Book•
Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology
01 Jan 1976-
TL;DR: Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology as discussed by the authors surveys contemporary theories of perception, criticizing mechanistic information-processing models and stressing differences between perception in the external world and in experimental laboratory situations.
Abstract: DOWNLOAD http://bit.ly/1ahnv9u Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology Surveys contemporary theories of perception, criticizing mechanistic information-processing models and stressing differences between perception in the external world and in experimental laboratory situations This book presents a general and formal theory of meaning, signs, and language. The theory is presented in a clear and consistent way offering novel and provocative insights. book explores the representational powers of a person's mind.. A book/disk/3-D glasses package that explains the concepts behind VR and provides fascinating software for readers who want to explore this rapidly-evolving topic. This book. pages. This important book focuses on the role of human factors in the design and use of automobiles. It should review current knowledge of human characteristics as related to.
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TL;DR: Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of self as independent and a construpal of the Self as interdependent as discussed by the authors, and these divergent construals should have specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Abstract: People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.
18,178 citations
05 Jun 2008
TL;DR: Theories of human behavior differ in their conceptions of human nature and what they regard as the basic determinants and mechanisms governing self-development, adaptation, and change as discussed by the authors, which is rooted in an agentic perspective.
Abstract: Theories of human behavior differ in their conceptions of human nature and what they regard as the basic determinants and mechanisms governing self-development, adaptation, and change. Social cognitive theory is rooted in an agentic perspective ( Bandura 1986, 2006a). To be an agent is to influence one's own functioning and events that affect one's life. In this view people are contributors to their life circumstances, not just products of them.
Keywords:
Information Processing and Cognitions;
Psychology
3,306 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a novel paradigm that circumvents such interpretative problems by requiring subjects to make a neutral response (button press) to a neutral stimulus (visual dot probe).
Abstract: Recent research has suggested that anxiety may be associated with processing biases that favor the encoding of emotionally threatening information. However, the available data can be accommodated by alternative explanations, including response bias accounts. The current study introduces a novel paradigm that circumvents such interpretative problems by requiring subjects to make a neutral response (button press) to a neutral stimulus (visual dot probe). The position of this dot probe was manipulted on a VDU (visual display unit) screen relative to visually displayed words, which could either be threat related or neutral in content. Probe detection latency data were then used to determine the impact of threat-related stimuli on the distribution of visual attention. Clinically anxious (but not clinically depressed) subjects consistently shifted attention toward threat words, resulting in reduced detection latencies for probes appearing in the vicinity of such stimuli. Normal control subjects, on the other hand, tended to shift attention away from such material. The results were interpreted as supporting the existence of anxiety-related encoding bias, and it is suggested that this cognitive mechanism may contribute to the maintenance of such mood disorders.
2,526 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that the brain produces an internal representation of the world, and the activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing, but it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness.
Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
2,271 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that the brain produces an internal representation of the world, and the activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing, but it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness.
Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
2,264 citations