Proceedings ArticleDOI
Brief announcement: collusion free protocol for rational secret sharing
Amjed Shareef
- pp 402-403
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This work extends the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague, and proposes a completely collusion free, &3949;-Nash equilibrium protocol, when n ≥ 2m-1, where n is the number of players and m is thenumber of shares needed to construct the secret.Abstract:
We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague [1] Some positive results have been derived by Kol and Naor[3] by considering that players only prefer to learnThe solution considers that players are of two types; one player is the short player and the rest of the players are long players But their protocol is susceptible to coalitions if the short player colludes with any of the long players We extend their protocol, and propose a completely collusion free, &3949;-Nash equilibrium protocol, when n ≥ 2m-1, where n is the number of players and m is the number of shares needed to construct the secretread more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Rational Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme Based On Bit Commitment Protocol
Yongquan Cai,Zhanhai Luo,Yi Yang +2 more
TL;DR: A new rational multi-secret sharing scheme that has high security and takes an identity authentication for the dealer in distribution phase so that it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating.
A Rational Secret Sharing Scheme Against Coalition Based on Nash Equilibrium and Neighbor's Strategy ∗
TL;DR: This work proposes a new one- way information transmission mechanism, every player in a rational secret sharing protocol only interacts with his around two players, which means his decision is strictly based on previous neighboring player's strategy.
Book ChapterDOI
Verifiable Rational Multi-secret Sharing Scheme
Yongquan Cai,Zhanhai Luo,Yi Yang +2 more
TL;DR: This paper proposed a verifiable rational multi-secret sharing scheme in which players can verify the identity of the dealer and it is feasible to prevent the forger from cheating.
References
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
Joseph Y. Halpern,Vanessa Teague +1 more
TL;DR: Under these assumptions, neither secret sharing nor multiparty function computation is possible using a mechanism that has a fixed running time, however, it is shown that both are possible using randomized mechanisms with constant expected running time.
Book ChapterDOI
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
Gillat Kol,Moni Naor +1 more
TL;DR: This paper suggests coalition-resilient secret sharing and SMPC protocols with the property that after any sequence of iterations it is still a computational best response to follow them, and are immune to backward induction.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Games for exchanging information
Gillat Kol,Moni Naor +1 more
TL;DR: This work provides a rational secret sharing scheme with simultaneous broadcast channel in which shares are taken from an unbounded domain, but have finite (and polynomial sized) expectation, and satisfies a stronger rationality concept (strict Nash equilibrium).