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Journal ArticleDOI

Cognitive Developmental Robotics: A Survey

TL;DR: Cognitive developmental robotics aims to provide new understanding of how human's higher cognitive functions develop by means of a synthetic approach that developmentally constructs cognitive functions through interactions with the environment, including other agents.
Abstract: Cognitive developmental robotics (CDR) aims to provide new understanding of how human's higher cognitive functions develop by means of a synthetic approach that developmentally constructs cognitive functions. The core idea of CDR is ldquophysical embodimentrdquo that enables information structuring through interactions with the environment, including other agents. The idea is shaped based on the hypothesized development model of human cognitive functions from body representation to social behavior. Along with the model, studies of CDR and related works are introduced, and discussion on the model and future issues are argued.

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Citations
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01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe a scenario where a group of people are attempting to find a solution to the problem of "finding the needle in a haystack" in the environment.
Abstract: 中枢神経系疾患の治療は正常細胞(ニューロン)の機能維持を目的とするが,脳血管障害のように機能障害の原因が細胞の死滅に基づくことは多い.一方,脳腫瘍の治療においては薬物療法や放射線療法といった腫瘍細胞の死滅を目標とするものが大きな位置を占める.いずれの場合にも,細胞死の機序を理解することは各種病態や治療法の理解のうえで重要である.現在のところ最も研究の進んでいる細胞死の型はアポトーシスである.そのなかで重要な位置を占めるミトコンドリアにおける反応および抗アポトーシス因子について概要を紹介する.

2,716 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a review of recent progress in cognitive science suggests that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and how they learn it.
Abstract: Recent progress in artificial intelligence has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats that of humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (1) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (2) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (3) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes toward these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.

2,010 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Eye movements reflect visual information searching in multiple conditions and are amenable for cellular-level investigations, which suggests that the oculomotor system is an excellent model system for understanding information-sampling mechanisms.

460 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Self-Adaptive Goal Generation Robust Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity (SAGG-RIAC) architecture is introduced as an intrinsically motivated goal exploration mechanism which allows active learning of inverse models in high-dimensional redundant robots.

409 citations


Cites background from "Cognitive Developmental Robotics: A..."

  • ...…mechanisms based on the concept of intrinsic motivation (sometimes called curiosity-driven learning) grounded into theories of motivation, spontaneous exploration, free play and development in humans [130, 35, 13] as well as in recent findings in the neuroscience of motivation [104, 52, 83]....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Soft materials may enable the automation of tasks beyond the capacities of current robotic technology.
Abstract: Soft materials may enable the automation of tasks beyond the capacities of current robotic technology.

323 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
14 Mar 1997-Science
TL;DR: Findings in this work indicate that dopaminergic neurons in the primate whose fluctuating output apparently signals changes or errors in the predictions of future salient and rewarding events can be understood through quantitative theories of adaptive optimizing control.
Abstract: The capacity to predict future events permits a creature to detect, model, and manipulate the causal structure of its interactions with its environment. Behavioral experiments suggest that learning is driven by changes in the expectations about future salient events such as rewards and punishments. Physiological work has recently complemented these studies by identifying dopaminergic neurons in the primate whose fluctuating output apparently signals changes or errors in the predictions of future salient and rewarding events. Taken together, these findings can be understood through quantitative theories of adaptive optimizing control.

8,163 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Illustration de trois fonctions principales qui sont predominantes dans l'etude de l'intervention de l'sattention dans les processus cognitifs: 1) orientation vers des evenements sensoriels; 2) detection des signaux par processus focal; 3) maintenir la vigilance en etat d'alerte
Abstract: : The concept of attention as central to human performance extends back to the start of experimental psychology, yet even a few years ago, it would not have been possible to outline in even a preliminary form a functional anatomy of the human attentional system. New developments in neuroscience have opened the study of higher cognition to physiological analysis, and have revealed a system of anatomical areas that appear to be basic to the selection of information for focal (conscious) processing. The importance of attention is its unique role in connecting the mental level of description of processes used in cognitive science with the anatomical level common in neuroscience. Sperry describes the central role that mental concepts play in understanding brain function. As is the case for sensory and motor systems of the brain, our knowledge of the anatomy of attention is incomplete. Nevertheless, we can now begin to identify some principles of organization that allow attention to function as a unified system for the control of mental processing. Although many of our points are still speculative and controversial, we believe they constitute a basis for more detailed studies of attention from a cognitive-neuroscience viewpoint. Perhaps even more important for furthering future studies, multiple methods of mental chronometry, brain lesions, electrophysiology, and several types of neuro-imaging have converged on common findings.

7,237 citations


"Cognitive Developmental Robotics: A..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Similar approaches can be found in [7] or [10], but CDR puts more emphasis on the human/humanoid cognitive development....

    [...]

  • ...On the other hand, at the later stage, social behaviors such as early communication, joint attention, imitation of various actions including vocalization, empathy, and verbal communication gradually emerged due to interactions with other agents....

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Book
21 Jan 1954
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a distinction between simple temporal displacements in extension due to the repetition of primitive processes on the occasion of new problems analogous to old ones, and the temporal displacement in comprehension due to a transition from one plane of activity to another; that is, from the plane of action to that of representation.
Abstract: class does not exist either, precisely since the relation between the two shadows compared is not a relation of simple comparison and common appurtenance to the same totality, but of substantial participation. The shadow perceived on the table is therefore no more an isolable object than is, on the sensorimotor plane, the watch which disappears under one cushion and which the child expects to see appear under another. But if there is thus an apparent return to the past it is for an opposite reason to that which obstructs objectification in sensorimotor intelligence; in the latter case the object is difficult to form in proportion as the child has difficulty in intercoordinating perceptual images, whereas on the plane of conceptual thought the object, already elaborated, again loses its identity to the extent that it is coordinated with other objects to construct a class or a relation. In conclusion, in the case of the object as in that of space, from the very beginnings of verbal reflection there is a return of the difficulties already overcome on the plane of action, and there is repetition, with temporal displacements, of the stages and process of adaptation defined by the transition from egocentrism to objectivity. And in both cases the phenomenon is due to the difficulties experienced by the child, after he has reached the social plane, in inserting his sensorimotor acquisitions in a framework of relationships of logical classes and deductive structures admitting of true generalisation, that is, taking into account the point of view of others and all possible points of view as well as his own. § 4. From Sensori-Motor Universe to Representation of the Child’s World II. Causality and Time The development of causality from the first months of life to the eleventh or twelfth year reveals the same graphic curve as that of space or object. The acquisition of causality seems to be completed with the formation of sensorimotor intelligence; in the measure that objectification and spatialisation of relations of cause and effect succeed the magico-phenomenalistic egocentrism of the primitive connections, a whole evolution resumes with the advent of speech and representative thought which seems to reproduce the preceding evolution before really extending it. But among the displacements to which this history of the concept of cause gives rise, distinction must again be made between the simple temporal displacements in extension due to the repetition of primitive processes on the occasion of new problems analogous to old ones, and the temporal displacements in comprehension due to the transition from one plane of activity to another; that is, from the plane of action to that of representation. It seems useless to us to emphasise the former. Nothing is more natural than the fact that belief in the efficacy of personal activity, a belief encouraged by chance comparisons through immediate or phenomenalistic experience, is again found throughout childhood in those moments of anxiety or of desire which characterise infantile magic. The second type of temporal displacements, however, raises questions which it is useful to mention here. During the first months of life the child does not dissociate the external world from his own activity. Perceptual images, not yet consolidated into objects or coordinated in a coherent space, seem to him to be governed by his desires and efforts, though these are not attributed to a self which is separate from the universe. Then gradually, as progress is made in the intelligence which elaborates objects and space by spinning a tight web of relations among these images, the child attributes an autonomous causality to things and persons and conceives of the existence of causal relations independent of himself, his own body becoming a source among other sources of effects integrated in this total system. What will happen when, through speech and representative thought, the subject succeeds not only in foreseeing the development of phenomena and in acting upon them but in evoking them apart from any action in order to try to explain them? It is here that the paradox of displacement in comprehension appears. By virtue of the "why" obsessing the child’s mind, as soon as his representation of the world can be detached without too much risk of error, one perceives that this universe, centred on the self, which seemed abolished because it was eliminated from practical action relating to the immediate environment, reappears on the plane of thought and impresses itself on the little child as the sole understandable conception of totality. Undoubtedly the child no longer behaves, as did the baby, as though he commanded everything and everybody. He knows that adults have their own will, that the rain, wind, clouds, stars, and all things are characterised by movements and effects he undergoes but cannot control. In short, on the practical plane, the objectification and spatialisation of causality remain acquired. But this does not at all prevent the child from representing the universe to himself as a large machine, organised exactly by whom he does not know, but organised with the help of adults and for the sake of the well-being of men and particularly of children. Just as in a house everything is arranged according to a plan, despite imperfections and partial failures, so also the raison d’être for everything in the physical universe is the function of a sort of order in the world, an order both material and moral, of which the child is the center. Adults are there "to take care of us," animals to do us service, the stars to warm us and give us light, plants to nourish us, rain to make the gardens grow, clouds to "make night," mountains to climb on, and lakes for boats, etc. Furthermore, to this more or less explicit and coherent artificialism there corresponds a latent animism which endows everything with the will to play its role and with just the force and awareness needed to act with regularity. Thus the causal egocentrism, which on the sensorimotor plane disappears gradually under the influence of spatialisation and objectification, reappears from the time of the beginnings of thought in almost as radical a form. Doubtless the child no longer attributes personal causality to others or to things, but while endowing objects with specific activities he centers all these activities on man and above all on himself. It seems clear that in this sense we may speak of temporal displacement from one plane to another and that the phenomenon is thus comparable to the phenomena which characterise the evolution of space and object. But it is in a still deeper sense that the primitive schemata of causality are again transposed in the child’s first reflective representations. If it is true that from the second year of life the child attributes causality to others and to objects instead of reserving a monopoly on them for his own activity, we have still to discover how he represents to himself the mechanism of these causal relations. We have just recalled that corresponding to the egocentric artificialism which makes the universe gravitate around man and child is an animism capable of explaining the activity of creatures and things in this sort of world. This example is precisely of a kind to help us understand the second kind of temporal displacement of which we now speak: if the child renounces considering his actions as the cause of every event, he nevertheless is unable to represent to himself the action of bodies except by means of schemata drawn from his own activity. An object animated by a "natural" movement like the wind which pushes clouds, or the moon which advances, thus seems endowed with purposefulness and finality, for the child is unable to conceive of an action without a conscious goal. Through lack of awareness, every process involving a relation of energies, such as the rising of the water level in a glass in which a pebble has been dropped, seems due to forces copied from the model of personal activity; the pebble "weighs" on the bottom of the water, it "forces" the water to rise, and if one held the pebble on a string midway of the column of the water the level would not change. In short, even though there is objectivity on the practical plane, causality may remain egocentric from the representative point of view to the extent that the first causal conceptions are drawn from the completely subjective consciousness of the activity of the self. With regard to spatialisation of the causal connection the same temporal displacement between representation and action is observable. Thus the child can acknowledge in practice the necessity for a spatial contact between cause and effect, but that does not make causality geometric or mechanical. For example, the parts of a bicycle all seem necessary to the child long before he thinks of establishing irreversible causal series among them. However, subsequent to these primitive stages of representation during which one sees reappear on the plane of thought forms of causality relative to those of the first sensorimotor stages and which seem surpassed by the causal structures of the final stages of sensorimotor intelligence, one witnesses a truly reflective objectification and spatialisation, whose progress is parallel to that which we have described on the plane of action. Thus it is that subsequent to the animism and dynamism we have just mentioned, we see a gradual "mechanism" taking form, correlative to the principles of conservation described in § 3 and to the elaboration of a relative space. Causality, like the other categories, therefore evolves on the plane of thought from an initial egocentrism to a combined objectivity and relativity, thus reproducing, in surpassing, its earlier sensorimotor evolution. With regard to time, concerning which we have tried to describe on the purely practical plane of the first two years of life the transformation from

5,878 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
13 Dec 1996-Science
TL;DR: The present study shows that a fundamental task of language acquisition, segmentation of words from fluent speech, can be accomplished by 8-month-old infants based solely on the statistical relationships between neighboring speech sounds.
Abstract: Learners rely on a combination of experience-independent and experience-dependent mechanisms to extract information from the environment. Language acquisition involves both types of mechanisms, but most theorists emphasize the relative importance of experience-independent mechanisms. The present study shows that a fundamental task of language acquisition, segmentation of words from fluent speech, can be accomplished by 8-month-old infants based solely on the statistical relationships between neighboring speech sounds. Moreover, this word segmentation was based on statistical learning from only 2 minutes of exposure, suggesting that infants have access to a powerful mechanism for the computation of statistical properties of the language input.

4,352 citations

Book
01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: The brain's default state: self-organized oscillations in rest and sleep, and perturbation of the default patterns by experience.
Abstract: Prelude. Cycle 1. Introduction. Cycle 2. Structure defines function. Cycle 3. Diversity of cortical functions is provided by inhibition. Cycle 4. Windows on the brain. Cycle 5. A system of rhythms: from simple to complex dynamics. Cycle 6. Synchronization by oscillation. Cycle 7. The brain's default state: self-organized oscillations in rest and sleep. Cycle 8. Perturbation of the default patterns by experience. Cycle 9. The gamma buzz: gluing by oscillations in the waking brain. Cycle 10. Perceptions and actions are brain state-dependent. Cycle 11. Oscillations in the "other cortex:" navigation in real and memory space. Cycle 12. Coupling of systems by oscillations. Cycle 13. The tough problem. References.

4,266 citations


"Cognitive Developmental Robotics: A..." refers background in this paper

  • ..., [24], [45]) have focused on rhythmic models, subsuming discrete movement as a special case, neurophysiological and computational research on arm motor control (e....

    [...]