, mothers known to show higher oxytocin during breastfeeding (Nissen et al. 1996), also have higher brain responses to their own baby’s crying than do formula-feeding mothers, in the insula, striatum, amygdala, and superior frontal gyrus (Kim et al. 2011)....
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1,022 citations
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...& Glimcher, P. W. (2004) Activity in posterior parietal cortex is correlated with the relative subjective desirability of action....
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...Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M. & Iizuka, H. (2008) Sensitivity to social contingency or...
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...& Di Paolo, E. A. (2008) Stability of coordination requires mutuality of...
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...Haggard, P. (2008) Human volition: Towards a neuroscience of will....
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...” Persuasively, Gallotti emphasizes that the we-mode may constitute an irreducible mode of cognition vis-à-vis cognitive states in the I-mode. As Searle (1990) and others have shown, weintentions (e.g., “we are playing this game together”) cannot be analyzed in terms of or reduced to a sum of the individual intentions of the agents and that the wemode has considerable explanatory power. We can completely agree with this claim and have actually said nothing to undermine it. In addition to Gallotti’s claim, our account can actually tell a persuasive story about the origin of our we-intentions. Surely, we-intentions cannot simply precede social interaction. Neither should we take weintentions as brute, inexplicable facts. The only viable explanation seems to be that joint engagement and activities may lead to intentions in the we-mode. That is, the wemode presupposes the features emphasized in our approach and is thus no replacement for it. Even if the we-mode was irreducible to two I-modes, it would still assume that within an interaction, the actions of an agent can be causally explained in terms of representations that reside in that agent alone. In this sense, it would be clearly spectatorial and would downplay sensorimotor accounts (see, e.g., Lewis & Stack). Rather than downgrading ideas of collective intentionality, our approach can lead towards an answer to the question of how collective intentions arise from interaction dynamics and emotional engagement. In the same vein as Gallotti, commentators Lewis & Stack suggest that “knowledge of ‘you’” emerges from a previously shared context in which infant and adult form a (proto-) conversational unit that can be described as a very early first-person plural experience. As mentioned before, we suggest that it may be the other way around. Implicitly, Lewis & Stack acknowledge this when they contend that these shared activities are “largely stagemanaged by the adult.” Without needing to discuss whether it is actually genuinely participatory and jointly “managed,” it is clear that this implies that someone takes the initiative by emotionally engaging with the other in a communication loop that is characterized by reciprocity, and is supported by social affordances. Furthermore, they ask what may fill the “spectatorial gap.” Even from a spectatorial perspective, one valid suggestion might be that it is essentially a form of embodied sensorimotor know-how (McGeer 2001; Schlicht, forthcoming). This is actually what Lewis & Stack themselves seem to suggest. The earliest forms of awareness are arguably “sensorimotor and take place within practical activities.” One important characteristic of know-how (with respect to some ability) is that its development goes hand in hand with the ability to recognize the execution of this ability in someone else’s actions. Knowing how to swim enables one to recognize when someone else executes her swimming ability successfully (McGeer 2001). Similarly, the suggestion would be that we develop social know-how in the context of scenes of mutual engagement and interaction. But, as mentioned before, the crucial difference in our approach is that this development of social know-how is not a faculty we develop to “bridge a gap.” Rather, it constitutes our primary way of experiencing others. This is in line with Bruner’s (1964) suggestion that the developmentally primary form of representation is “enactive” in the sense that it is embodied and inextricably tied to (inter-) action....
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549 citations
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...Greater amygdala activations were correlated with higher observed maternal sensitivity, suggesting that the increase in brain activations triggered by breastfeeding may prepare for the expression of coordinated parenting at the stage when infants enter the social world (Kim et al., 2011)....
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References
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"Breastfeeding, brain activation to ..." refers methods in this paper
...A correction for multiple testing was not employed since there is only one primary analysis based on one hypothesis (Perneger, 1998)....
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"Breastfeeding, brain activation to ..." refers background in this paper
...These circuits are important for processing the emotional states of others (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Völlm et al., 2005)....
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1,042 citations
950 citations
"Breastfeeding, brain activation to ..." refers background in this paper
...These circuits are important for processing the emotional states of others (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Völlm et al., 2005)....
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...These circuits are important for processing the emotional states of others (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Völlm et al., 2005)....
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