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Journal ArticleDOI

Collective Redress: Will Portugal Show the Way?

01 May 2015-Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (Oxford University Press)-Vol. 6, Iss: 5, pp 299-300
TL;DR: In Portugal, a mass damages claim against Sport TV, which until recently held the monopoly in the provision of paid premium sports channels in Portugal (Lisbon Judicial Court, case no. 7074/15.8T8LSB), was made by the Portuguese Competition Observatory as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Portugal is a small country by European standards and, with the financial and economic crisis, it has not always been in the limelight, for positive reasons, in the last years. Here is one area in which, however, this small country, with unlimited access to the gigantic ocean resources, could show the path, or at least, a possible path, to the rest of Europe. That path concerns collective redresses in damages competition proceedings. When the decision was made not to include provisions on collective redress in the EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive, it became clear that each Member State would have to find its own way of interpreting the principle of effectiveness and its implications for actions relating to mass damages arising from antitrust infringements. And it is good that things turned out the way they did, because the approach which would have been possible at the EU level, as the Commission’s broader 2013 Recommendation shows, would have imposed conditions which might have seriously stifled the possibility of achieving full reparation of damages to consumers through collective enforcement. The choice for the optin system, in particular, would inevitably mean that a great number of consumers would not be represented, favouring the non-reparation of damages to those who are least informed, more prone to inertia and more in need of protection. While research seems to growingly point to the economic and sociopolitical justification of opt-out mechanisms, as long as certain safeguards are in place, very few Member States have as yet made this option. Examples that stand out, in varying degrees, are the Netherlands, Portugal and, more recently, the UK, and Belgium. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say that the laws of the Member States have not yet made it possible for companies to be ordered to fully compensate consumers for the damages caused by anticompetitive practices. Despite the many decisions taken by the European Commission and the NCAs which could have led to follow-on consumer redress, there are very few cases in the EU as a whole which can be pointed to as examples thereof. Two successful cases related to a very limited number of injured parties—the Austrian driving schools cartel case (District Court of Graz, file no. 4 C 463/06 h) and the UK’s JJB Sport case (CAT, case no. 1078/7/9/07), the latter concluded with a settlement. More often, attempts at such actions are wholly unsuccessful, usually not passing the stage of admissibility—such as the French mobile telephony case (Paris Commercial Court, 6 December 2007, UFC Que Choisir v Bouygues Telecom), the Spanish Telefonica case (Madrid Commercial Court No. 4, 7 November 2012, Ausbanc v Telefonica) or the Italian Microsoft case (Milan Tribunal, 20 December 2010, upheld by Milan Court of Appeals, 3 May 2011). This may change. On 12 March 2015, the Portuguese Competition Observatory, a non-profit association of academics from a number of Universities, filed a mass damages claim against Sport TV, which until recently held the monopoly in the provision of paid premium sports channels in Portugal (Lisbon Judicial Court, case no. 7074/15.8T8LSB). The action seeks to compensate over 600,000 clients for damages allegedly resulting from a number of anticompetitive practices, but also to compensate those who were excluded from the benefit of these channels due to the inflation of prices and all Portuguese pay-tv subscribers, between 2005 and June 2013 (over 3 million at the end of the period), who suffered from a reduction of competition on this market as a result of increased transparency and reduced incentive to competition arising from the practices of the company jointly controlled by the pay-tv market leader. Partly following an abuse of dominance decision by the Portuguese Competition Authority, confirmed by the courts, the action can lead to reparations in the tens of millions. In that case, the claim was made possible by the Portuguese (1995) actio popularis law, in which standing is given to any injured consumer or consumer association, with little in the way of certification and no financial resources requirements, very limited court fees and safeguards set up primarily through the vigilance of the Court and the Public Prosecutor. Beyond attracting claimants to Portugal, that claim may turn into a case-study for the EU as a whole. For

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Book
19 Aug 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an analytical presentation of how Europe has created its own version of collective actions, showing how the Copernican turn of class actions questions the fundamentals of the European thinking about market and public interest.
Abstract: This open access book offers an analytical presentation of how Europe has created its own version of collective actions. In the last three decades, Europe has seen a remarkable proliferation of collective action legislation, making class actions the most successful export product of the American legal scholarship. While its spread has been surrounded by distrust and suspiciousness, today more than half of the EU Member States have introduced collective actions for damages and from those who did, more than half chose, to some extent, the opt-out system.This book demonstrates why collective actions have been felt needed from the perspective of access to justice and effectiveness of law, the European debate and the deep layers of the European reaction and resistance, revealing how the Copernican turn of class actions questions the fundamentals of the European thinking about market and public interest. Using a transsystemic presentation of the European national models, it analyzes the way collective actions were accommodated with the European regulatory environment, the novel and peculiar regulatory questions they had to address and how and why they work differently on this side of the Atlantic.

17 citations


Cites background from "Collective Redress: Will Portugal S..."

  • ...Civil Justice Quart 28(3):367–388 Wagner G (2011) Collective redress—categories of loss and legislative options....

    [...]

  • ...106 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 6.1 Collective Actions Are Needed in Europe to Ensure Access to Justice and Effectiveness of the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 6.2 European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 6.3 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing . . . . . . . . . 117 viii Contents 6.4 European Models of Collective Actions: A Transsystemic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

    [...]

  • ...12The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions (2009)....

    [...]

  • ...22.) of the Minister of Justice....

    [...]

  • ...Chapter 2 Why Are Collective Actions Needed in Europe: Small Claims Are Not Reasonably Enforced in Practice and Collective Actions Ensure Effective Access to Justice It is probably very easy to agree with the tenet that “[r]ights which cannot be enforced in practice are worthless.”...

    [...]

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed an opt-out model to solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law infringements.
Abstract: The EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive does not include provisions for collective redress. Each EU member state is free to provide national regulation on this matter. The Portuguese legal system provided regulation on actio popularis since 1995. The ‘rational apathy’ of individual consumers may lead to non-reparation of damage and be of significant benefit for the company that is in breach of the law. The opt-out models solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law infringements. Under those circumstances, it is rational to be apathetic, because it can be foreseen that the cost of filing for compensatory damages will exceed the recovery obtained from the defendant. Such rational apathy of the parties injured by competition law infringements favours the wrongfully acting companies by not extracting their illegal gains from them. By not requiring the active consent of each of the claimants, the opt-out model is able to override rational apathy of consumers.

9 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a legal framework for collective action regimes in the EU with the proviso that national law must not discriminate between the application of EU and domestic law and must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation.
Abstract: Aside from some general legal requirements, EU law contains no “federal” legal framework for Member States’ collective action regimes. Member States have procedural autonomy in the application of EU law, that is, they are free to determine the structure and way of application and enforcement, with the proviso that national law must not discriminate between the application of EU and domestic law (principle of equivalence) and “must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (principle of effectiveness).”

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the EU Recommendation on common principles for collective redress might have limited impact on the field of competition law due to: several uncertainties regarding the legal standing in class actions; difficulties in their funding; and the risk of forum shopping with cross-border actions.
Abstract: It will be argued in this article that the EU Recommendation on common principles for collective redress might have limited impact on the field of competition law due to: several uncertainties regarding the legal standing in class actions; difficulties in their funding; and the risk of forum shopping with cross-border actions. Nevertheless, Belgium and Great Britain have recently introduced class actions into their national legal systems and addressed some of the difficulties which other Member States were experiencing already. It will also be suggested that the Portuguese model – the ‘Popular Action’ – and recent Portuguese practice may be considered an interesting example to follow in order to overcome some of the identified obstacles to private antitrust enforcement.

7 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2019
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the regulatory contexts in the US and in Europe for class actions and show that the US law features a large array of legal institutions which catalyze the operation of class actions but are completely missing in Europe (e.g., contingency fees, no or one-way cost shifting, super-compensatory damages such as punitive and treble damages, pre-trial discovery, jury trials).
Abstract: Not surprisingly, collective actions’ regulatory contexts in the US and in Europe differ considerably. US law features a large array of legal institutions which catalyze the operation of class actions but are completely missing in Europe (e.g. contingency fees, no or one-way cost-shifting, super-compensatory damages such as punitive and treble damages, pre-trial discovery, jury trials). In fact, notwithstanding their independent nature, these legal concepts are quite often associated with class actions.

2 citations