Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08
TL;DR: The authors summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08, starting with the trends leading up to the crisis and explaining how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
Abstract: This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.
Figures (6)
Figure 5: A network of interest rate swap arrangements 
Figure 1: Decline in Mortgage Credit Default Swap ABX Indices 
Figure 3: Interest Rate Spreads 
Figure 2: Outstanding asset-backed commercial paper and unsecured commercial paper. 
Figure 4: The two liquidity spirals: loss spiral and margin spiral. 
Figure 4: The two liquidity spirals: loss spiral and margin spiral.
Citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a model that links a security's market liquidity and traders' funding liquidity, i.e., their availability of funds, to explain the empirically documented features that market liquidity can suddenly dry up (i) is fragile), (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, and (iv) experiences “flight to liquidity” events.
Abstract: We provide a model that links a security’s market liquidity — i.e., the ease of trading it — and traders’ funding liquidity — i.e., their availability of funds. Traders provide market liquidity and their ability to do so depends on their funding, that is, their capital and the margins charged by their financiers. In times of crisis, reductions in market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to a liquidity spiral. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up (i.e. is fragile), (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) experiences “flight to liquidity” events, and (v) comoves with the market. Finally, the model shows how the Fed can improve current market liquidity by committing to improve funding in a potential future crisis.
3,166 citations
TL;DR: The authors developed a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints and used the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis.
2,158 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007).
Abstract: This paper documents that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&A, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short-term debt. We document that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.
2,100 citations
Cites background from "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credi..."
...…and solvency of the banking sector.2 Unsecured commercial paper holders refused to roll over their debt, while repo lenders and trading counterparties required more collateral to back their loans and trades, all of which drained liquidity from the system (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2009)....
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...Unsecured commercial paper holders refused to roll over their debt, while repo lenders and trading counterparties required more collateral to back their loans and trades, all of which drained liquidity from the system (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2009)....
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...As noted in the introduction, banks had a difficult time rolling over their short-term debt (including repos) because of concerns about the solvency and liquidity of the banking system (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2009)....
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TL;DR: The authors developed a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis, and used the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how various credit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we have seen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis.
Abstract: We develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. We use the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how various credit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we have seen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis. We make use of earlier literature to develop our framework and characterize how very recent literature is incorporating insights from the crisis.
1,900 citations
Cites background from "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credi..."
...Vt(s h t ; b h t ; dt) (Qt st !bt ): (11)...
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...Let ht be the Lagrangian multiplier for the incentive constraint (11) faced by bank of type h and t P...
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TL;DR: Discount-rate variation is the central organizing question of current asset-pricing research as discussed by the authors, and a survey of discount-rate theories and applications can be found in the survey.
Abstract: Discount-rate variation is the central organizing question of current asset-pricing research. I survey facts, theories, and applications. Previously, we thought returns were unpredictable, with variation in price-dividend ratios due to variation in expected cashflows. Now it seems all price-dividend variation corresponds to discount-rate variation. We also thought that the cross-section of expected returns came from the CAPM. Now we have a zoo of new factors. I categorize discount-rate theories based on central ingredients and data sources. Incorporating discount-rate variation affects finance applications, including portfolio theory, accounting, cost of capital, capital structure, compensation, and macroeconomics.
1,624 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, including three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity.
24,874 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Bhandari et al. found that the relationship between market/3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable, and when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size.
Abstract: Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market 3, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size, the relation between market /3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable. THE ASSET-PRICING MODEL OF Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average returns and risk. The central prediction of the model is that the market portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). The efficiency of the market portfolio implies that (a) expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market O3s (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return), and (b) market O3s suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns. There are several empirical contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model. The most prominent is the size effect of Banz (1981). He finds that market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by market Os. Average returns on small (low ME) stocks are too high given their f estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. Another contradiction of the SLB model is the positive relation between leverage and average return documented by Bhandari (1988). It is plausible that leverage is associated with risk and expected return, but in the SLB model, leverage risk should be captured by market S. Bhandari finds, howev er, that leverage helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns in tests that include size (ME) as well as A. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity, BE, to its market value, ME. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find that book-to-market equity, BE/ME, also has a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks.
14,517 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors predict that corporate borrowing is inversely related to the proportion of market value accounted for by real options and rationalize other aspects of corporate borrowing behavior, such as the practice of matching maturities of assets and debt liabilities.
12,521 citations
"Deciphering the Liquidity and Credi..." refers background in this paper
...…injecting additional equity since the proceeds of the investment are primarily going to existing debt-holders rather than the new equity holders (Myers 1977). incarnations of funding liquidity risk are only detrimental when the assets can be sold only at firesale prices—that is, when market…...
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...The debt-overhang problem arises when even informed financiers refrain from injecting additional equity since the proceeds of the investment are primarily going to existing debt-holders rather than the new equity holders ( Myers 1977 )....
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9,341 citations
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Abstract: This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
9,099 citations
"Deciphering the Liquidity and Credi..." refers background in this paper
...Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets....
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