Code and data files for "Fiscal Policy and Default Risk in Emerging Markets"
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...Φ( θ∗ − x∗ σ )− t = 0 (12) The second equilibrium condition: when θ = θ∗, the fraction of agents that attack the currency is just enough to make the government abandon the peg....
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Cites background or result from "Code and data files for "Fiscal Pol..."
...Cuadra et al. (2010) show that in a model with endogenous fiscal policy and sovereign default risk, debt is less useful to the government in smoothing consumption fluctuations, and fiscal policy becomes optimally procyclical....
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...The household’s per-period utility function follows Cuadra et al. (2010):...
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...As in Cuadra et al. (2010), the model predicts a procyclical fiscal policy; that is, the government levies higher tax rates during economic downturns when the default risk makes it difficult to issue bonds in the international financial market. A time-inconsistency problem, as in Gonçalves and Guimaraes (2015), arises in this environment as the government cannot commit to its future fiscal policies. During economic downturns, the government can choose to either levy a high tax rate to repay its debt or default on its debt and avoid levying an overly high tax rate. Setting a higher tax rate provides a stronger incentive for the government to repay. However, a discretionary government makes its default-taxation decision solely based on its debt balance and income realization and disregards the benefit of setting a higher tax rate on default risk. Consequently, the government is reluctant to make fiscal adjustments and defaults too frequently. In equilibrium, the excessive default incidence is priced by foreign creditors and limits the government’s ability to borrow. This time-inconsistency problem creates a role for the government to use commitment devices to alleviate default risk and improve welfare. In this paper, we use the model to assess the value of fiscal commitment that has been promoted extensively after the recent European debt crisis. Specifically, we consider two types of commitment measures: a non-contingent tax commitment and a contingent tax commitment.5 Under the non-contingent tax commitment, the government sets a single tax rate at the time the bond is issued. In the next period, the preset tax rate is implemented, regardless of the government’s default decision and income realizations. In comparison, under the contingent tax commitment, the government commits to a full schedule of tax rates that is contingent on the next-period income. In that sense, the government is more flexible and can customize its tax policy (5)In this paper, we assume commitment devices are always available and evaluate the effects of imposing fiscal commitment on the indebted countries. As discussed in the introduction, such commitment can be achieved by introducing balanced budget rules as domestic laws or building credibility through tough and persistent fiscal stances. In addition, Gonçalves and Guimaraes (2015) argue that a third-party institution such as the IMF can also serve as a commitment device by forcing the debtor countries to implement the planned fiscal adjustments. Moreover, Leeper (2017) points out that many features of conventional fiscal policy entail substantial precommitment: the structure of tax code and social programs are given until changed....
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...This paper builds on the literature that studies fiscal policy in the sovereign default model proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008), Cuadra et al. (2010), and Arellano and Bai (2017)....
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...As in Cuadra et al. (2010), the model predicts a procyclical fiscal policy; that is, the government levies higher tax rates during economic downturns when the default risk makes it difficult to issue bonds in the international financial market....
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2 citations
Cites background from "Code and data files for "Fiscal Pol..."
...…of debt dynamics and default in incomplete asset markets models: Eaton & Gersovitz (1981), Aguiar & Amador (2013), Aguiar & Gopinath (2006), Cuadra et al. (2010), Pouzo & Presno (2014), and Yue (2010).4 In fact, the benchmark for comparison is Arellano (2008), which accounts for the…...
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References
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"Code and data files for "Fiscal Pol..." refers background in this paper
...7 Lane and Tornell (1999) argue that in economies without strong legal and political institutions, a “voracity” effect may take place....
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