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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Brief announcement: collusion free protocol for rational secret sharing

25 Jul 2010-pp 402-403
TL;DR: This work extends the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague, and proposes a completely collusion free, &3949;-Nash equilibrium protocol, when n ≥ 2m-1, where n is the number of players and m is thenumber of shares needed to construct the secret.
Abstract: We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague [1] Some positive results have been derived by Kol and Naor[3] by considering that players only prefer to learnThe solution considers that players are of two types; one player is the short player and the rest of the players are long players But their protocol is susceptible to coalitions if the short player colludes with any of the long players We extend their protocol, and propose a completely collusion free, &3949;-Nash equilibrium protocol, when n ≥ 2m-1, where n is the number of players and m is the number of shares needed to construct the secret
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A new rational multi-secret sharing scheme that has high security and takes an identity authentication for the dealer in distribution phase so that it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating.
Abstract: In this paper we mainly focus on the fraud problem among the players and the shortcomings of multi-secret sharing existed in rational secret sharing schemes. Based on the exited schemes and the related knowledge such as bit commitment agreement, we proposed a new rational multi-secret sharing scheme that has high security. In our scheme, we take an identity authentication for the dealer in distribution phase. Players can verify the correctness of the identity of the dealer. In this way, it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating. Based on the discrete logarithm problem, the player can also verify the correctness of the secret share. At the same time the secret shares are divided into groups so that the distribution phase is well designed for the multi-secret sharing. Additional the game theory model is also adopted to realize the rational multi secret sharing. The Execution efficiency, security and the feasibility has been remarkably improved in this our scheme compared with the traditional secret sharing schemes

11 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...Such as references [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21] and [22]....

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01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: This work proposes a new one- way information transmission mechanism, every player in a rational secret sharing protocol only interacts with his around two players, which means his decision is strictly based on previous neighboring player's strategy.
Abstract: In order to prevent any arbitrary subsets of coalition in rational secret sharing, we propose a new one- way information transmission mechanism, every player in a rational secret sharing protocol only interacts with his around two players, which means his decision is strictly based on previous neighboring player's strategy. Combined with the punishment strategy of Maleka's scheme and pay- off distribution principle in Game Theory, our scheme is capable of achieving Nash equilibrium and has the feature of anti-coalition. For the conspirators, getting the secret at the same time or in less than necessary iteration rounds is almost impossible. Without repeated involvement of the dealer, our scheme has the features of verifiability, anti- coalition, and more meaningfully, superiority of approach- ing reality model by taking rational behavior into consid- eration.

3 citations


Cites background from "Brief announcement: collusion free ..."

  • ...The rational thinking means each player is selfish, just enough to take his own interests into consideration so that he wants himself to be and only be the person who obtains the secret....

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Book ChapterDOI
28 Oct 2011
TL;DR: This paper proposed a verifiable rational multi-secret sharing scheme in which players can verify the identity of the dealer and it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating.
Abstract: In this paper we mainly focus on the cheating problem and the incapability problem existed in rational secret sharing schemes. Based on current schemes and the related knowledge of bit commitment agreement, we proposed a verifiable rational multi-secret sharing scheme in which players can verify the identity of the dealer. In this way, it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating. The correctness of the secret share is also guaranteed by discrete logarithm problem. The secret shares are divided into groups so that the distribution phase is well designed. The game theory model is also adopted to realize the rational multi secret sharing. The efficient of our scheme has remarkably improved in this protocol as well as the security and feasibility.

1 citations

References
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
13 Jun 2004
TL;DR: Under these assumptions, neither secret sharing nor multiparty function computation is possible using a mechanism that has a fixed running time, however, it is shown that both are possible using randomized mechanisms with constant expected running time.
Abstract: We consider the problems of secret sharing and multiparty computation, assuming that agents prefer to get the secret (resp., function value) to not getting it, and secondarily, prefer that as few as possible of the other agents get it. We show that, under these assumptions, neither secret sharing nor multiparty function computation is possible using a mechanism that has a fixed running time. However, we show that both are possible using randomized mechanisms with constant expected running time.

336 citations


"Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers background or result in this paper

  • ...This impossibility result is proved by Halpern and Teague[1]....

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  • ...Halpern and Teague[1] introduced the problem of rational secret sharing assuming that the players are rational, where each player behaves in a selfish manner....

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  • ...[1] J. Halpern and V. Teague....

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  • ...We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague[1]....

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Book ChapterDOI
19 Mar 2008
TL;DR: This paper suggests coalition-resilient secret sharing and SMPC protocols with the property that after any sequence of iterations it is still a computational best response to follow them, and are immune to backward induction.
Abstract: The goal of this paper is finding fair protocols for the secret sharing and secure multiparty computation (SMPC) problems, when players are assumed to be rational. It was observed by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004) that protocols with bounded number of iterations are susceptible to backward induction and cannot be considered rational. Previously suggested cryptographic solutions all share the property of having an essential exponential upper bound on their running time, and hence they are also susceptible to backward induction. Although it seems that this bound is an inherent property of every cryptography based solution, we show that this is not the case. We suggest coalition-resilient secret sharing and SMPC protocols with the property that after any sequence of iterations it is still a computational best response to follow them. Therefore, the protocols can be run any number of iterations, and are immune to backward induction. The mean of communication assumed is a broadcast channel, and we consider both the simultaneous and non-simultaneous cases.

215 citations


"Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...The completely collusion free protocol is presented in [2] by Kol and Naor by making cryptographic assumptions....

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Proceedings ArticleDOI
17 May 2008
TL;DR: This work provides a rational secret sharing scheme with simultaneous broadcast channel in which shares are taken from an unbounded domain, but have finite (and polynomial sized) expectation, and satisfies a stronger rationality concept (strict Nash equilibrium).
Abstract: We consider the rational versions of two of the classical problems in foundations of cryptography: secret sharing and multiparty computation, suggested by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004). Our goal is to design games and fair strategies that encourage rational participants to exchange information about their inputs for their mutual benefit, when the only mean of communication is a broadcast channel. We show that protocols for the above information exchanging tasks, where players' values come from a bounded domain, cannot satisfy some of the most desirable properties. In contrast, we provide a rational secret sharing scheme with simultaneous broadcast channel in which shares are taken from an unbounded domain, but have finite (and polynomial sized) expectation. Previous schemes (mostly cryptographic) have required computational assumptions, making them inexact and susceptible to backward induction, or used stronger communication channels. Our scheme is non-cryptographic, immune to backward induction, and satisfies a stronger rationality concept (strict Nash equilibrium). We show that our solution can also be used to construct an e-Nash equilibrium secret sharing scheme for the case of a non-simultaneous broadcast channel.

154 citations


"Brief announcement: collusion free ..." refers background or methods in this paper

  • ...Kol and Naor[3] proposed an efficient solution to the problem in the form of a strict rational secret sharing protocol in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel (on which all players broadcast...

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  • ...Our protocol is completely collusion free if n ≥ 2m−1, otherwise it is equivalent to Kol and Naor’s[3] protocol....

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  • ...Some positive results have been derived by Kol and Naor[3] by considering that players only prefer to learn....

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  • ...derived from utilities and distribution D, similar to [3]....

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  • ...The protocol in [3] is collusion free, even if (m− 1) long players collude they cannot get any advantage....

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