Competition for competence and interpartner learning within international strategic alliances
TL;DR: In this paper, a detailed analysis of nine international alliances yielded a fine-grained understanding of the determinants of interpartner learning, concluding that not all partners are equally adept at learning, that asymmetries in learning alter the relative bargaining power of partners, stability and longevity may be inappropriate metrics of partnership success, and partners may have competitive, as well as collaborative aims, vis-a-vis each other.
Abstract: Global competition highlights asymmetries in the skill endowments of firms. Collaboration may provide an opportunity for one partner to internalize the skills of the other, and thus improve its position both within and without the alliance. Detailed analysis of nine international alliances yielded a fine-grained understanding of the determinants of interpartner learning. The study suggests that not all partners are equally adept at learning; that asymmetries in learning alter the relative bargaining power of partners; that stability and longevity may be inappropriate metrics of partnership success; that partners may have competitive, as well as collaborative aims, vis-a-vis each other; and that process may be more important than structure in determining learning outcomes.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces.
Abstract: Scholars of the theory of the firm have begun to emphasize the sources and conditions of what has been described as “the organizational advantage,” rather than focus on the causes and consequences of market failure. Typically, researchers see such organizational advantage as accruing from the particular capabilities organizations have for creating and sharing knowledge. In this article we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the following arguments: (1) social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital; (2) organizations, as institutional settings, are conducive to the development of high levels of social capital; and (3) it is because of their more dense social capital that firms, within certain limits, have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing intellectual capital. We present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces...
15,365 citations
Cites background or methods from "Competition for competence and inte..."
...This anticipation of or receptivity to learning and new knowledge creation has been shown to be an important factor affecting the success or otherwise of strategic alliances (Hamel, 1991)....
[...]
...These two dimensions of explicit/tacit and individual/social knowledge have been combined by Spender (1996), who created a matrix of four 2 To this recent authors have added the concept of knowwhy (Hamel, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992)....
[...]
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that an increasingly important unit of analysis for understanding competitive advantage is the relationship between firms and identify four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage: relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources/capabilities, and effective governance.
Abstract: In this article we offer a view that suggests that a firm's critical resources may span firm boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm resources and routines. We argue that an increasingly important unit of analysis for understanding competitive advantage is the relationship between firms and identify four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage: (1) relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge-sharing routines, (3) complementary resources/capabilities, and (4) effective governance. We examine each of these potential sources of rent in detail, identifying key subprocesses, and also discuss the isolating mechanisms that serve to preserve relational rents. Finally, we discuss how the relational view may offer normative prescriptions for firm-level strategies that contradict the prescriptions offered by those with a resource-based view or industry structure view.
11,355 citations
Cites background from "Competition for competence and inte..."
...Complementary resource endowments have been the focus of much prior discussion on the formation and management of alliances and have been discussed widely as a key factor driving returns from alliances (Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 1985; Hill & Hellriegel, 1994; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994; Teece, 1987)....
[...]
...In instances where researchers have explicitly studied how firms collaborate to generate economic rents, they have tended to focus on one particular benefit associated with collaboration, such as learning, lower transaction costs, or pooling of resources (DQre, 1983; Dyer, 1996a; Hamel, 1991; Larson, 1992; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Teece, 1987)....
[...]
TL;DR: Powell et al. as mentioned in this paper developed a network approach to organizational learning and derive firm-level, longitudinal hypotheses that link research and development alliances, experience with managing interfirm relationships, network position, rates of growth, and portfolios of collaborative activities.
Abstract: This research was supported by grants provided to the first author by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute, University of Arizona, and the Aspen Institute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund and by grants to the second author by the College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona. We have benefited from productive exchanges with numerous audiences to whom portions of this paper have been presented: a session at the 1994 Academy of Management meetings, the Social Organization workshop at the University of Arizona, the Work, Organizations, and Markets workshop at the Harvard Sociology Department, the 1994 SCOR Winter Conference at Stanford University, and colloquia at the business schools at the University of Alberta, UC-Berkeley, Duke, and Emory, and the JFK School at Harvard. For detailed comments on an earlier draft, we are extremely grateful to Victoria Alexander, Ashish Arora, Maryellen Kelley, Peter Marsden, Charles Kadushin, Dick Nelson, Christine Oliver, Lori Rosenkopf, Michael Sobel, Bill Starbuck, Art Stinchcombe, and anonymous reviewers at ASQ. We thank Dina Okamoto for research assistance and Linda Pike for editorial guidance. Address correspondence to Walter W. Powell, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. We argue in this paper that when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather than in individual firms. The large-scale reliance on interorganizational collaborations in the biotechnology industry reflects a fundamental and pervasive concern with access to knowledge. We develop a network approach to organizational learning and derive firm-level, longitudinal hypotheses that link research and development alliances, experience with managing interfirm relationships, network position, rates of growth, and portfolios of collaborative activities. We test these hypotheses on a sample of dedicated biotechnology firms in the years 1990-1994. Results from pooled, within-firm, time series analyses support a learning view and have broad implications for future theoretical and empirical research on organizational networks and strategic alliances.*
8,249 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the internal stickiness of knowledge transfer and test the resulting model using canonical correlation analysis of a data set consisting of 271 observations of 122 best-practice transfers in eight companies.
Abstract: The ability to transfer best practices internally is critical to a firtn's ability to build competitive advantage through the appropriation of rents from scarce internal knowledge. Just as a firm's distinctive competencies tnight be dificult for other firms to imitate, its best prczctices could be dfficult to imitate internnlly. Yet, little systematic attention has been pcrid to such internal stickiness. The author analyzes itlterrzal stickiness of knowledge transfer crnd tests the resulting model using canonical correlation analysis of a data set consisting of 271 observations of 122 best-practice transfers in eight companies. Contrary to corzverztiorzrzl wisdom that blames primarily motivational factors, the study findings show the major barriers to internal knowledge transfer to be knowledge-related factors such as the recipient's lack oj absorptive capacity, causal anzbiguity, and an arciuous relationship between the source and the recipient. The identification and transfer of best practices cally are hindered less by confidentiality and legal is emerging as one of the most important and obstacles than external transfers, they could be widespread practical management issues of the faster and initially less complicated, all other latter half of the 1990s. Armed with meaningful, things being equal. For those reasons, in an era detailed performance data, firms that use fact- when continuous organizational learning and based management methods such as TQM, bench- relentless performance improvement are needed to marking, and process reengineering can regularly remain competitive, companies must increasingly compare the performance of their units along resort to the internal transfer of capabilitie~.~ operational dimensions. Sparse but unequivocal Yet, experience shows that transferring capaevidence suggests that such comparisons often bilities within a firm is far from easy. General reveal surprising performance differences between Motors had great difficulty in transferring manuunits, indicating a need to improve knowledge facturing practices between divisions (Kerwin and utilization within the firm (e.g., Chew, Bresnahan, Woodruff, 1992: 74) and IBM had limited suc
6,805 citations
Cites background from "Competition for competence and inte..."
...Hence, unleaming (Hedberg, 1981) will be required to replace prior knowledge (cf. also Hamel, 1991 )....
[...]
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a social network perspective to the study of strategic alliances and identify five key issues for the formation of alliances, the choice of governance structure, the dynamic evolution of alliances and the performance of alliances.
Abstract: This paper introduces a social network perspective to the study of strategic alliances. It extends prior research, which has primarily considered alliances as dyadic exchanges and paid less attention to the fact that key precursors, processes, and outcomes associated with alliances can be defined and shaped in important ways by the social networks within which most firms are embedded. It identifies five key issues for the study of alliances: (1) the formation of alliances, (2) the choice of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of alliances, (4) the performance of alliances, and (5) the performance consequences for firms entering alliances. For each of these issues, this paper outlines some of the current research and debates at the firm and dyad level and then discusses some of the new and important insights that result from introducing a network perspective. It highlights current network research on alliances and suggests an agenda for future research. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
4,694 citations
References
More filters
Book•
12 Oct 2017
TL;DR: The Discovery of Grounded Theory as mentioned in this paper is a book about the discovery of grounded theories from data, both substantive and formal, which is a major task confronting sociologists and is understandable to both experts and laymen.
Abstract: Most writing on sociological method has been concerned with how accurate facts can be obtained and how theory can thereby be more rigorously tested. In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss address the equally Important enterprise of how the discovery of theory from data--systematically obtained and analyzed in social research--can be furthered. The discovery of theory from data--grounded theory--is a major task confronting sociology, for such a theory fits empirical situations, and is understandable to sociologists and laymen alike. Most important, it provides relevant predictions, explanations, interpretations, and applications. In Part I of the book, "Generation Theory by Comparative Analysis," the authors present a strategy whereby sociologists can facilitate the discovery of grounded theory, both substantive and formal. This strategy involves the systematic choice and study of several comparison groups. In Part II, The Flexible Use of Data," the generation of theory from qualitative, especially documentary, and quantitative data Is considered. In Part III, "Implications of Grounded Theory," Glaser and Strauss examine the credibility of grounded theory. The Discovery of Grounded Theory is directed toward improving social scientists' capacity for generating theory that will be relevant to their research. While aimed primarily at sociologists, it will be useful to anyone Interested In studying social phenomena--political, educational, economic, industrial-- especially If their studies are based on qualitative data.
53,267 citations
44,847 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and behavior of business firms operating in a market environment, including both general discussion and the manipulation of specific simulation models consistent with that theory.
Abstract: This study develops an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and behavior of business firms operating in a market environment. It includes both general discussion and the manipulation of specific simulation models consistent with that theory. The analysis outlines the differences between an evolutionary theory of organizational and industrial change and a neoclassical microeconomic theory. The antecedents to the former are studies by economists like Schumpeter (1934) and Alchian (1950). It is contrasted with the orthodox theory in the following aspects: while the evolutionary theory views firms as motivated by profit, their actions are not assumed to be profit maximizing, as in orthodox theory; the evolutionary theory stresses the tendency of most profitable firms to drive other firms out of business, but, in contrast to orthodox theory, does not concentrate on the state of industry equilibrium; and evolutionary theory is related to behavioral theory: it views firms, at any given time, as having certain capabilities and decision rules, as well as engaging in various ‘search' operations, which determines their behavior; while orthodox theory views firm behavior as relying on the use of the usual calculus maximization techniques. The theory is then made operational by the use of simulation methods. These models use Markov processes and analyze selection equilibrium, responses to changing factor prices, economic growth with endogenous technical change, Schumpeterian competition, and Schumpeterian tradeoff between static Pareto-efficiency and innovation. The study's discussion of search behavior complicates the evolutionary theory. With search, the decision making process in a firm relies as much on past experience as on innovative alternatives to past behavior. This view combines Darwinian and Lamarkian views on evolution; firms are seen as both passive with regard to their environment, and actively seeking alternatives that affect their environment. The simulation techniques used to model Schumpeterian competition reveal that there are usually winners and losers in industries, and that the high productivity and profitability of winners confer advantages that make further success more likely, while decline breeds further decline. This process creates a tendency for concentration to develop even in an industry initially composed of many equal-sized firms. However, the experiments conducted reveal that the growth of concentration is not inevitable; for example, it tends to be smaller when firms focus their searches on imitating rather than innovating. At the same time, industries with rapid technological change tend to grow more concentrated than those with slower progress. The abstract model of Schumpeterian competition presented in the study also allows to see more clearly the public policy issues concerning the relationship between technical progress and market structure. The analysis addresses the pervasive question of whether industry concentration, with its associated monopoly profits and reduced social welfare, is a necessary cost if societies are to obtain the benefits of technological innovation. (AT)
22,566 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: Porter as mentioned in this paper presents a comprehensive structural framework and analytical techniques to help a firm to analyze its industry and evolution, understand its competitors and its own position, and translate this understanding into a competitive strategy to allow the firm to compete more effectively to strengthen its market position.
Abstract: Michael Porter presents a comprehensive structural framework and analytical techniques to help a firm to analyze its industry and evolution, understand its competitors and its own position, and translate this understanding into a competitive strategy to allow the firm to compete more effectively to strengthen its market position. The introduction reviews a classic approach to strategy formulation, one that comprises a combination of ends and means (policies), factors that limit what a company can accomplish, tests of consistency, and an approach for developing competitive strategy. A competitive strategy articulates a firm's goals, how it will compete, and its policies for achieving those goals. Competitive advantage is defined in terms of cost and differentiation while linking it to profitability. Part I, "General Analytical Techniques," provides a general framework for analyzing the structure of an industry and understanding the underlying forces of competition (and hence profitability). Five competitive forces act on an industry: (1) threat of new entrants, (2) intensity of rivalry among existing firms, (3) threat of substitute products or services, (4) bargaining power of buyers, and (5) bargaining power of suppliers. Looking at industry structure provides a way to consider how value is created and divided among existing and potential industry participants. One competitive force always captures essential issues in the division of value.There are three generic competitive strategies for coping with the five competitive forces: (1) overall cost leadership, (2) differentiation, and (3) focus. There are risks with each strategy. A firm without a strategy is "stuck in the middle." This framework for examining competition transcends particular industry, technology, or management theories. Building on this framework, techniques are presented for industry forecasting, analysis of competitors, predicting their behavior, and building a response profile. Essential for a competitive strategy are techniques for recognizing and accurately reading market signals. Implications of structural analysis for buyer selection and purchasing strategy are presented. Game theory provides concepts for responding to competitive moves. Using the concept of strategic groups, structural analysis can also explain differences in firm performance (profitability), provide a guide for competitive strategy, and predict industry evolution. Part II, "Generic Industry Environments," shows how firms can use the analytical framework to develop a competitive strategy in industry environments, which reflect differences in industry concentration, state of industry maturity, and exposure to international competition. These environments determine a business's competitive strategic context, available alternatives, and common strategic errors. Five generic industry environments are examined: fragmented industries (where level of industrial concentration is low), emerging industries, transition to industry maturity, declining industries, and global industries. In each, the crucial aspects of industry structure, key strategic issues, characteristic strategic alternatives (including divestment), and strategic pitfalls are identified. Part III, "Strategic Decisions," draws on the analytical framework to examine important types of strategic decisions confronting firms that compete in a single industry: vertical integration, major capacity expansion, and new business entry. Additional use of economic theory and administrative consideration of management and motivation helps a company to make key decisions, and gives insight into how competitors, customers, suppliers, and potential entrants might make them. Appendix A discusses use of techniques for portfolio analysis applied to competitor analysis. Appendix B provides approaches to conducting an industry study, including sources of field and published dat
12,533 citations