Cognition In The Wild
01 Jan 2016-
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated decision-making processes in 18 multi-agency groups who were video recorded while engaged in simulated major incident emergencies involving a potential need to evacuate individuals from the location of the incident.
Abstract: Multi‐agency groups are brought together to make strategic decisions in response to major incident emergencies. Here, we investigated decision‐making processes in 18 multi‐agency groups who were video recorded while engaged in simulated major incident emergencies involving a potential need to evacuate individuals from the location of the incident. Three general categories of decision‐making activity were used to code the videos: situation assessment (SA), plan formulation (PF) and plan execution (PE). Analysis of the transitions between these decision‐making activities showed that there were marked between‐group departures from normative models of decision‐making, which predict an orderly transition from SA to PF and then from PF to PE. These departures appeared to reflect between‐group differences in the tendency to explore information (evident in reciprocal transitions between SA and PF) or exploit information (apparent in transitions to and from SA and PF to PE). Moreover, the tendency to explore but not exploit information was associated with the number of transitions to critical decisions (i.e. to evacuate individuals from the location of the incident).
3 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...A central component of this approach, developed by Klein (1993, 2003, 2008; see also, Klein et al., 2003; Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b), was based on just this kind of interaction: how previous experience primes decisions in the face of uncertain information (i.e. recognition- primed or intuitive…...
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25 Apr 2020
TL;DR: This paper introduces a nascent project aimed at exploring new avenues to support creativity, socialisation and community through smart interfaces for augment reality through a preliminary framework consisting of 2 orthogonal continua (virtual-real and human-thing) and 2 critical perspective (postphenomenology/posthumanism and cultural interface).
Abstract: This paper introduces a nascent project aimed at exploring new avenues to support creativity, socialisation and community through smart interfaces for augment reality. Augmented reality has been so far largely conceptualised from a point of view of 'power users' seeking to support very specific applications, e.g. in training and simulation. With the availability of devices to mass market, new applications become possible, and new research problems open up. We offer a preliminary framework consisting of 2 orthogonal continua (virtual-real and human-thing) and 2 critical perspective (postphenomenology/posthumanism and cultural interface). With this poster we hope to stimulate valuable discussion and seek input from the CHI community about the challenges, opportunities, and theoretical perspectives underpinning a smart, socialised AR.
3 citations
01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: The article undertakes the new emerging perspective of language as a dynamic form of activity between interacting human agents and redefines it as “an activity in which wordings play a part” (Cowley).
Abstract: The article undertakes the new emerging perspective of language as a dynamic form of activity between interacting human agents and redefines it as “an activity in which wordings play a part” (Cowley). Drawing on the views of Maturana, Bottineau, Harris, Thibault, Cowley and others, the author situates the concept of language in the vast field of ecology, agency and interactivity. Language thus conceived is not a code-like denotational structure but an aspect of sense-saturated communicative coordination and a result of human actions and co-actions. On this view we describe a conversation as an unfolding process of two or more interactants entering the cognitive dynamics which allows them to connect to each other and to their environments thus pursuing their individual and shared goals. This can be referred to as sense-making through dialogicality.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the notion of dialectics in linguistic bodies theory is presented as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model.
Abstract: This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology.
3 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...In line with this thought, there has been an increasing interest in the study of “cognition in the wild” (Hutchins, 1995), i.e., “to consider the complexities of everyday sociomaterial engagements, the experience of living and interact ing in the real world, stepping outside the lab” (LB, p.…...
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TL;DR: In this paper, Hamami argues that the reliability argument is fundamentally correct, but that there is another epistemic property differentiating the deductive method from non-deductive reliable processes.
Abstract: Although there exists today a variety of non-deductive reliable processes able to determine the truth of certain mathematical propositions, proof remains the only form of justification accepted in mathematical practice. Some philosophers and mathematicians have contested this commonly accepted epistemic superiority of proof on the ground that mathematicians are fallible: when the deductive method is carried out by a fallible agent, then it comes with its own level of reliability, and so might happen to be equally or even less reliable than existing non-deductive reliable processes—I will refer to this as the reliability argument. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the reliability argument forces us to reconsider the commonly accepted epistemic superiority of the deductive method over non-deductive reliable processes. I will argue that the reliability argument is fundamentally correct, but that there is another epistemic property differentiating the deductive method from non-deductive reliable processes. This property is based on the observation that, although mathematicians are fallible agents, they are also self-correcting agents. This means that when a proof is produced which only contains repairable mistakes, given enough time and energy, a mathematician or a group thereof should be able to converge towards a correct proof through a finite number of verification and correction rounds, thus providing a guarantee that the considered proposition is true, something that non-deductive reliable processes will never be able to produce. From this perspective, the standard of justification adopted in mathematical practice should be read in a diachronic way: the demand is not that any proof that is ever produced be correct—which would amount to require that mathematicians are infallible—but rather that, over time, proofs that contain repairable mistakes be corrected, and proofs that cannot be repaired be rejected. ∗Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium. Email: yacin.hamami@gmail.com. Website: www.yacinhamami.com.
3 citations
Cites background from "Cognition In The Wild"
...Taken together, these observations provide evidence 17I have in mind a conception of collective agents such as the one proposed by Bird (2014) in what he calls the ‘distributed model’ (Bird, 2014, pp. 44–46) which is inspired by Hutchins (1995)....
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References
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TL;DR: The authors argue that the affordances an environment offers to an animal are dependent on the skills the animal possesses and that the landscape of affordances we inhabit as humans is very rich and resourceful.
Abstract: How broad is the class of affordances we can perceive? Affordances (Gibson, 1979/1986) are possibilities for action provided to an animal by the environment—by the substances, surfaces, objects, and other living creatures that surround it. A widespread assumption has been that affordances primarily relate to motor action—to locomotion and manual behaviors such as reaching and grasping. We propose an account of affordances according to which the concept of affordances has a much broader application than has hitherto been supposed. We argue that the affordances an environment offers to an animal are dependent on the skills the animal possesses. By virtue of our many abilities, the landscape of affordances we inhabit as humans is very rich and resourceful.
628 citations
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TL;DR: Situative analyses include hypotheses about principles of coordination that support communication and reasoning in activity systems, including construction of meaning and understanding as discussed by the authors, which is a program of research in the learning sciences that I call "situative".
Abstract: This chapter discusses a program of research in the learning sciences that I call “situative.” The defining characteristic of a situative approach is that instead of focusing on individual learners, the main focus of analysis is on activity systems : complex social organizations containing learners, teachers, curriculum materials, software tools, and the physical environment. Over the decades, many psychologists have advocated a study of these larger systems (Dewey, 1896, 1929/1958; Lewin, 1935, 1946/1997; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1987), although they remained outside the mainstream of psychology, which instead focused on individuals. Situative analyses include hypotheses about principles of coordination that support communication and reasoning in activity systems, including construction of meaning and understanding. Other terms for the perspective I refer to as situative include sociocultural psychology (Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 1995), activity theory (Engestrom, 1993; 1999), distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995a), and ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1996). I use the term “situative” because I was introduced to the perspective by scholars who referred to their perspective as situated action (Suchman, 1985), situated cognition (Lave, 1988), or situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991). I prefer the term “situative,” a modifier of “perspective,” “analysis,” or “theory,” to “situated,” used to modify “action,” “cognition,” or “learning,” because the latter adjective invites a misconception: that some instances of action, cognition, or learning are situated and others are not. During the 1980s and 1990s these scholars and others provided analyses in which concepts of cognition and learning are relocated at the level of activity systems.
545 citations
TL;DR: This work argues that advances in digital technologies increase innovation network connectivity by reducing communication costs and increasing its reach and scope and increase the speed and scope of digital convergence, which increases network knowledge heterogeneity and need for integration.
Abstract: The increased digitization of organizational processes and products poses new challenges for understanding product innovation. It also opens new horizons for information systems research. We analyse how ongoing pervasive digitization of product innovation reshapes knowledge creation and sharing in innovation networks. We argue that advances in digital technologies 1 increase innovation network connectivity by reducing communication costs and increasing its reach and scope and 2 increase the speed and scope of digital convergence, which increases network knowledge heterogeneity and need for integration. These developments, in turn, stretch existing innovation networks by redistributing control and increasing the demand for knowledge coordination across time and space presenting novel challenges for knowledge creation, assimilation and integration. Based on this foundation, we distinguish four types of emerging innovation networks supported by digitalization: 1 project innovation networks; 2 clan innovation networks; 3 federated innovation networks; and 4 anarchic innovation networks. Each network involves different cognitive and social translations - or ways of identifying, sharing and assimilating knowledge. We describe the role of five novel properties of digital infrastructures in supporting each type of innovation network: representational flexibility, semantic coherence, temporal and spatial traceability, knowledge brokering and linguistic calibration. We identify several implications for future innovation research. In particular, we focus on the emergence of anarchic network forms that follow full-fledged digital convergence founded on richer innovation ontologies and epistemologies calling to critically re-examine the nature and impact of modularization for innovation.
418 citations
TL;DR: A blind IQA model is proposed, which learns qualitative evaluations directly and outputs numerical scores for general utilization and fair comparison and is not only much more natural than the regression-based models, but also robust to the small sample size problem.
Abstract: This paper investigates how to blindly evaluate the visual quality of an image by learning rules from linguistic descriptions. Extensive psychological evidence shows that humans prefer to conduct evaluations qualitatively rather than numerically. The qualitative evaluations are then converted into the numerical scores to fairly benchmark objective image quality assessment (IQA) metrics. Recently, lots of learning-based IQA models are proposed by analyzing the mapping from the images to numerical ratings. However, the learnt mapping can hardly be accurate enough because some information has been lost in such an irreversible conversion from the linguistic descriptions to numerical scores. In this paper, we propose a blind IQA model, which learns qualitative evaluations directly and outputs numerical scores for general utilization and fair comparison. Images are represented by natural scene statistics features. A discriminative deep model is trained to classify the features into five grades, corresponding to five explicit mental concepts, i.e., excellent, good, fair, poor, and bad. A newly designed quality pooling is then applied to convert the qualitative labels into scores. The classification framework is not only much more natural than the regression-based models, but also robust to the small sample size problem. Thorough experiments are conducted on popular databases to verify the model’s effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness.
360 citations
TL;DR: The current state of the descriptive information-processing model, and its relation to the major topics in empirical aesthetics today, including the nature of aesthetic emotions, the role of context, and the neural and evolutionary foundations of art and aesthetics are reviewed.
Abstract: About a decade ago, psychology of the arts started to gain momentum owing to a number of drives: technological progress improved the conditions under which art could be studied in the laboratory, neuroscience discovered the arts as an area of interest, and new theories offered a more comprehensive look at aesthetic experiences. Ten years ago, Leder, Belke, Oeberst, and Augustin (2004) proposed a descriptive information-processing model of the components that integrate an aesthetic episode. This theory offered explanations for modern art's large number of individualized styles, innovativeness, and for the diverse aesthetic experiences it can stimulate. In addition, it described how information is processed over the time course of an aesthetic episode, within and over perceptual, cognitive and emotional components. Here, we review the current state of the model, and its relation to the major topics in empirical aesthetics today, including the nature of aesthetic emotions, the role of context, and the neural and evolutionary foundations of art and aesthetics.
329 citations