Cognition In The Wild
01 Jan 2016-
TL;DR: The cognition in the wild is universally compatible with any devices to read and is available in the digital library an online access to it is set as public so you can download it instantly.
Abstract: Thank you very much for reading cognition in the wild. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have look hundreds times for their favorite books like this cognition in the wild, but end up in malicious downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they cope with some harmful virus inside their laptop. cognition in the wild is available in our digital library an online access to it is set as public so you can download it instantly. Our book servers spans in multiple countries, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Merely said, the cognition in the wild is universally compatible with any devices to read.
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Dissertation•
01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: The models I introduce suggest distributed Bayesian inference as a framework for understanding shared belief formation, and also show that people can overcome other difficult computational challenges associated with achieving rational group agency.
Abstract: As the world becomes increasingly digitally mediated, people can more and more easily form groups, teams, and communities around shared interests and goals. Yet there is a constant struggle across forms of social organization to maintain stability and coherency in the face of disparate individual experiences and agendas. When are collectives able to function and thrive despite these challenges? In this thesis I propose a theoretical framework for reasoning about collective intelligence—the ability of people to accomplish their shared goals together. A simple result from the literature on multiagent systems suggests that strong general collective intelligence in the form of “rational group agency” arises from three conditions: aligned utilities, accurate shared beliefs, and coordinated actions. However, achieving these conditions can be difficult, as evidenced by impossibility results related to each condition from the literature on social choice, belief aggregation, and distributed systems. The theoretical framework I propose serves as a point of inspiration to study how human groups address these difficulties. To this end, I develop computational models of facets of human collective intelligence, and test these models in specific case studies. The models I introduce suggest distributed Bayesian inference as a framework for understanding shared belief formation, and also show that people can overcome other difficult computational challenges associated with achieving rational group agency, including balancing the group “exploration versus exploitation dilemma” for information gathering and inferring levels of “common p-belief” to coordinate actions. Thesis Supervisor: Joshua B. Tenenbaum Title: Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Thesis Supervisor: Alex “Sandy” Pentland Title: Toshiba Professor of Media Arts and Sciences
6 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...This idea is referred to as “distributed cognition” [55]....
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...There is a growing view of group behavior as implementing distributed algorithms [55, 61, 26, 32], which goes a step beyond the predominant analytical framework of agent-based models in that it formalizes specific information processing tasks that groups are solving....
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...Hutchins, who coined the term, studied what is now a classic example of the crew of a navy ship solving the computational problem of navigation on the open waters [55]....
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...What are the specific mechanisms by which humans establish effective coordinated distributed information processing agents that can accomplish more than any individual alone, and how do our abilities play a role in these mechanisms? The perspective of group behavior as distributed processing [55] suggests the importance of communication for collective intelligence because of the importance of communication in distributed systems....
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TL;DR: This study explores fast-and-frugal heuristics that may be used to prioritize patient alarms, while continuing to monitor patient physiological state, and identifies three specific factors that are helpful for clinical personnel: ventilator presence, number of intravenous drips, and number of medications.
Abstract: Automated patient monitoring systems suffer from several design problems. Among them, alarm fatigue is one of the most critical issues, as evidenced by the Sentinel Event Alert that The Joint Commission – the U.S. hospital-accrediting body – recently issued. In this study, we explore fast-and-frugal heuristics that may be used to prioritize patient alarms, while continuing to monitor patient physiological state. By using a combination of human factors methodologies and the theory of Distributed Cognition (DCog), we studied alarm fatigue and its relationship to the underlying hospital systems. We identified three specific factors that we envision to be helpful for clinical personnel: ventilator presence, number of intravenous drips, and number of medications. We discuss their application in daily hospital operation. We also address cost-benefit considerations and possible monitor designs. Received on 20 November 2016; accepted on 06 April 2017; published on 13 July 2017
6 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...This explains the assertion that nurses are most aware of the status of nearby patients: they are aware of the information available within their horizon of observation, as identified by Hutchins [13] (p....
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...This explains the assertion that nurses are most aware of the status of nearby patients: they are aware of the information available within their horizon of observation, as identified by Hutchins [13] (p. 268)....
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...DCog views cognition as distributed among human, technological actors, and cognitive artifacts (such as “to-do” lists), as well as through time, within specific work systems [13]....
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TL;DR: The authors discusses anthropological concerns about niche construction theory, but also suggests ways in which some of them might be reduced if they were to incorporate insights from developmental systems theory and actor network theory.
Abstract: | Many North American anthropologists remain deeply suspicious of attempts to theorize the evolution of culture, given the legacy in our discipline of nineteenth-century stagist theories of cultural evolution that were shaped by scientific racism . In the late twentieth-century, some theorists tried to escape this legacy by using formal models drawn from neo-Darwinian population biology to reconceptualize cultural evolutionary processes, but these more recent approaches have been found unsatisfactory for reasons of their own. For example, gene-culture coevolution and the dual inheritance theory have limited appeal to many contemporary cultural anthropologists because these theories rely on definitions of culture, and assumptions about human individuals and social groups, that many cultural anthropologists no longer find persuasive . Niche construction, by contrast, appears more promising as a framework for connecting cultural change with biological and ecological change. Nevertheless, the innovative features of niche construction coexist uneasily alongside the same problematic features that limit the usefulness of gene-culture coevolution and dual inheritance theory in cultural anthropology . This article discusses anthropological concerns about niche construction theory, but also suggests ways in which some of them might be reduced if niche construction theory were to incorporate insights from developmental systems theory and actor network theory.
6 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...Kendal also approvingly refers to the work of anthropologists Bonnie Nardi (1996) and Will Hutchins (1995), and to the work of philosopher Andy Clark (2011), all of whom emphasize that cognition is not something that takes place inside our heads, but is the product of the changes in relational structures of biotic and abiotic components that are both internal and eternal to the mind (2011, 247)....
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...Gravlee, Clarence, H. Russell Bernard, and William Leonard....
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...Hutchins, Will....
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...Gravlee, Clarence, H. Russell Bernard, and William Leoard....
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...Kendal also approvingly refers to the work of anthropologists Bonnie Nardi (1996) and Will Hutchins (1995), and to the work of philosopher Andy Clark (2011), all of whom emphasize that cognition is not something that takes place inside our heads, but is the product of the changes in relational…...
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27 Aug 2020
6 citations
27 May 2015
TL;DR: It is argued that video games are tools prone to reshape the understanding of history in such a way that learning about past events becomes a matter of boundary control and collaborative knowledge production.
Abstract: This paper is a reflection on how video games support representations of history by using the interactive particularities of the medium. History appears as a space that can be recreated through technologically-mediated performances in which players are assigned the role of participants in a story made available by design. Fiction and realism are constitutive parts of historical games in which players have no choice but to navigate a world depicted through precise programmes of action. By analysing a representative game in the historical genre (i.e. 'Valiant Hearts: The Great War'), I argue that video games are tools prone to reshape the understanding of history in such a way that learning about past events becomes a matter of boundary control and collaborative knowledge production.
6 citations
Additional excerpts
...DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF...
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References
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TL;DR: The authors argue that the affordances an environment offers to an animal are dependent on the skills the animal possesses and that the landscape of affordances we inhabit as humans is very rich and resourceful.
Abstract: How broad is the class of affordances we can perceive? Affordances (Gibson, 1979/1986) are possibilities for action provided to an animal by the environment—by the substances, surfaces, objects, and other living creatures that surround it. A widespread assumption has been that affordances primarily relate to motor action—to locomotion and manual behaviors such as reaching and grasping. We propose an account of affordances according to which the concept of affordances has a much broader application than has hitherto been supposed. We argue that the affordances an environment offers to an animal are dependent on the skills the animal possesses. By virtue of our many abilities, the landscape of affordances we inhabit as humans is very rich and resourceful.
628 citations
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TL;DR: Situative analyses include hypotheses about principles of coordination that support communication and reasoning in activity systems, including construction of meaning and understanding as discussed by the authors, which is a program of research in the learning sciences that I call "situative".
Abstract: This chapter discusses a program of research in the learning sciences that I call “situative.” The defining characteristic of a situative approach is that instead of focusing on individual learners, the main focus of analysis is on activity systems : complex social organizations containing learners, teachers, curriculum materials, software tools, and the physical environment. Over the decades, many psychologists have advocated a study of these larger systems (Dewey, 1896, 1929/1958; Lewin, 1935, 1946/1997; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1987), although they remained outside the mainstream of psychology, which instead focused on individuals. Situative analyses include hypotheses about principles of coordination that support communication and reasoning in activity systems, including construction of meaning and understanding. Other terms for the perspective I refer to as situative include sociocultural psychology (Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 1995), activity theory (Engestrom, 1993; 1999), distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995a), and ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1996). I use the term “situative” because I was introduced to the perspective by scholars who referred to their perspective as situated action (Suchman, 1985), situated cognition (Lave, 1988), or situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991). I prefer the term “situative,” a modifier of “perspective,” “analysis,” or “theory,” to “situated,” used to modify “action,” “cognition,” or “learning,” because the latter adjective invites a misconception: that some instances of action, cognition, or learning are situated and others are not. During the 1980s and 1990s these scholars and others provided analyses in which concepts of cognition and learning are relocated at the level of activity systems.
545 citations
TL;DR: This work argues that advances in digital technologies increase innovation network connectivity by reducing communication costs and increasing its reach and scope and increase the speed and scope of digital convergence, which increases network knowledge heterogeneity and need for integration.
Abstract: The increased digitization of organizational processes and products poses new challenges for understanding product innovation. It also opens new horizons for information systems research. We analyse how ongoing pervasive digitization of product innovation reshapes knowledge creation and sharing in innovation networks. We argue that advances in digital technologies 1 increase innovation network connectivity by reducing communication costs and increasing its reach and scope and 2 increase the speed and scope of digital convergence, which increases network knowledge heterogeneity and need for integration. These developments, in turn, stretch existing innovation networks by redistributing control and increasing the demand for knowledge coordination across time and space presenting novel challenges for knowledge creation, assimilation and integration. Based on this foundation, we distinguish four types of emerging innovation networks supported by digitalization: 1 project innovation networks; 2 clan innovation networks; 3 federated innovation networks; and 4 anarchic innovation networks. Each network involves different cognitive and social translations - or ways of identifying, sharing and assimilating knowledge. We describe the role of five novel properties of digital infrastructures in supporting each type of innovation network: representational flexibility, semantic coherence, temporal and spatial traceability, knowledge brokering and linguistic calibration. We identify several implications for future innovation research. In particular, we focus on the emergence of anarchic network forms that follow full-fledged digital convergence founded on richer innovation ontologies and epistemologies calling to critically re-examine the nature and impact of modularization for innovation.
418 citations
TL;DR: A blind IQA model is proposed, which learns qualitative evaluations directly and outputs numerical scores for general utilization and fair comparison and is not only much more natural than the regression-based models, but also robust to the small sample size problem.
Abstract: This paper investigates how to blindly evaluate the visual quality of an image by learning rules from linguistic descriptions. Extensive psychological evidence shows that humans prefer to conduct evaluations qualitatively rather than numerically. The qualitative evaluations are then converted into the numerical scores to fairly benchmark objective image quality assessment (IQA) metrics. Recently, lots of learning-based IQA models are proposed by analyzing the mapping from the images to numerical ratings. However, the learnt mapping can hardly be accurate enough because some information has been lost in such an irreversible conversion from the linguistic descriptions to numerical scores. In this paper, we propose a blind IQA model, which learns qualitative evaluations directly and outputs numerical scores for general utilization and fair comparison. Images are represented by natural scene statistics features. A discriminative deep model is trained to classify the features into five grades, corresponding to five explicit mental concepts, i.e., excellent, good, fair, poor, and bad. A newly designed quality pooling is then applied to convert the qualitative labels into scores. The classification framework is not only much more natural than the regression-based models, but also robust to the small sample size problem. Thorough experiments are conducted on popular databases to verify the model’s effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness.
360 citations
TL;DR: The current state of the descriptive information-processing model, and its relation to the major topics in empirical aesthetics today, including the nature of aesthetic emotions, the role of context, and the neural and evolutionary foundations of art and aesthetics are reviewed.
Abstract: About a decade ago, psychology of the arts started to gain momentum owing to a number of drives: technological progress improved the conditions under which art could be studied in the laboratory, neuroscience discovered the arts as an area of interest, and new theories offered a more comprehensive look at aesthetic experiences. Ten years ago, Leder, Belke, Oeberst, and Augustin (2004) proposed a descriptive information-processing model of the components that integrate an aesthetic episode. This theory offered explanations for modern art's large number of individualized styles, innovativeness, and for the diverse aesthetic experiences it can stimulate. In addition, it described how information is processed over the time course of an aesthetic episode, within and over perceptual, cognitive and emotional components. Here, we review the current state of the model, and its relation to the major topics in empirical aesthetics today, including the nature of aesthetic emotions, the role of context, and the neural and evolutionary foundations of art and aesthetics.
329 citations