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Creating and Capturing Value in Public-Private Ties: A Private Actor's Perspective

TL;DR: The authors identify the value creation and capture mechanisms embedded in these ties through a theoretical framework of two conceptual public-private structural alternatives, each associated with different value-creating capacities, rationales, and outcomes.
Abstract: Intersecting the boundaries of public and private economic activity, public-private ties carry important organizational strategy, management, and policy implications. We identify the value creation and capture mechanisms embedded in these ties through a theoretical framework of two conceptual public-private structural alternatives, each associated with different value-creating capacities, rationales, and outcomes. Two important restraints on private value capture--public partner opportunism and external stakeholder activism--arise asymmetrically under each form, carrying a critical effect on partnership outcomes.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors employed a systematic procedure to review the literature on universities-industry collaboration (UIC) and identified five key aspects, which underpinned the theory of UIC.
Abstract: The collaboration between universities and the industry is increasingly perceived as a vehicle to enhance innovation through knowledge exchange. This is evident by a significant increase in studies that investigate the topic from different perspectives. However, this body of knowledge is still described as fragmented and lacks efficient comprehensive view. To address this gap, we employed a systematic procedure to review the literature on universities-industry collaboration (UIC). The review resulted in identifying five key aspects, which underpinned the theory of UIC. We integrate these key aspects into an overarching process framework, which together with the review, provide a substantial contribution by creating an integrated analysis of the state of literature concerning this phenomenon. Several research avenues are reported as distilled from the analysis.

495 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the time is ripe to rethink academic entrepreneurship and that more stakeholders have become involved in academic entrepreneurship, and that universities have become more strategic in their approach to this activity.
Abstract: Academic entrepreneurship, which refers to efforts undertaken by universities to promote commercialization on campus and in surrounding regions of the university, has changed dramatically in recent years. Two key consequences of this change are that more stakeholders have become involved in academic entrepreneurship and that universities have become more ‘strategic’ in their approach to this activity. The authors assert that the time is ripe to rethink academic entrepreneurship. Specifically, theoretical and empirical research on academic entrepreneurship needs to take account of these changes, so as to improve the rigour and relevance of future studies on this topic. We outline such a framework and provide examples of key research questions that need to be addressed to broaden understanding of academic entrepreneurship.

408 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This study analyzes over 1400 publications from a wide range of disciplines over a 20-year time period and synthesizes formerly dispersed research perspectives into a comprehensive multi-dimensional framework of public-private partnerships.

348 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jun 1996
TL;DR: A review of the literature on Pareto-optimal allocation of public goods can be found in this paper, where the authors focus on the problem of finding the optimal level of provision of a public good without any explicit assumption concerning the distribution of private goods and hence of utility.
Abstract: The systematic tendency toward underprovision of a public good that seems to be implied by the model of Nash-Cournot equilibrium has encouraged extensive analysis of alternative allocative mechanisms and their evaluation against the yardstick provided by the set of Pareto-efficient allocations. The aim of this chapter, which is necessarily highly selective, is to review some of this large and varied literature. We begin with a closer look at the set of Pareto-efficient, or Paretooptimal, allocations. Pareto-optimal provision of public goods In the public goods economy, just as in its private goods counterpart, the optimality criterion typically identifies not one, but an infinite number of allocations – all the points on the utility possibilities frontier between R and S in Figure 7.1. Any discussion of “the optimum” must presuppose either a very special structure, so that there is, indeed, a single optimal level of Q associated with every allocation along the frontier RS , or else the introduction of some kind of social welfare function that enables us to rank optima and pick out the optimum optimorum. Economists have, however, often expressed and relied upon the hope that certain allocation decisions can be made without reference to distributional considerations. In the present context, this is reflected in many treatments that refer to the optimal level of provision of a public good without any explicit assumption concerning the distribution of private goods and hence of utility.

282 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Feng Li1
TL;DR: In this paper, a holistic business model framework is developed, which is then used to analyse the empirical evidence from the creative industries, and three new themes for future research are highlighted.

262 citations

References
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Dissertation
09 Dec 2016
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France and found that the political affiliation of successive mayors was a major determinant of the proportion of public services provided in-house.
Abstract: This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house,or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities.First, these public-private contracts are analyzed, and the major influence of mayors’ electoral motives on contractual renegotiations is revealed. Second, the drivers of the choice between internal provision and externalization of public services are studied. The political affiliation of successive mayors is found to be a major determinant of the proportion of public services provided in-house. Finally, the decision to provide one public service using simultaneously in-house provisionand externalization is studied, and it appears that this choice is more motivated by pragmatism rather than ideology. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, and highlights the importance of political factors in the study of the latter.

8 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the dynamics and nature of entrepreneurial orientation in the context of nonprofit-business collaboration (NBC), examining how the EO core dimensions manifest themselves when nonprofit organizations (NPOs) proactively engage in NBC.
Abstract: Triggered by budgetary challenges and growing awareness of social needs, recent years have seen increasing entrepreneurial behaviour in the nonprofit sector, of which collaboration with for-profit organizations is a case in point. Yet, while extant research has extensively studied the entrepreneurial orientation (EO) of for-profit organizations, scant attention has been paid to its manifestations in the cross-sector collaboration context and from the nonprofit perspective, even though numerous nonprofit organizations’ idiosyncrasies point at the need for a reconceptualization of the EO dimensions in that domain. Thus, taking the nonprofit perspective, our research aims to explore the dynamics and nature of EO in the context of nonprofit-business collaboration (NBC), examining how the EO core dimensions manifest themselves when nonprofit organizations (NPOs) proactively engage in NBC. We unpack the meaning of EO through two complementary empirical studies. Our work nuances the rather overlooked entrepreneurial posture of so-called ‘active-in-collaboration’ NPOs, exposes new meanings of collaborative EO dimensions (relational proactiveness, relational innovativeness, and relational risk management), discusses their underpinning mechanisms, and suggests promising areas for further research and implications for practice.

8 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The PPP hospital in Lesotho appeared to reduce corruption by controlling discretion and increasing accountability, transparency, and detection and enforcement, and administrators should account for cost savings resulting from reduced corruption.
Abstract: Introduction Health care sector corruption diverts resources that could otherwise be used to improve access to health services. Use of private-sector practices such as a public-private partnership (PPP) model for hospital governance and management may reduce corruption. In 2011, a government-run hospital in Lesotho was replaced by a PPP hospital, offering an opportunity to compare hospital systems and practices. Objective To assess whether a PPP model in a hospital can help curb corruption. Methods We conducted 36 semistructured interviews with key informants between February 2013 and April 2013. We asked about hospital operations and practices at the government-run and PPP hospitals. We performed content analysis of interview data using a priori codes derived from the Corruption in the Health Sector framework and compared themes related with corruption between the hospitals. Results Corrupt practices that were described at the government-run hospital (theft, absenteeism, and shirking) were absent in the PPP hospital. In the PPP hospital, anticorruption mechanisms (controls on discretion, transparency, accountability, and detection and enforcement) were described in four management subsystems: human resources, facility and equipment management, drug supply, and security. Conclusion The PPP hospital appeared to reduce corruption by controlling discretion and increasing accountability, transparency, and detection and enforcement. Changes imposed new norms that supported personal responsibility and minimized opportunities, incentives, and pressures to engage in corrupt practices. By implementing private-sector management practices, a PPP model for hospital governance and management may curb corruption. To assess the feasibility of a PPP, administrators should account for cost savings resulting from reduced corruption.

8 citations

08 Dec 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors empirically analyzed the performance and the determinants of the public private partnership (hereafter PPP) for the French case, an outsourcing strategy recently developed in the public sector.
Abstract: Organizational Choice under Uncertainty: Four Essays on Public Private Partnerships in France This dissertation empirically analyzes the performance and the determinants of the Public Private Partnership (hereafter PPP) for the French case, an outsourcing strategy recently developed in the public sector. PPP is an organizational form in which a public actor engages a private operator to execute public investment in one global longterm contract, bundling financing, design, construction, maintenance and sometimes other services (Hart [2003]). This contractual form has become a relevant alternative to traditional procurement in a financially restrained context for public authorities. Nevertheless, since its creation, PPP has continuously been criticized because of its high costs and the widely spread idea that PPP is tactically used to put the debt off balance sheet. Following the analysis of Transaction Cost Economics theory, as a hybrid model, PPP’s potential advantages are not clear enough. Indeed, it may address several governance problems such as partners’ opportunism, specific as7 sets and unspecifiable performance ex ante (Heide and John [1988], Williamson [1975]). At the same time, it might potentially be more costly due to its legal ramifications and coordination complexities (Hennart [1993], Kogut [1991], Murray and Siehl [1989]). In addition, the financing of PPP coming from the private sector is also a source of higher cost for this solution (Marty and Tran [2014]). Therefore, PPP’s potential advantages have to compensate the potential higher costs (Grimsey and Lewis [2005]) in order to become an efficient organization. Moreover, regarding the organizational choice in the public sector, scholars debate about public actors’ motivation for social welfare. On the one hand, Public Administration literature argues that public employees may draw careers by a unique set of altruistic motives: serving the public interest (Frederickson and Hart [1985], Perry and Porter [1982], Perry and Wise [1990]). On the other hand, New Public Management literature suggests that public managers are rational decision makers who primarily seek to maximize their personal utility (Niskanen [1975]). Yet, while PPP has grown considerably in recent decades and nowadays accounts for a significant portion of public investment (Posner et al. [2009]), empirical research on this topic remains scarce. PPP represents therefore an uncertain environment for its stakeholders. Several studies on PPP’s cost performance have been done but their results are not conclusive (Hodge et al. [2010], Whittington [2012], Blanc-Brude et al. [2009], Blanc-Brude [2013], Raisbeck et al. [2010]). PPP determinants have previously been studied both at the national and sub-national level (Hammami et al. [2006], Albalate et al. [2012]), however, the level of analysis, in general, does not deal with the actual decision making structure. This dissertation intends to fill these gaps by providing an analysis of PPP in France since its creation in 2004. More precisely, we analyze PPP’s perfor-

8 citations