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Journal Article

"Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement*

01 May 2006-Texas Law Review (University of Texas, Austin, School of Law Publications, Inc.)-Vol. 84, Iss: 6, pp 1633
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the coercive approach is inappropriate and jeopardizes the long-term interests of the federalist system and argue that Congress should pursue the more federalist-friendly permissive approach, which leaves the decision whether (and to what extent) to enforce immigration law squarely in state and local hands.
Abstract: If the 9/11 terrorist attacks changed everything,1 they particularly changed the character of American law enforcement and the relationship of federal authorities to their state and local counterparts. Although less publicized than its condemnation of the infamous intelligence-sharing "wall,"2 the 9/11 Commission also insisted upon increased enforcement of the nation's immigration laws3 to prevent another terrorist attack and noted the "growing role for state and local law enforcement" in ongoing counterterrorism efforts.4 To that end, politicians, academics, journalists, and law enforcement officials have advocated removing the "other wall" in American law enforcement:5 the wall that currently discourages the country's 700,000 state and local police officers6 from enforcing federal immigration law.7 Although state and local police have undisputed legal authority to enforce the immigration code's criminal provisions,8 most do not assist in immigration enforcement since they perceive little federal support for their efforts.9 For example, when state and local police have encountered illegal immigrants10 in the course of their routine policing duties11 and have then contacted federal immigration authorities, the Interior and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE)12 has historically refused to take custody of those immigrants, citing a lack of resources and detention space.13 Moreover, motivated by political pressure and public safety concerns, some states and localities have even enacted "sanctuary" (or "noncooperation") policies, actively prohibiting their law enforcement personnel from assisting immigration authorities unless required to do so by law.14 To further complicate matters, over the past twenty years Congress, the federal courts, and the executive branch have sent confusing (and sometimes contradictory) signals concerning the scope of state and local legal authority to enforce immigration law.15 Prompted by rising state and local frustration with inadequate federal immigration enforcement and heightened awareness about the interconnectedness of illegal immigration and national security,16 Congress has recently considered enlisting state and local police as part of broader immigration reform efforts. Federal lawmakers have contemplated two distinct techniques for procuring state and local involvement in immigration enforcement, referred to by this Note as the coercive and permissive approaches.17 The coercive approach, most recently exemplified by the controversial Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (the Border Protection Act),18 not only clarifies that states and localities have the legal authority to investigate, arrest, and detain foreign nationals who have allegedly violated federal immigration law but takes an additional step to coerce sanctuary states and localities into abolishing their noncooperation policies as a condition for continued receipt of certain federal funds.19 The permissive approach, on the other hand, exemplified by the Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005 (the Comprehensive Enforcement Act),20 simply affirms state and local immigration enforcement authority. Part I of this Note outlines the ongoing debate about the public policy consequences of nonfederal immigration enforcement by discussing the problematic phenomenon of illegal immigration, the shifts in federal enforcement priorities, and the implications of increasing state and local immigration enforcement. Part II addresses the scope of legal authority for nonfederal immigration enforcement by examining opinions issued by the executive branch, federal courts, and legal scholars. Part III analyzes various legislative proposals that incorporate both coercive and permissive approaches to nonfederal immigration enforcement. Part IV argues that the coercive approach inappropriately jeopardizes the long-term interests of the federalist system. It then advocates that Congress should pursue the more federalist-friendly permissive approach, which leaves the decision whether (and to what extent) to enforce immigration law squarely in state and local hands. …
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored the development of immigration federalism in Australia and Canada (expressed through the establishment of state/provincial/territorial immigrant selection programs) and its implications for immigrants' rights and immigration opportunities.
Abstract: This article explores the development of immigration federalism in Australia and Canada (expressed through the establishment of state/provincial/territorial immigrant selection programs) and its implications for immigrants’ rights and immigration opportunities. Given the very limited scholarship on the issue, and the lack of previous comparative studies on immigration federalism in Australia and Canada, our research is exploratory by nature. Our finding is that provincial/state/territorial programs offer some advantages to prospective applicants (such as increased immigration opportunities), but, at the same time, raise a number of concerns (such as an increased dependence on employers). As our study reveals, the costs and benefits of immigration opportunities under state/provincial/territorial programs differ for skilled and low-skilled workers, whereby the latter are given only limited access to permanent residence, and on more onerous conditions than skilled workers. Drawing on these findings, we ident...

15 citations


Cites background from ""Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clar..."

  • ...between migration and national security, particularly after 9/11; and the shift in the focus of enforcement from outside border control to enforcement from within (Johnson, 2012; Chacón, 2009; Huntington, 2008; Boatright, 2006)....

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  • ...…irregular migration; the tightening of state/local budgets; the link between migration and national security, particularly after 9/11; and the shift in the focus of enforcement from outside border control to enforcement from within (Johnson, 2012; Chacón, 2009; Huntington, 2008; Boatright, 2006)....

    [...]

01 Jan 2018
TL;DR: Theories of local response and decision-making for police response and response to immigrants in Sanctuary Cities were discussed in this article, where a case study of six Sanctuary Cities in Connecticut and New Hampshire is presented.
Abstract: ................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................. 4 Immigration Federaism ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 State and Local Initiatives ............................................................................................................................................... 13 Theories of Local Response ............................................................................................................................................ 16 General Theories of Police Response and Decision Making ........................................................................... 20 Policy and Rhetoric Changes Under President Trump ..................................................................................... 24 Outline of Thesis By Chapter ............................................................................................................................ 27 Chapter One: Sanctuary City History and Analysis ......................... 30 History of the Term ‘Sanctuary’ .................................................................................................................................... 30 Recent Sanctuary City History ....................................................................................................................................... 34 Sanctuary City Debate: Pros and Cons ..................................................................................................................... 37 State Responses to Sanctuary Cities during Trump Administration .......................................................... 42 Examining Sanctuary Cities Before and After President Trump .................................................................. 44 Chapter Two: Demographic Analysis for Case Study ...................... 48 Connecticut and New Hampshire Demographic Information ....................................................................... 49 Connecticut and New Hampshire Ideology Analysis ......................................................................................... 51 Connecticut and New Hampshire Immigration Policy Analysis ................................................................... 53 Cities and Immigrant Policies ........................................................................................................................................ 56 City Demographics: Foreign-Born Population ..................................................................................................... 59 Immigration Policies in Each City ............................................................................................................................... 60 Comparing Responses to Immigrants Across Cities .......................................................................................... 69 Chapter 3: Interviewing Police Officers in Connecticut and New Hampshire: A Case Study Analysis ..................................................... 75 Views and Perceptions of Officers ................................................................................................................................ 78 Policies in the Six Cities................................................................................................................................................... 85 Changes in Response to the New Administration ............................................................................................... 95 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 103 Appendix .............................................................................................. 109 Bibliography ......................................................................................... 111

5 citations

01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: This article argued that the U.S. Constitution and relevant court cases have established the federal government as the main enforcer of immigration laws, and that unnecessary immigration enforcement by states can cause local officers to disregard their traditional job and use their resources to enforce federal laws.
Abstract: Since 2002, state and local governments have passed many laws and ordinances designed to regulate immigration. This sort of activism, combined with the failure of the federal government to enforce immigration laws, has blurred the line between who should and should not be enforcing immigration laws. This study seeks to clarify the debate concerning the enforcement of immigration laws in the United States. Through an analytical review of the U.S. Constitution, relevant U.S. Supreme Court rulings, and critical lower court cases, this study contends that the federal government is entitled to exclusive enforcement of immigration laws. This conclusion centers on four main arguments: (a) the U.S. Constitution and relevant court cases have established the federal government as the main enforcer of immigration laws; (b) the complexity of immigration laws concerning the enforcement of criminal and civil regulation may result in federal preemption for states and localities that overstep their formal agreements with the federal government; (c) the unnecessary immigration enforcement by states can cause local officers to disregard their traditional job and use their resources to enforce federal laws; and (d) local enforcement of immigration laws has further distanced immigrant communities by the voluntary or involuntary violation of civil rights.

1 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: This article argued that the U.S. Constitution and relevant court cases have established the federal government as the main enforcer of immigration laws, and that unnecessary immigration enforcement by states can cause local officers to disregard their traditional job and use their resources to enforce federal laws.
Abstract: Since 2002, state and local governments have passed many laws and ordinances designed to regulate immigration. This sort of activism, combined with the failure of the federal government to enforce immigration laws, has blurred the line between who should and should not be enforcing immigration laws. This study seeks to clarify the debate concerning the enforcement of immigration laws in the United States. Through an analytical review of the U.S. Constitution, relevant U.S. Supreme Court rulings, and critical lower court cases, this study contends that the federal government is entitled to exclusive enforcement of immigration laws. This conclusion centers on four main arguments: (a) the U.S. Constitution and relevant court cases have established the federal government as the main enforcer of immigration laws; (b) the complexity of immigration laws concerning the enforcement of criminal and civil regulation may result in federal preemption for states and localities that overstep their formal agreements with the federal government; (c) the unnecessary immigration enforcement by states can cause local officers to disregard their traditional job and use their resources to enforce federal laws; and (d) local enforcement of immigration laws has further distanced immigrant communities by the voluntary or involuntary violation of civil rights.

1 citations


Cites background from ""Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clar..."

  • ...According to a poll reported by Boatright (2006), “Over 80% of Americans already think that state and local police should be involved in immigration enforcement” (p. 1667)....

    [...]

  • ...According to Booth (2006), in 2005 there were an estimated 8 to 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., “with an additional 800,000 joining that number each year” (p. 1066). More than two-thirds of the unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. have entered the country within the last 10 years (C. M. Rodríguez, 2008). The uncontrolled levels of illegal immigration have made it clear that there is an immigration problem in the United States. In response to ineffective policy and enforcement by Washington, DC, state and local governments have reacted by passing their own immigration enforcement legislation. In 2007, “More than 1,400 bills addressing immigration...in some capacity were introduced in state legislatures across the country” (C. M. Rodríguez, 2008, p. 569). In her research, C. M. Rodríguez (2008) said that non-federal legislatures will continue to be active in immigration enforcement until the passage of a comprehensive immigration reform....

    [...]

  • ...Another scholar, Boatright (2006), argued that “even if states have constitutional authority to enforce immigration law, federal law preempts inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause where concurrent jurisdiction exists” (p....

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  • ...In addition, states and localities have shown dissatisfaction with ICE given that it has historically refused to take custody of undocumented immigrants citing a lack of resources and detention space (Boatright, 2006). All these cases have encouraged non-federal agents to increase their immigration enforcement efforts and put pressure on the federal government to pass a comprehensive immigration reform. The participation of state and local governments would increase the number of available resources as well as provide the federal government with needed manpower to enforce immigration laws. Since national security became a top priority to the United States post-9/11, some non-federal agents have argued that state and local participation will enhance national security and add more manpower to the more than 2,000 federal immigration agents (McKenzie 2004). Specifically, the participation of non-federal agents would benefit immigration enforcement due to their constant contact with the general public. Not only are state and local policemen most likely to get in contact with criminals, but they are also more likely to have the personnel to respond to violations of immigration law. For example, local police encountered three of the terrorists who participated in the 9/11 attacks. Likewise, Boatright (2006) added that since state and local police represent approximately 95% of the U....

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  • ...Further, Boatright (2006) stated that when an individual state acts with its own reason, the state has the power to embroil the U.S. in international conflicts....

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Posted ContentDOI
24 May 2021
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine Toronto's Access T.O. policy, a policy created by the City of Toronto to transform Toronto into a "sanctuary city" and highlight areas where the policy needs improvement and further expansion.
Abstract: This paper examines Toronto's Access T.O. policy, a policy created to transform Toronto into a sanctuary city. I argue that the Access T.O. policy has made progress towards turning Toronto into a practicable sanctuary city. However, I also highlight areas where the policy needs improvement and further expansion. I also show how the City of Toronto's Access T.O. policy offers an alternative approach to migration and settlement policies found at the level of the Canadian federal state and illustrate how these policies diverge and contradict. The Access T.O. policy, like other sanctuary cities, is shown to provide an alternative understanding and implementation of citizenship, belonging, rights, ethics and morality, human agency, security and borders to that found in federal state policies. The paper provides background information on sanctuary cities prior to entering this aforementioned discussion and concludes with considerations for Access T.O.'s continued expansion and implementation.