# Brief announcement: collusion free protocol for rational secret sharing

##### Citations

11 citations

### Additional excerpts

...Such as references [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21] and [22]....

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3 citations

### Cites background from "Brief announcement: collusion free ..."

...The rational thinking means each player is selfish, just enough to take his own interests into consideration so that he wants himself to be and only be the person who obtains the secret....

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1 citations

##### References

336 citations

### "Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers background or result in this paper

...This impossibility result is proved by Halpern and Teague[1]....

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...Halpern and Teague[1] introduced the problem of rational secret sharing assuming that the players are rational, where each player behaves in a selfish manner....

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...[1] J. Halpern and V. Teague....

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...We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague[1]....

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215 citations

### "Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers methods in this paper

...The completely collusion free protocol is presented in [2] by Kol and Naor by making cryptographic assumptions....

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154 citations

### "Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers background or methods in this paper

...Kol and Naor[3] proposed an efficient solution to the problem in the form of a strict rational secret sharing protocol in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel (on which all players broadcast...

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...Our protocol is completely collusion free if n ≥ 2m−1, otherwise it is equivalent to Kol and Naor’s[3] protocol....

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...Some positive results have been derived by Kol and Naor[3] by considering that players only prefer to learn....

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...derived from utilities and distribution D, similar to [3]....

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...The protocol in [3] is collusion free, even if (m− 1) long players collude they cannot get any advantage....

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