Constructing constructs for psychopathology: the NIMH research domain criteria.
Citations
1,635 citations
Cites background from "Constructing constructs for psychop..."
...However, the RDoC framework is concerned with basic biological processes (e.g., neural circuits) as much as with pathological behavior, and seeks to link animal and human research, thus largely focusing on constructs that apply across species (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013)....
[...]
544 citations
473 citations
375 citations
311 citations
Cites background or result from "Constructing constructs for psychop..."
...[PubMed: 16769298] Huang YY, Kotov R, de Girolamo G, Preti A, Angermeyer M, Benjet C, … Kessler RC. DSM-IV personality disorders in the WHO World Mental Health Surveys....
[...]
...A uthor M anuscript A uthor M anuscript A uthor M anuscript A uthor M anuscript Institute of Mental Health (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; Insel et al., 2010; Sanislow et al., 2010)....
[...]
...Transdimensional Dispositions and the Causal Heterogeneity of Psychopathology There are fundamental similarities between the present causal taxonomy and key tenets of the NIMH RDoC initiative (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013; Insel et al., 2010; Sanislow et al., 2010)....
[...]
...[PubMed: 10883720] Bijl RV, Ravelli A, van Zessen G. Prevalence of psychiatric disorder in the general population: Results of the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS)....
[...]
...Functional disability and quality of life decrements in mental disorders: Results from the Mental Health Module of the German Health Interview and Examination Survey for Adults (DEGS1-MH)....
[...]
References
67,017 citations
10,186 citations
"Constructing constructs for psychop..." refers background in this paper
...Notwithstanding oft-cited limitations of self-report measures (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), such measures are not necessarily less valid or less useful than measures in other domains (Haeffel & Howard, 2010)....
[...]
7,863 citations
"Constructing constructs for psychop..." refers background in this paper
...Classification can then proceed from accurate observations to some rationale, such as formal similarity or association in nature, for defining categories. Arguably, thoughts and feelings are not observable, and so must be inferred (for a contrasting view, see Dretske, 1999, 2000). Traditionally, great weight has been accorded in psychopathology to self-reports of thoughts and feelings, and such reported experiences have often been considered as “primary” phenomena to be explained. An alternative view (e.g., Kozak & Miller, 1982; Miller & Kozak, 1993) to this subjectivism is that self-reported experiences have the logical status of fallible hypotheses about function. That is to say that experiential claims constitute a kind of “folk” psychology of the self that, as such, should be neither assumed veridical nor simply discounted. (For a similar but more developed account see Daniel Dennett’s “heterophenomenology” in Consciousness Explained, 1991.) In citing Kozak and Miller’s article, Berenbaum might seem to acknowledge their agnostic view of the veridicality of reports of experience, but his interest in classifying thoughts and feelings leaves ambiguity about his own position. From the RDoC perspective, one would seek neither to explain nor classify selfreported thoughts or feelings, but rather, one might use the selfreports to inform hypotheses about psychobiological mechanisms (constructs) that in turn would be subject to convergent validation, via multiple levels of analysis, to explain some narrowly defined problem behavior. Ultimately, if the RDoC initiative proves successful, psychobiological mechanisms might usurp the telltale role of self-reported experiences in a renovated diagnostic system. A problem with this tidy formulation of reports of experiences as fallible hypotheses about function arises if self-report is the only available indicator of a clinical problem, such as a putative delusion, hallucination, or feeling of shame, or if self-report data provide resolution that is simply unavailable from other indicators. Subjective interpretations, regardless of their fallibility, can contribute to a subject’s functioning, and self-report is often the most efficient way, if not the only way, to discover these interpretations. In other words, meaning matters, and the language of self-report can code nuances of meaning with fine resolution. Mostly, it is not self-reports themselves (observable behavior) that are psychiatric problems, but rather, the unobservable thoughts or feelings to which they are supposed to refer, and any related ill-motivated behavior. If one does not adopt an expedient working assumption of the veridicality of self-reports, and there are no available converging measures from different levels of analysis, then one forsakes capacity to study various important problems. Although the RDoC approach provides no elegant solution to this puzzle, in pure form, it would nonetheless avoid taking self-reports as veridical. However, unless or until more resolved construct ascertainment becomes available, the study of certain kinds of psychiatric clinical problems will continue to require expedient but scientifically awkward presumptions about the referents of self-reports. In sum, however, Berenbaum is right in supposing that research that relies exclusively on self-report data would fall outside of RDoC approach. The fact that RDoC constructs necessarily involve biological measures should not be taken to imply that self-report measures alone have no validity or utility. Notwithstanding oft-cited limitations of self-report measures (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), such measures are not necessarily less valid or less useful than measures in other domains (Haeffel & Howard, 2010). In fact, they have routinely been found more useful for predicting psychiatric problems (e.g., Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976; Haeffel et al., 2008; Kwapil, 1998) than any available biological measure. Furthermore, the predictive utility of self-reports need not depend upon presumed veridicality. In other words, subjective perception of a situation can sometimes be a better predictor of a person’s functioning in that situation than objective measurement of the situation itself (Cotton, 1980). The explanatory role of self-reports in psychopathology is reminiscent of Dennett’s (1978) construal of the role of intentional constructs in psychological explanation....
[...]
...Research in psychopathology has increasingly identified problems with the current diagnostic system, as embodied in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the mental and behavioral disorders section of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD; World Health Organization, 2007). The structure of these systems was developed during the 1970s to deal with a troubling lack of reliability in assigning diagnoses, which threatened the credibility of psychiatry as a medical specialty. The product arrived in the form of the DSM–III (1980), which threw out most of the old system based on psychodynamic assumptions about etiology....
[...]
...Research in psychopathology has increasingly identified problems with the current diagnostic system, as embodied in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the mental and behavioral disorders section of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD; World Health Organization, 2007)....
[...]
5,173 citations
"Constructing constructs for psychop..." refers background or methods in this paper
...For Berenbaum, a crucial issue is the view that “the RDoC framework conceptualized mental illnesses as brain disorders” (Insel et al., 2010, p. 749)....
[...]
...Detailed descriptions of the process and structure of the RDoC project are available elsewhere so need not be covered here in detail (e.g., Insel et al., 2010; Sanislow et al., 2010; Morris & Cuthbert, 2012)....
[...]
1,010 citations
"Constructing constructs for psychop..." refers background in this paper
...…that affect relationships between systems—for example, the correlation of “fear” and “distress” disorders in structural models of internalizing (e.g., Krueger & Markon, 2006), or recent reports of neuroplasticity resulting from interactions between prefrontal cortex and mesolimbic dopamine…...
[...]