Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
About: This article is published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.The article was published on 1992-11-01. It has received 578 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Contextualism & Contemporary philosophy.
Citations
More filters
456 citations
TL;DR: A defense of learning from words is given in this article, where the authors present a view of the personal view of testimony as a Generative Epistemic Source of knowledge.
Abstract: Introduction 1. The Nature of Testimony 2. Rejecting Transmission 3. A Defense of Learning from Words 4. Norms of Assertion and Testimonial Knowledge 5. A Critique of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism 6. Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony 7. Positive Reasons, Defeaters, and the Infant/Child Objection 8. Trust and Assurance: The Interpersonal View of Testimony Appendix. Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
386 citations
TL;DR: The authors surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s, focusing on contextualism about knowledge attributions, modest forms of foundationalism, and the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
Abstract: This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on (i) contextualism about knowledge attributions, (ii) modest forms of foundationalism, and (iii) the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
214 citations
TL;DR: DeRose and Cohen as discussed by the authors argue that knowledge attributions are context-sensitive because context affects what knowledge-attributing sentences literally express. But they do not consider the role of context in the determination of the conditions to be satisfied by knowledge attributing sentences.
Abstract: othis view strikes many as implausible, 7 it does seem to square with the relevant data. Thus, e.g., in terms of the Bank Case, it’s DeRose’s contention that most of us will find both of the following claims compelling: ~1! when I claim to know that the bank will be open on Saturday in Case A, I am saying something true;~2! I am also saying something true in Case B when I concede that I don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday. Granted, “I seem to be in no better position to know in Case A than in Case B” ~DeRose 1992, p. 914!. Still, DeRose thinks, one can perfectly consistently maintain both ~1! and~2!: @I#n Bank Case B...when, in the face of my wife’s doubt, I admit that I don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday, I don’t contradict an earlier claim to know that I might have made before the doubt was raised and before the issue was so important because, in an important sense, I don’t mean the same thing by “know” as I meant in the earlier claim. ~Ibid., p. 921; italics added ! According to DeRose, then, the meaning of “know ~s!” varies with certain features of the context in which it is used in making knowledge attributions. And so too for Cohen; for while there are important differences between the views of Cohen and DeRose ~more on this presently !, both believe that context enters into epistemology in virtue of the contribution it makes to the meanings of key epistemic terms, and thus in virtue of the role it plays in the determination of the conditions to be satisfied by knowledge-attributing sentences. So, according to the contextualist, knowledge attributions are context-sensitive because context affects what knowledge-attributing sentences literally express . While it promises to account for “what we want to say” with regard ~e.g.! to the Bank Case, contextualists make much of the fact that their view provides what is alleged to be a novel and quite plausible resolution of sceptical puzzles~DeRose 1992, 1995; Cohen 1988; Lewis 1979, 1996; Unger 1986 !. Taking his cue from Cohen~1988, pp. 93–94 ! the sceptical argument DeRose ~1995! focuses on is the following: ~SA! P1. I don’t know that I’m not a BIV@that is, a bodiless brain in a vat being electrochemically stimulated to have just those sensory experiences I’m having #. P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. So, C. I don’t know that I have hands. Of course, unlike the Bank Case, SA isn’t an example of merely pedestrian knowledge attributions. The basic strategy of the contextualist, however, is the same with respect to both sorts of case. In particular, it is the contextualist’s 480 NOÛS
209 citations
Cites background from "Contextualism and Knowledge Attribu..."
...I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday....
[...]
...If “knows” really is like “other context-sensitive words, like ‘here’” ~DeRose 1992, p. 925!, having this pointed out to us should have precisely this effect; but it does not.12,13 Second, the contextualist wants to tie what the sentences we utter meanvery closely to what we mean in uttering them:…...
[...]
...~DeRose 1992, p. 920!...
[...]
...Granted, “I seem to be in no better position to know in Case A than in Case B”~DeRose 1992, p. 914!....
[...]
...~DeRose 1992, p. 913!...
[...]
TL;DR: Experimental philosophy as discussed by the authors is a movement of analytic philosophers who apply methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions, and it has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thoughtexperiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims.
Abstract: It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement –experimental philosophy– has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.
198 citations