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Constitutional Design for Divided Societies

01 Jan 2013-Vol. 1, Iss: 4, pp 33-44
TL;DR: Lijphart as mentioned in this paper presents a set of such recommendations, focusing in particular on the constitutional needs of countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages, and his recommendations will indicate as precisely as possible which particular power-sharing rules and institutions are optimal and why.
Abstract: Over the past half-century, democratic constitutional design has undergone a sea change. After the Second World War, newly independent countries tended simply to copy the basic constitutional rules of their former colonial masters, without seriously considering alternatives. Today, constitution writers choose more deliberately among a wide array of constitutional models, with various advantages and disadvantages. While at first glance this appears to be a beneficial development, it has actually been a mixed blessing: Since they now have to deal with more alternatives than they can readily handle, constitution writers risk making ill-advised decisions. In my opinion, scholarly experts can be more helpful to constitution writers by formulating specific recommendations and guidelines than by overwhelming those who must make the decision with a barrage of possibilities and options. This essay presents a set of such recommendations, focusing in particular on the constitutional needs of countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages. In such deeply divided societies the interests and demands of communal groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing, and my recommendations will indicate as precisely as possible which particular power-sharing rules and institutions are optimal and why. (Such rules and institutions may be useful in less intense forms in many other societies as well.) Most experts on divided societies and constitutional engineering broadly agree that deep societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy, and that it is therefore generally more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided than in homogeneous Arend Lijphart is Research Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (1999) and many other studies of democratic institutions, the governance of deeply divided societies, and electoral systems.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, between-group inequality (BGI) has a large, robust, and negative relationship with public goods provision, whereas ELF, cultural fractionalization (CF), and overall inequality do not.
Abstract: groups: between-group inequality (BGI). We show that ELF, cultural fractionalization (CF), and BGI measure different things, and that the choice between them has an important impact on our understanding of which countries are most ethnically diverse. Furthermore, empirical tests reveal that BGI has a large, robust, and negative relationship with public goods provision, whereas CF, ELF, and overall inequality do not. diversity is widely held to make governance more difficult. Such diversity is associated with low production of public goods; poor economic growth; and high levels of corruption, violence, and civil conflict. But diversity hardly sentences a country to poor political and economic outcomes. Latvia, for example, has better governance indicators than Brazil, and Zambia has better governance indicators than Nigeria, even though these pairs of countries have similar levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). Why, then, do some countries cope more successfully with ethnic diversity than others? This article addresses this question by focusing on the

349 citations

Book
Pippa Norris1
01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare four types of political institutions: the electoral system, parliamentary or presidential executives, unitary or federal states, and the structure and independence of the mass media.
Abstract: Proposals for power-sharing constitutions remain controversial, as highlighted by current debates in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sudan. This book updates and refines the theory of consociationalism, taking account of the flood of contemporary innovations in power-sharing institutions that have occurred worldwide. The book classifies and compares four types of political institutions: the electoral system, parliamentary or presidential executives, unitary or federal states, and the structure and independence of the mass media. The study tests the potential advantages and disadvantages of each of these institutions for democratic governance. Cross-national time-series data concerning trends in democracy are analyzed for all countries worldwide since the early 1970s. Chapters are enriched by comparing detailed case studies. The mixed-method research design illuminates the underlying causal mechanisms by examining historical developments and processes of institutional change within particular nations and regions.

341 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors showed that low-magnitude multi-member districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure proportional representation (PR) while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions.
Abstract: Can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments? The academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types, majoritarian and proportional, and implies a straightforward trade-off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation (PR) delivers. We posit that these trade-offs are better characterized as non-linear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to PR, while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections, by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range. We test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006. Electoral systems that use low-magnitude multi-member districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions.

261 citations


Cites background from "Constitutional Design for Divided S..."

  • ...Electoral systems that use low-magnitude multi-member districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, Elgie as discussed by the authors argued that the inherent perils of presidentialism and the unequivocally virtuous nature of parliamentarism were especially salient during the 1990s, but they remain important to this day.
Abstract: The scholarly debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the two dominant democratic regime types—presidentialism and parliamentarism—gained prominence during the “third wave” of democratization. Discussions of the inherent perils of presidentialism and the unequivocally virtuous nature of parliamentarism were especially salient during the 1990s, but they remain important to this day. In the past few years, democratizing countries such as Afghanistan, East Timor, and Iraq have faced or are still facing tough choices as to regime constitution. Moreover, a number of established democracies, including Mexico and Taiwan, are currently debating whether or not to change their basic system of government. Most academic contributions to the regime-type debate have focused on the relative advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism, and the consensus seems to adhere to Juan Linz’s judgment that, all else being equal, parliamentarism should be chosen above presidentialism. 1 That said, there are powerful counterarguments that properly crafted presidential regimes can be of advantage in certain countries. 2 In the presidentialism-versus-parliamentarism debate, analysis of semipresidential systems—which have both a directly elected president and a prime minister responsible to the legislature—has been notable for its near absence. Semipresidentialism has been and remains a very popular choice of government, especially for countries that democratized during or after the third wave; indeed, in the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union Robert Elgie, Paddy Moriarty Professor of Government and International Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland, is coeditor of the journal French Politics. He is also editor of Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (1999) and Divided Government in Comparative Perspective (2001) and coeditor of Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe (forthcoming).

207 citations


Cites background from "Constitutional Design for Divided S..."

  • ...”(5) Arturo Valenzuela and Arend Lijphart have agreed in these pages with Linz’s judgment.(6) The general constitutional category of semipresidentialism encompasses a diverse set of polities that operate in ways which differ significantly from one another....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore four programs and policies that respond in some way to the challenges induced by climate change and modern energy use and highlight how polycentrism may enhance effective climate and energy governance, but that further research is needed to fully substantiate that claim.

200 citations

References
More filters
Book
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the third wave of global democratization has come to an end, leaving a growing gap between the electoral form and the liberal substance of democracy.
Abstract: In this book noted political sociologist Larry Diamond sets forth a distinctive theoretical perspective on democratic evolution and consolidation in the late twentieth century. Rejecting theories that posit preconditions for democracy-and thus dismiss its prospects in poor countries-Diamond argues instead for a "developmental" theory of democracy. This, he explains, is one which views democracy everywhere as a work in progress that emerges piecemeal, at different rates, in different ways and forms, in different countries. Diamond begins by assessing the "third wave" of global democratization that began in 1974. With a wealth of quantitative data and case illustrations, he shows that the third wave has come to an end, leaving a growing gap between the electoral form and the liberal substance of democracy. This underscores the hollow, fragile state of many democracies and the imperative of concolidation. He then defines the concept of democratic consolidation and identifies the conditions that foster it. These include strong political institutions, appropriate institutional designs, decentralization of power, a vibrant civil society, and improved economic and political performance. If new and troubled democracies are to be consolidated, Diamond argues, they must become more deeply democratic-more liberal, accountable, and responsive to their citizens. Drawing on extensive public opinion research in developing and postcommunist states, he demonstrates the importance of freedom, transparency, and the rule of law for generating the broad legitimacy that is the essence of democratic consolidation. The book concludes with a hopeful view of the prospects for a fourth wave of global democratization.

2,107 citations

Book
01 Jun 2009
TL;DR: In this article, the constitutional origin and survival of assembly and executive, and the legislative powers of presidents: veto and decree, are discussed, as well as electoral dynamics: efficiency and inefficiency.
Abstract: Part I. Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy: 1. Basic choices in democratic regime types 2. What is presidentialism? Criticisms and responses 3. The constitutional origin and survival of assembly and executive 4. Legislative powers of presidents: veto and decree Part II. Electoral Dynamics of Presidential Democracy: 5. Electoral dynamics: efficiency and inefficiency 6. Electoral rules and the party system 7. Electoral cycles and the party system Part III. Institutiona: Engineering: 8. Semi-presidentialism: the third alternative 9. Electoral cycles in semi-presidential regimes 10. Divided polities and collegial presidencies 11. Conclusions Appendices.

1,356 citations

Book
01 Jan 1993
TL;DR: A comprehensive survey of 233 politically active communal groups, plus in-depth assessments of ethnic tensions in the western democracies, the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, and Africa is presented in this article.
Abstract: The turmoil in Yugoslavia, the rebellions of the Kurds and Shi???is in Iraq, the ongoing struggle in South Africa???ethnic conflict continues unabated in many areas of the world.To help us understand the persistence of such conflict, this pioneering work analyzes ethnopolitical conflict in every region of the globe. An ambitious and unprecedented effort, it provides a comprehensive survey of 233 politically active communal groups, plus in-depth assessments of ethnic tensions in the western democracies, the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, and Africa.By identifying these groups and examining their disadvantages and grievances, Minorities at Risk attempts to explain why disadvantaged groups mobilize, and it evaluates strategies that have successfully reduced ethnic conflict in the past, including autonomy, pluralism, and power sharing.This provocative and well-written volume challenges conventional wisdom and raises the discussion about a widespread but little-understood phenomenon to a higher level.

1,051 citations

Book
01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: Shugart and Wattenberg as discussed by the authors place mixed-member systems in the world of electoral systems and place them as the best of both worlds in a typology of mixed-members.
Abstract: Part 1 Placing mixed-member systems in the world of electoral systems: Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, mixed-member electoral systems - a definition and typology Matthew Shugart, extreme electoral systems and the appeal of the mixed-member alternative. Part 2 Origins of mixed-member systems: Susan E. Scarrow, Germany - the mixed-member system as a political compromise David Denemark, choosing MMP in New Zealand - explaining the 1993 electoral reform Richard S. Katz, reforming the Italian electoral law, 1993 Gideon Rahat, the politics of reform in Israel - how the Israeli mixed system came to be Steven R. Reed and Michael F. Thies, the causes of electoral reform in Japan Brian F. Crisp and Juan Carlos Rey, the sources of electoral reform in Venezuela Rene Antonio Mayorga, electoral reform in Bolivia - origins of the mixed-member proportional system Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey Weldon, reforming electoral systems in Mexico John W. Schiemann, hedging against uncertainty - regime change and the origins of Hungary's mixed-Member system Robert G. Moser and Frank C. Thames Jr, compromise amidst political conflict, the origins of Russia's mixed-member system. Part 3 Consequences of mixed-member systems: Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Bernhard Wessels, the political consequences of Germany's mixed-member system - personalization at the grass roots? Fiona Barker, Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay and Nigel S. Roberts, an initial assessment of the consequences of MMP in New Zealand Roberto D'Alimonte, mixed electoral rules, partisan realignment, and party system change in Italy Reuven Y. Hazan, the Israeli mixed electoral system - unexpected reciprocal and cumulative consequences Steven R. Reed and Michael F. Thies, the consequences of electoral reform in Japan Michael R. Kulisheck and Brian F. Crisp, the legislative consequences of MMP electoral rules in Venezuela Rene Antonio Mayorga, the mixed-member proportional system and its consequences in Bolivia Jeffrey Weldon, the consequences of the Mexicos mixed electoral system, 1988-1997 Kenneth Benoit, evaluating Hungary's mixed-member electoral system Robert G. Moser, the consequences of Russia's mixed-member electoral system. Part 4 Prospects for reform in other countries: David M. Farrell, the United Kingdom comes of age - the British electoral reform revolution of the 1990s R. Kent Weaver, electoral rules and electoral reform in Canada Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, are mixed-member systems the best of both worlds?

459 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The case of Latin America: party politics and the crisis of presidentialism in Chile -a proposal for a parliamentary form of government, Arturo Valenzuela presidentialism and democratic stability in Uruguay, Luis Eduardo Gonzalez and Charles Guy Gillespie Brazil - toward parliamentarism?, Bolivar Lamounier presidentialism, and Colombian politics, Jonathon Hartlyn loose parties, "floating" politicans, and institutional stress -presidentism in Ecuador, 1979-1988, Catherine M. Conaghan presidents, messiahs, and constitutional breakdowns in Peru, Cynthia McCl
Abstract: Part 1 Comparative perspectives: presidentialism and majoritarian democracy - theoretical observations, Arend Lijphart neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism, Giovanni Sartori presidentialism and parliamentarism in comparative perspective, Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach presidentialism and political stability in France, Ezra N. Suleiman. Part 2 The case of Latin America: party politics and the crisis of presidentialism in Chile - a proposal for a parliamentary form of government, Arturo Valenzuela presidentialism and democratic stability in Uruguay, Luis Eduardo Gonzalez and Charles Guy Gillespie Brazil - toward parliamentarism?, Bolivar Lamounier presidentialism and Colombian politics, Jonathon Hartlyn loose parties, "floating" politicans, and institutional stress - presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988, Catherine M. Conaghan presidents, messiahs, and constitutional breakdowns in Peru, Cynthia McClintock Venezuela - democratic despite presidentialism, Michael Coppedge.

450 citations