Corporate Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: The Case of the Steel Industry
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed and tested a simple mod-el for the use of political strategies, such as lobbying the government for trade protection, in the strategic management literature.
Abstract: An underplayed topic in the strategic management literature is firms' use of political strategies, such as lobbying the government for trade protection. This study developed and tested a simple mod...
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Journal Article•
TL;DR: The Handbook of Organization Studies as mentioned in this paper provides a retrospective and prospective overview of organization studies, providing a synthesis of knowledge and literature from the field of organizational studies, and provides an overview of the most significant issues to affect organization studies such as leadership, diversity and globalization.
Abstract: Providing a retrospective and prospective overview of organization studies, the Handbook continues to challenge and inspire readers with its synthesis of knowledge and literature. As ever, contributions have been selected to reflect the diversity of the field. New chapters cover areas such as organizational change; knowledge management; and organizational networks.
Part One reflects on the relationship between theory, research and practice in organization studies.
Part Two address a number of the most significant issues to affect organization studies such as leadership, diversity and globalization.
Comprehensive and far-reaching, this important resource will set new standards for the understanding of organizational studies. It will be invaluable to researchers, teachers and advanced students alike.
2,211 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a study of Canadian firms in the oil and gas, mining, and forestry industries from 1986 to 1995 showed that both resource-based and institutional factors influence corporate sustainable development.
Abstract: This study operationalizes corporate sustainable development and examines its organizational determinants. Data for this project pertain to Canadian firms in the oil and gas, mining, and forestry industries from 1986 to 1995. I find that both resource-based and institutional factors influence corporate sustainable development. By exploring time-related effects, I also find that media pressures were important in early periods and resource-based opportunities endured over time. This finding challenges the assumption that firms first adopt innovations in response to technical rewards which are later institutionalized. These counter-intuitive results may be attributable to the unique characteristics of the dependent variable, corporate sustainable development. They raise important questions and directions for future research. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
2,209 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a taxonomy of political strategies and identify firm and institutional variables that affect the likelihood of making specific decisions within a decision-tree model of political strategy formulation that integrates and extends prior diffused work.
Abstract: In this article we examine two general approaches to political action (transactional and relational), two levels of participation (individual and collective), and three types of generic political strategies (information, financial incentive, and constituency building), thus presenting a comprehensive taxonomy of political strategies. In addition, we identify firm and institutional variables that affect the likelihood of making specific decisions within the formulation model. The result is a decision-tree model of political strategy formulation that integrates and extends prior diffused work.
1,372 citations
TL;DR: Corporate political activities, or corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favorable to the firm, are commonly employed by firms across countries as discussed by the authors, which are referred to as corporate political activities (CPA).
1,168 citations
Cites background from "Corporate Political Strategy and Fo..."
...…of CPA in recent work is firm size, whether measured by sales (Bhuyan, 2000; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hart, 2001; Martin, 1995; Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002a), ssets (Meznar & Nigh, 1995), market share (Schuler, 1996), or number of employees (Bhuyan, 2000; Hillman, 2003; Meznar & Nigh, 1995)....
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...Organizational slack has also been offered as an important driver of CPA (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Schuler, 1996; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997; Schuler et al., 2002)....
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...Organizational slack has also been offered as an important driver of CPA (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Schuler, 1996 ; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997 ; Schuler et al., 2002)....
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...For example,Schuler (1996)andHillman and Hitt (1999)focus on the relationship between product diversification and CPA....
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...Organizational slack has also been offered as an important driver of CPA (Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Schuler, 1996 ; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997 ; Schuler et al., 2002). While slack has been operationalized several ways (e.g., a firm’s debt-to-equity, current assets-to-current liabilities, and free cash flows), there have been two opposite arguments made about its relationship to CPA. The first is that firms with high levels of slack will be active in CPA because they can afford to do so, similar to the size explanation above. The other is that firms with very low levels of slack will be politically active because a political solution may be one of the only ways to rectify their financial woes. In one of the few empirical studies to test the relationship between slack and CPA, Meznar and Nigh (1995) found a positive relationship between resources and a proactive political strategy (i....
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TL;DR: This article found that firms with politicians on the board are associated with better market-based performance across both groups of firms, although the relationship was more pronounced within heavily regulated industries than less regulated industries.
715 citations
Cites background from "Corporate Political Strategy and Fo..."
...Running throughout this stream of research is the recognition that public policies and government decisions affect all aspects of a business and can significantly affect the bottom line (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Marsh, 1998; Schuler, 1996)....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and behavior of business firms operating in a market environment, including both general discussion and the manipulation of specific simulation models consistent with that theory.
Abstract: This study develops an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and behavior of business firms operating in a market environment. It includes both general discussion and the manipulation of specific simulation models consistent with that theory. The analysis outlines the differences between an evolutionary theory of organizational and industrial change and a neoclassical microeconomic theory. The antecedents to the former are studies by economists like Schumpeter (1934) and Alchian (1950). It is contrasted with the orthodox theory in the following aspects: while the evolutionary theory views firms as motivated by profit, their actions are not assumed to be profit maximizing, as in orthodox theory; the evolutionary theory stresses the tendency of most profitable firms to drive other firms out of business, but, in contrast to orthodox theory, does not concentrate on the state of industry equilibrium; and evolutionary theory is related to behavioral theory: it views firms, at any given time, as having certain capabilities and decision rules, as well as engaging in various ‘search' operations, which determines their behavior; while orthodox theory views firm behavior as relying on the use of the usual calculus maximization techniques. The theory is then made operational by the use of simulation methods. These models use Markov processes and analyze selection equilibrium, responses to changing factor prices, economic growth with endogenous technical change, Schumpeterian competition, and Schumpeterian tradeoff between static Pareto-efficiency and innovation. The study's discussion of search behavior complicates the evolutionary theory. With search, the decision making process in a firm relies as much on past experience as on innovative alternatives to past behavior. This view combines Darwinian and Lamarkian views on evolution; firms are seen as both passive with regard to their environment, and actively seeking alternatives that affect their environment. The simulation techniques used to model Schumpeterian competition reveal that there are usually winners and losers in industries, and that the high productivity and profitability of winners confer advantages that make further success more likely, while decline breeds further decline. This process creates a tendency for concentration to develop even in an industry initially composed of many equal-sized firms. However, the experiments conducted reveal that the growth of concentration is not inevitable; for example, it tends to be smaller when firms focus their searches on imitating rather than innovating. At the same time, industries with rapid technological change tend to grow more concentrated than those with slower progress. The abstract model of Schumpeterian competition presented in the study also allows to see more clearly the public policy issues concerning the relationship between technical progress and market structure. The analysis addresses the pervasive question of whether industry concentration, with its associated monopoly profits and reduced social welfare, is a necessary cost if societies are to obtain the benefits of technological innovation. (AT)
22,566 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1965
10,504 citations
"Corporate Political Strategy and Fo..." refers background in this paper
...A premise of collective action theory (Olson, 1971) is that a firm's incentive for political action is determined by its expected private net benefit....
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...Collective action is premised upon assumptions of perfectly rational behavior in a world of complete information (Olson, 1971)....
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...The collective goods nature of trade protection should discourage most firms from taking political actions (Olson, 1971)....
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Book•
01 Jan 1963
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an overview of basic concepts in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, and present a specific price and output model for a specific type of products. But they do not discuss the relationship between the two concepts.
Abstract: List of Tables and Figures. Acknowledgements. Preface to Second Edition. 1. Introduction. 2. Antecedents of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 3. Organizational Goals. 4. Organizational Expectations. 5. Organizational Choice. 6. A Specific Price and Output Model. 7. A Summary of Basic Concepts in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 8. Some Implications. 9. An Epilogue. Index.
8,897 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1971
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit, and that the state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest of its citizens.
Abstract: The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce. The state can seize money by the only method which is permitted by the laws of a civilized society, by taxation. The state can ordain the physical movements of resources and the economic decisions of households and firms without their consent.
7,956 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1982TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an Evolutionary Model of Economic Growth as a Pure Selection Process and a Schumpeterian Competition for economic growth in the United States, with a focus on the evolution of public policies and the role of analysis.
Abstract: I. OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION 1. Introduction 2. The Need for an Evolutionary Theory II. ORGANIZATION-THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 3. The Foundations of Contemporary Orthodoxy 4. Skills 5. Organizational Capabilities and Behavior III. TEXTBOOK ECONOMICS REVISITED 6. Static Selection Equilibrium 7. Firm and Industry Response to Changed Market Conditions IV. GROWTH THEORY 8. Neoclassical Growth Theory: A Critique 9. An Evolutionary Model of Economic Growth 10. Economic Growth as a Pure Selection Process 11. Further Analysis of Search and Selection V. SCHUMPETERIAN COMPETITION 12. Dynamic Competition and Technical Progress 13. Forces Generating and Limiting Concentration under Schumpeterian Competition 14. The Schumpeterian Tradeoff Revisited VI. ECONOMIC WELFARE AND POLICY 15. Normative Economics from an Evolutionary Perspective 16. The Evolution of Public Policies and the Role of Analysis VII. CONCLUSION 17. Retrospect and Prospect References Index
6,823 citations