Committee selection with multimodal preferences
Pallavi Jain,Nimrod Talmon +1 more
- Vol. 325, pp 123-130
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TLDR
This work designs efficient algorithms for certain cases of committee selection with multimodal preferences and discusses applications of the model and the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules to this setting.Abstract:
We study committee selection with multimodal preferences: Assuming a set of candidatesA, a set of voters V , and ` layers, where each voter v ∈ V has ordinal preferences over the alternatives for each layer separately, the task is to select a committee S ⊆ A of size k. We discuss applications of our model and study the computational complexity of several generalizations of known committee scoring rules (specifically, k-Borda and Chamberlin–Courant) to our setting, as well as discuss domain restrictions for our model. While most problems we encounter are computationally intractable in general, we nevertheless design efficient algorithms for certain cases.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences
TL;DR: In this article , the authors introduce three position-based matching models, which minimize the "dissatisfaction score", which measures matchings from different perspectives, and present diverse complexity results for these three models, among others, polynomial-time solvability for the first model.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences
TL;DR: In this paper , the complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences was studied and eleven stability notions derived from three well-established stability notions for stable matchings with ties and four adaptions proposed by Chen et al.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Distortion in Attribute Approval Committee Elections
Dorothea Baumeister,Linus Boes +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , the distortion in attribute approval committee elections is studied, where each candidate satisfies a variety of attributes in different categories (e.g., academic degree, work experience, lo-cation).
Journal ArticleDOI
Multi-votes Election Control by Selecting Rules
Aizhong Zhou,Jianliang Xu +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors considered a new model of election control that by assigning different rules to the votes from different layers, makes the special candidate p being the winner of the election (a rule can be assigned to different layers).
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Computing and testing Pareto optimal committees
Haris Aziz,Jérôme Monnot +1 more
TL;DR: This work assumes that each agent specifies a weak order on single alternatives, from which a preference relation over subsets is derived using some preference extension, and studies the complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes.
Posted Content
Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees
TL;DR: In this article, the complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes is studied for five prominent preference extensions (responsive, downward lexicographic, upward lexicographical, best, and worst).
Posted Content
Committee Selection with Attribute Level Preferences.
TL;DR: This work provides a formal study of the different aspects of the problem of committee selection from a fixed set of candidates where each candidate has multiple quantifiable attributes and proves that finding a committee with justified representation and the highest approval voting score is NP-complete.