Committee selection with multimodal preferences
Pallavi Jain,Nimrod Talmon +1 more
- Vol. 325, pp 123-130
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TLDR
This work designs efficient algorithms for certain cases of committee selection with multimodal preferences and discusses applications of the model and the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules to this setting.Abstract:
We study committee selection with multimodal preferences: Assuming a set of candidatesA, a set of voters V , and ` layers, where each voter v ∈ V has ordinal preferences over the alternatives for each layer separately, the task is to select a committee S ⊆ A of size k. We discuss applications of our model and study the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules (specifically, k-Borda and Chamberlin–Courant) to our setting, as well as discuss domain restrictions for our model. While most problems we encounter are computationally intractable in general, we nevertheless design efficient algorithms for certain cases.read more
Citations
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Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences
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Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
TL;DR: In this paper , the complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences was studied and eleven stability notions derived from three well-established stability notions for stable matchings with ties and four adaptions proposed by Chen et al.
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Distortion in Attribute Approval Committee Elections
Dorothea Baumeister,Linus Boes +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , the distortion in attribute approval committee elections is studied, where each candidate satisfies a variety of attributes in different categories (e.g., academic degree, work experience, lo-cation).
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Multi-votes Election Control by Selecting Rules
Aizhong Zhou,Jianliang Xu +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors considered a new model of election control that by assigning different rules to the votes from different layers, makes the special candidate p being the winner of the election (a rule can be assigned to different layers).
References
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Proceedings Article
Multi-attribute proportional representation
Jérôme Lang,Piotr Skowron +1 more
TL;DR: This work considers the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set, and studies the properties of the associated subset selection rules, as well as their computation complexity.
Posted Content
Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections
TL;DR: This technique gives efficient algorithms for finding optimal committees under Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and the Chamberlin–Courant rule with single-peaked preferences, as well as for certain OWA-based rules.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules
TL;DR: This work introduces and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees, the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter.
Proceedings Article
Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections.
TL;DR: In this paper, a new technique called carefully chosen integer linear programming (IP) formulations for certain voting problems admit an LP relaxation which is totally unimodular if preferences are single-peaked, and thus admits an integral optimal solution.
Journal ArticleDOI
Achieving fully proportional representation by clustering voters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed several approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe voting rules and experimentally analyzed their performance, and found that their algorithms are computationally efficient and, in many cases, are able to provide solutions which are very close to optimal.