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Chinese lineage and society: Fukien and Kwangtung
01 Jan 1971-
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors proposed a taxonomy of communities in China, including village, lineage, kinship, and clan I, and found that the majority of the communities belong to the same group.
Abstract: I. VILLAGE, LINEAGE, AND CLAN I 2. FAMILY 43 3. SOCIAL STATUS, POWER, AND GOVERNMENT 68 4. RELATIONS BETWEEN LINEAGES 97 5. GEOMANCY AND ANCESTOR WORSHIP 118 6. LINEAGES IN CHINA 155 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL POSTSCRIPT 185 LIST OF WORKS CITED 191 INDEX 201
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27 Aug 2007TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors discussed the limitations of formal party and bureaucratic institutions and the structure of solidary groups in the context of local governance in rural China, and proposed a framework for local governance.
Abstract: 1. Governance and informal institutions of accountability 2. Decentralization and local governmental performance 3. Local governmental performance: assessing village public goods provision 4. Informal accountability and the structure of solidary groups 5. Temples and churches in rural China 6. Lineages and local governance 7. Accountability and village democratic reforms 8. The limitations of formal party and bureaucratic institutions 9. Conclusion.
282 citations
TL;DR: The lineage model of political organizaatio- tion still embellishes phantom protostates in the work of African historians or "the lineage mode of production" in French Marxist an- thropologists, or they appear simply as part of the trappings in dozens of ethnographic monographs.
Abstract: The establishment of "lineage theory" or "descent theory" is conventionally traced to the publication in 1940 of African Political Systems, The Nuer, and The Political System of the Anuak ( 15, 16,28). Lineage theory dominated the study of social structure in British anthropology immediately after the end of World War II and retained a central position until the mid-1960s when, like British social anthropology more generally and the British Em pire itself, it seemed to lose its impetus and to run into the sands. Yet it did not completely vanish. Elements of the lineage model of political organiza tion still embellish phantom protostates in the work of African historians or "the lineage mode of production" in the work of French Marxist an thropologists, or they appear simply as part of the trappings, taken for granted, in dozens of ethnographic monographs. This stubborn half-life of lineage theory warrants consideration. I have an historical interest in lineage theory also, for although repre sented at the time as a breakthrough, it was rather a transformation of earlier theories in anthropology. Understanding the way in which the trans formation occurred helps us to see how and why anthropology developed as it did. The organization of my review is roughly chronological, and I shall sketch the genealogy of lineage theory, a genealogy which predictably has been tampered with (by others) to fi t later political realities. Evans-Pritch ard, for example, pointed out that there is a long history of interest in the central themes of descent theory, that is, in "the reciprocal relations be tween descent groups and local and political groups, between lineages and
165 citations
TL;DR: It is found that although rates of coresidence are high, noncoresident sons and daughters live close to parents, have frequent contact with their parents, and provide regular help to parents.
Abstract: Although most older Chinese parents live with an adult son or daughter, most adult offspring do not live with parents. We examine the relations of these noncoresident offspring with parents in terms of proximity, frequency of contact, and exchange of help. Based on a 1993 random sample survey conducted in two major Chinese cities, we find that although rates of coresidence are high, noncoresident sons and daughters live close to parents, have frequent contact with their parents, and provide regular help to parents. Relationships with noncoresident sons and daughters are unaffected by whether parents coreside with another child. There is some evidence of closer relationships with sons than with daughters, but parents without a son receive as much help from all children as do parents with sons. The effects of these and other predictors are estimated in multivariate analyses, and results are interpreted in terms of the persistence or change of traditional family norms.
153 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to the bifurcation between clans and corporations in China and Europe over the last millennium. And they highlighted that loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions.
Abstract: Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically and historically - the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.
147 citations
TL;DR: Most previous scholarship about the civil service examination system in imperial China has emphasized the degree of social mobility such examinations permitted in a premodern society as discussed by the authors, but these a priori judgments are often expressed teleologically when tied to the "modernization narrative" that still pervades our historiography of Ming (1368-1644) and Ch'ing (1644-1911) dynasty China.
Abstract: Most previous scholarship about the civil service examination system in imperial China has emphasized the degree of social mobility such examinations permitted in a premodern society. In the same vein, historians have evaluated the examination process in late imperial China from the perspective of the modernization process in modern Europe and the United States. They have thereby successfully exposed the failure of the Confucian system to advance the specialization and training in science that are deemed essential for nation-states to progress beyond their premodern institutions and autocratic political traditions. In this article, I caution against such contemporary, ahistorical standards for political, cultural, and social formation. These a priori judgments are often expressed teleologically when tied to the “modernization narrative” that still pervades our historiography of Ming (1368–1644) and Ch'ing (1644–1911) dynasty China.
147 citations