Consciousness cannot be separated from function
TL;DR: It is argued that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science and a 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point.
About: This article is published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences.The article was published on 2011-08-01. It has received 303 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Electromagnetic theories of consciousness & Neural correlates of consciousness.
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Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that the brain produces an internal representation of the world, and the activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing, but it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness.
Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
2,271 citations
TL;DR: Evidence is shown that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception, and Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.
Abstract: The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.
931 citations
Cites background from "Consciousness cannot be separated f..."
...It has been argued that consciousness cannot be separated from the brain mechanisms supporting it, such as attention, working memory, or decision taking (Cohen and Dennett, 2011)....
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TL;DR: How integrated information theory accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the brain is discussed and can be used to develop new tools for assessing consciousness in non-communicative patients.
Abstract: Uncovering the neural basis of consciousness is a major challenge to neuroscience. In this Perspective, Tononi and colleagues describe the integrated information theory of consciousness and how it might be used to answer outstanding questions about the nature of consciousness. In this Opinion article, we discuss how integrated information theory accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Integrated information theory starts from the essential properties of phenomenal experience, from which it derives the requirements for the physical substrate of consciousness. It argues that the physical substrate of consciousness must be a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power and provides a means to determine, in principle, the quality and quantity of experience. The theory leads to some counterintuitive predictions and can be used to develop new tools for assessing consciousness in non-communicative patients.
928 citations
TL;DR: The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience as discussed by the authors. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they ar...
Abstract: The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they ar...
453 citations
TL;DR: This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to a peculiar kind of generic conscious representation that has no independent rationale and an unmotivated form of unconscious representation that in some cases conflicts with what the authors know about unconscious representation.
403 citations
References
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TL;DR: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable as mentioned in this paper, which is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong.
Abstract: Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.
4,669 citations
01 Jan 1960
3,745 citations
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that it is possible to retain information about only four colours or orientations in visual working memory at one time, but it is also possible to retaining both the colour and the orientation of four objects, indicating that visual workingMemory stores integrated objects rather than individual features.
Abstract: Short-term memory storage can be divided into separate subsystems for verbal information and visual information, and recent studies have begun to delineate the neural substrates of these working-memory systems. Although the verbal storage system has been well characterized, the storage capacity of visual working memory has not yet been established for simple, suprathreshold features or for conjunctions of features. Here we demonstrate that it is possible to retain information about only four colours or orientations in visual working memory at one time. However, it is also possible to retain both the colour and the orientation of four objects, indicating that visual working memory stores integrated objects rather than individual features. Indeed, objects defined by a conjunction of four features can be retained in working memory just as well as single-feature objects, allowing sixteen individual features to be retained when distributed across four objects. Thus, the capacity of visual working memory must be understood in terms of integrated objects rather than individual features, which places significant constraints on cognitive and neurobiological models of the temporary storage of visual information.
3,608 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: In this article, the basic model of conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed, and the neural basis of conscious experience is explained, including the fundamental role of context, goal contexts, spontaneous problem solving and the stream of consciousness.
Abstract: List of figures and tables Preface Part I Introduction: 1 What is to be explained? some preliminaries Part II The Basic Model: 2 Model 1: conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed 3 The neural basis of conscious experience Part III The Fundamental Role of Context: 4 Model 2: unconscious contexts shape conscious experience 5 Model 3: conscious experience is informative - it always demands some degree of adaptation Part IV Goals and Voluntary Control: 6 Model 4: Goal contexts, spontaneous problem solving, and the stream of consciousness 7 Model 5: volition as ideomotor control of thought and action Part V Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring: 8 Model 6: attention as control of access to consciousness 9 Model 7 Self as the dominant context of experience and action Part VI Consciousness is Functional: 10 The functions of consciousness Part VII Conclusion: 11 A summary and some future directions Glossary and guide to theoretical claims References Name index, Subject index
2,722 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that the brain produces an internal representation of the world, and the activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing, but it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness.
Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
2,271 citations