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Creating and Capturing Value in Public-Private Ties: A Private Actor's Perspective
TL;DR: The authors identify the value creation and capture mechanisms embedded in these ties through a theoretical framework of two conceptual public-private structural alternatives, each associated with different value-creating capacities, rationales, and outcomes.
Abstract: Intersecting the boundaries of public and private economic activity, public-private ties carry important organizational strategy, management, and policy implications. We identify the value creation and capture mechanisms embedded in these ties through a theoretical framework of two conceptual public-private structural alternatives, each associated with different value-creating capacities, rationales, and outcomes. Two important restraints on private value capture--public partner opportunism and external stakeholder activism--arise asymmetrically under each form, carrying a critical effect on partnership outcomes.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the process through which firms and non-profit organizations reconcile divergent worldviews in the development of firm-NPO partnerships and find that during the initial stages of collaboration, partners manage differences by engaging in joint pilot projects and by demonstrating management's commitment to the partnerships.
Abstract: This paper investigates the process through which firms and non-profit organizations (NPOs) reconcile divergent worldviews in the development of firm–NPO partnerships. Drawing on data from two long-lived firm–NPO partnerships, this study suggests that the dynamics of reconciliation in situations of institutional complexity can be better understood by examining how firms and NPOs manage the interplay of both market and social logics in an inter-organizational context. We have found that during the initial stages of collaboration, partners manage differences by engaging in joint pilot projects and by demonstrating management’s commitment to the partnerships. Subsequently, after firms and NPOs sign a formal partnership agreement, they seek to maintain a sustainable mode of interaction by adopting three distinct mechanisms for managing tensions arising from the partnership: negotiating activity scope, monitoring and learning, and modifying organizational practices. Our research findings contribute to the literature on cross-sector partnership and institutional complexity by highlighting the means by which organizations reduce tensions associated with divergent institutional logics and maintain successful partnerships.
25 citations
15 Dec 2017
TL;DR: In this paper, Neely et al. proposed a success map for understanding drivers of performance, which encapsulates those things that the business has to deliver if it is to achieve its overall financial goals.
Abstract: ed structure for understanding drivers of performance. “The success map encapsulates those things that the business has to deliver if it is to achieve its overall financial goals” (Neely et al., 2001). Based on a success map, organizations can work on questions to develop measures for performance data collection and analysis. This approach challenges organizations to develop constructs that supposedly drive revenues and costs, and to articulate their reasoning on how these are related. Organizations, both public and private, can thereby improve their strategic focus and internal coherence (Bacharach et al., 1996; Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). An example of a success map – limited here to values is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1. Alliance value map
25 citations
05 Jun 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the institutional foundations of value cocreation through cross-sector social interactions (CSSIs) and global health diplomacy (GHD), and developed a value parliament as a metaphor to explain how the decision makers' application of rational technologies in model-based decision making conflicts with emotions (which avoid decision paralysis), beliefs, identities and political allegiances to swing the pendulum in favour of the dominant group of decision makers.
Abstract: This is an interdisciplinary inquiry into the strategic corporate responsibility (SCR) of the major actors in global health governance. These actors include pharmaceutical MNCs, health-oriented international NGOs, global governors (e.g. World Health Organization), and national governments. Value destruction through the proliferation of pharmaceutical counterfeits is used as a lens to offer empirical insights into how the above actors influence, and are influenced by, national and global institutions to integrate corporate responsibility (CR) into corporate strategy to shape global health outcomes. Additionally, the study problematizes how the actors’ governance approaches lead to (un)sustainable value co-creation/co-protection with and for consumers in transitioning economies. Ghana’s national–global interconnectedness is used as a proxy for the transitioning economies of West, East, Central and Southern (WECS) Africa. Two major arguments are advanced in this study. First, the notion of CR is not an ‘it’ as reified in extant literature but is only an empty rhetoric, unless the process is embedded in the day-to-day strategic-ethical behavior of an organization to create institutionally and contextually relevant value in the long term. Second, it follows that there cannot be responsible value co-creation without values-based value co-protection; the two are inextricably intertwined (Article 1). Through multiple approaches and semi-structured interviews (N=62) across sectors, I investigated the institutional foundations of value cocreation through cross-sector social interactions (CSSIs) and global health diplomacy (GHD). Following the interpretivist tradition through a fieldwork, this qualitative study contributes to the neo-institutional theory. I draw attention away from seeing CR as pertaining to businesses only by meaningfully reframing the CR concept differently from the mainstream CR discourse which ignores the non-business actors such as governments. More prominently, I reorient attention from organization-centeredness (resource-based view) to a consumer/patient-centered perspective for value co-creation/co-protection. The study develops a value parliament as a metaphor to explain how the decision makers’ application of rational technologies in model-based decision making conflicts with emotions (which avoid decision paralysis), beliefs, identities and political allegiances to swing the pendulum in favour of the dominant group of decision makers. The study argues that value creation will only come about through the central role of strategic ethical leadership and valuesbased managerial entrepreneurship (Article 2), pockets of excellence emerging from inefficient cross-sector interactions (Article 3), and institutional responsibility on the part of transitioning economies and international organizations through collaborative investments in patient-centered global health instead of organization-centeredness (Article 4). Additionally, the institutional path dependence of global health governance results in a five-fold paradox in emerging economies of Africa: (i) complex formal bureaucratic structures/high institutional void and lack of enforcement mechanisms for consumer coprotection; (ii) relatively stable political institutions/weak public health systems; (iii) resource abundance/high dependency on donors; (iv) high economic growth/weak structural determinants of health; (v) increase in noncommunicable diseases/lack of political will to enact radical change in the institutional path dependence of GHD. In synthesis, the study develops the theory of the ultimate preference for non-optimal solutions in global health governance. Here, values and micropolitics, power asymmetry, corporate irresponsibility and institutional path dependence are the explanatory variables of this theory. Thus, for any given set of global health solutions for creating value (maximum health benefits), a range of market and institutional possibilities always exist. Nevertheless, deliberately quick fixes (representing the foreign policy and economic interests of the core region) are preferred over sustainable options. The major reason for these includes the prioritization of survival (organizational/institutional preservation) through resource seeking, incentive seeking, market seeking and legitimacy/status and relevance seeking rather than value co-creation for the consumer or the patient. This allows actors to maintain the status quo and the attendant incentive structures—leading to weak governance structures that undermine the sustainability and institutionalization of global health as a major concern. The theory explains why medico-techno-scientific products remain geopolitical commodities via which powerful actors leverage competitive advantage, allowing them to maintain the path dependence of global health outcomes in transitioning economies of WECS Africa. The main conclusion of the study challenges the conventional view by arguing that the global health governance deficit stems from the path dependence of market and institutional mechanisms and not the high cost of innovations and investments in ameliorating global health or mitigating global health risks as previously thought.
25 citations
25 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of the private sector in bolstering sustainability and resilience by examining the distribution of risks between public and private partners and the economic, political, environmental, and social impacts of these partnership arrangements.
24 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1990TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
27,080 citations
TL;DR: The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality.
Abstract: The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality.
22,421 citations
01 Mar 2010
18,472 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1984TL;DR: The Stakeholder Approach: 1. Managing in turbulent times 2. The stakeholder concept and strategic management 3. Strategic Management Processes: 4. Setting strategic direction 5. Formulating strategies for stakeholders 6. Implementing and monitoring stakeholder strategies 7. Conflict at the board level 8. The functional disciplines of management 9. The role of the executive as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Part I. The Stakeholder Approach: 1. Managing in turbulent times 2. The stakeholder concept and strategic management 3. Stakeholder management: framework and philosophy Part II. Strategic Management Processes: 4. Setting strategic direction 5. Formulating strategies for stakeholders 6. Implementing and monitoring stakeholder strategies Part III. Implications for Theory and Practice: 7. Conflict at the board level 8. The functional disciplines of management 9. The role of the executive.
17,404 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning and examine some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space.
Abstract: This paper considers the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning. It examines some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space, and the effects of ecological interaction. Two general situations involving the development and use of knowledge in organizations are modeled. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an organization and an organizational code. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in competition for primacy. The paper develops an argument that adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run. The possibility that certain common organizational practices ameliorate that tendency is assessed.
16,377 citations