Defining Emotion: A Brief History:
Citations
67 citations
Cites background from "Defining Emotion: A Brief History:"
...Even attempting to define emotion in the human context has caused problems (e.g. see Gendron, 2010; Izard, 2010), and the difficulty is magnified in non-human animals who cannot tell us whether or what they feel....
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66 citations
Cites background from "Defining Emotion: A Brief History:"
...However, the study of human emotion has long been challenging to those engaging with it, as the exact definition of ‘emotion’ is still debated (Gedron, 2010; Scheer, 2012)....
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41 citations
Cites result from "Defining Emotion: A Brief History:"
...Within the scope of the interrelated, yet novel compared to philosophy (Mueller, 1979), scientific discipline of psychology, researchers followed a similar path and tried to specify the essence of emotion (Gendron, 2010)....
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37 citations
Cites background from "Defining Emotion: A Brief History:"
...Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of defining emotion has a long history. I also agree with her that the finding of considerable agreement among emotion scientists on the structures and functions of emotions may be sufficient to foster and help guide a continuation of the rapid rate of research on various aspects of emotions. I also expect to see increasing attention to the idea that emotions and cognition are highly interactive and very often (though in my view not always) inseparable (Izard, Krauthamer-Ewing, Woodburn, Finlon, & Rosen, 2009). Perhaps most of my differences with Wierzbicka stem from our different goals. Her concern seems focused on an ordinary English-language definition of the word emotion whereas my concern was with its scientific definition. The difference between these two types of definition is similar to the distinction between descriptive (folk language) and prescriptive (scientific) definitions as drawn by Widen and Russell (2010). I agree with Wierzbicka (2010) that it is possible to give the term emotion an operational definition and I advocated such a step in my article. However, operational definitions can vary widely and they do not constitute a general definition. The definitional model that Wierzbicka offered in her commentary will be considered by some scientists as one that does not qualify as an operational definition. Yet I found aspects of her definition interesting. Her definitional model begins with “thinking.” I consider cognition as perhaps the most frequently occurring component in emotion activation processes in humans. However, cognition is by no means the only activator of emotions, and it is of highly limited utility in studying human infants and nonhuman animals. Emotions can be activated by at least four different multi-aspect systems or processes, including some that begin with physiological activities that also work in prelingual infants and nonhuman animals (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s implication of the efficacy of cognition alone as an activator of emotions may be compromised by findings from neuroscientists showing that emotion and cognition interact virtually continuously (Lewis, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006). The idea of emotion or affect influencing cognition frequently (if not continuously) dates back to Plato and Aristotle and was clearly evident in the thinking of 17th-century philosophers (cf. Izard, 2007; Langer, 1967). Theory and evidence strongly suggest that although Wierzbicka’s model for emotion activation may be an effective one, neither it nor any other lock-step formulaic model can explain all instances of emotion activation (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s critique of discrete emotions theory and her proposal that emotion feelings are nondiscrete are controversial. There is a large and growing body of empirical literature ranging from neuroscience to social and clinical science that focuses on constructs like, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear, and in recent years empirical research on the emotion of interest has grown rapidly (Silvia, 2006). Also, she may have conflated the perception of a feeling and its motivational effects on cognition (and action) with the meaning of words and the conceptualization processes that she apparently conceives as the ultimate source of motivation. Her position stands in stark contrast to that epitomized by Tomkins’ (1962) axiom: cognition without emotion is impotent, emotion without cognition is blind....
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...Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of defining emotion has a long history. I also agree with her that the finding of considerable agreement among emotion scientists on the structures and functions of emotions may be sufficient to foster and help guide a continuation of the rapid rate of research on various aspects of emotions. I also expect to see increasing attention to the idea that emotions and cognition are highly interactive and very often (though in my view not always) inseparable (Izard, Krauthamer-Ewing, Woodburn, Finlon, & Rosen, 2009). Perhaps most of my differences with Wierzbicka stem from our different goals. Her concern seems focused on an ordinary English-language definition of the word emotion whereas my concern was with its scientific definition. The difference between these two types of definition is similar to the distinction between descriptive (folk language) and prescriptive (scientific) definitions as drawn by Widen and Russell (2010). I agree with Wierzbicka (2010) that it is possible to give the term emotion an operational definition and I advocated such a step in my article. However, operational definitions can vary widely and they do not constitute a general definition. The definitional model that Wierzbicka offered in her commentary will be considered by some scientists as one that does not qualify as an operational definition. Yet I found aspects of her definition interesting. Her definitional model begins with “thinking.” I consider cognition as perhaps the most frequently occurring component in emotion activation processes in humans. However, cognition is by no means the only activator of emotions, and it is of highly limited utility in studying human infants and nonhuman animals. Emotions can be activated by at least four different multi-aspect systems or processes, including some that begin with physiological activities that also work in prelingual infants and nonhuman animals (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s implication of the efficacy of cognition alone as an activator of emotions may be compromised by findings from neuroscientists showing that emotion and cognition interact virtually continuously (Lewis, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006). The idea of emotion or affect influencing cognition frequently (if not continuously) dates back to Plato and Aristotle and was clearly evident in the thinking of 17th-century philosophers (cf. Izard, 2007; Langer, 1967). Theory and evidence strongly suggest that although Wierzbicka’s model for emotion activation may be an effective one, neither it nor any other lock-step formulaic model can explain all instances of emotion activation (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s critique of discrete emotions theory and her proposal that emotion feelings are nondiscrete are controversial. There is a large and growing body of empirical literature ranging from neuroscience to social and clinical science that focuses on constructs like, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear, and in recent years empirical research on the emotion of interest has grown rapidly (Silvia, 2006). Also, she may have conflated the perception of a feeling and its motivational effects on cognition (and action) with the meaning of words and the conceptualization processes that she apparently conceives as the ultimate source of motivation. Her position stands in stark contrast to that epitomized by Tomkins’ (1962) axiom: cognition without emotion is impotent, emotion without cognition is blind. The recent findings of neuroscientists on the interaction of emotion and cognition as reviewed by Pessoa (2008) place some limitations on the veracity of Tomkins’ clever observation....
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...Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of defining emotion has a long history....
[...]
...Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of defining emotion has a long history. I also agree with her that the finding of considerable agreement among emotion scientists on the structures and functions of emotions may be sufficient to foster and help guide a continuation of the rapid rate of research on various aspects of emotions. I also expect to see increasing attention to the idea that emotions and cognition are highly interactive and very often (though in my view not always) inseparable (Izard, Krauthamer-Ewing, Woodburn, Finlon, & Rosen, 2009). Perhaps most of my differences with Wierzbicka stem from our different goals. Her concern seems focused on an ordinary English-language definition of the word emotion whereas my concern was with its scientific definition. The difference between these two types of definition is similar to the distinction between descriptive (folk language) and prescriptive (scientific) definitions as drawn by Widen and Russell (2010). I agree with Wierzbicka (2010) that it is possible to give the term emotion an operational definition and I advocated such a step in my article....
[...]
...Gendron (2010) correctly observed that the problem of defining emotion has a long history. I also agree with her that the finding of considerable agreement among emotion scientists on the structures and functions of emotions may be sufficient to foster and help guide a continuation of the rapid rate of research on various aspects of emotions. I also expect to see increasing attention to the idea that emotions and cognition are highly interactive and very often (though in my view not always) inseparable (Izard, Krauthamer-Ewing, Woodburn, Finlon, & Rosen, 2009). Perhaps most of my differences with Wierzbicka stem from our different goals. Her concern seems focused on an ordinary English-language definition of the word emotion whereas my concern was with its scientific definition. The difference between these two types of definition is similar to the distinction between descriptive (folk language) and prescriptive (scientific) definitions as drawn by Widen and Russell (2010). I agree with Wierzbicka (2010) that it is possible to give the term emotion an operational definition and I advocated such a step in my article. However, operational definitions can vary widely and they do not constitute a general definition. The definitional model that Wierzbicka offered in her commentary will be considered by some scientists as one that does not qualify as an operational definition. Yet I found aspects of her definition interesting. Her definitional model begins with “thinking.” I consider cognition as perhaps the most frequently occurring component in emotion activation processes in humans. However, cognition is by no means the only activator of emotions, and it is of highly limited utility in studying human infants and nonhuman animals. Emotions can be activated by at least four different multi-aspect systems or processes, including some that begin with physiological activities that also work in prelingual infants and nonhuman animals (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s implication of the efficacy of cognition alone as an activator of emotions may be compromised by findings from neuroscientists showing that emotion and cognition interact virtually continuously (Lewis, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006). The idea of emotion or affect influencing cognition frequently (if not continuously) dates back to Plato and Aristotle and was clearly evident in the thinking of 17th-century philosophers (cf. Izard, 2007; Langer, 1967). Theory and evidence strongly suggest that although Wierzbicka’s model for emotion activation may be an effective one, neither it nor any other lock-step formulaic model can explain all instances of emotion activation (Izard, 1993). Wierzbicka’s critique of discrete emotions theory and her proposal that emotion feelings are nondiscrete are controversial. There is a large and growing body of empirical literature ranging from neuroscience to social and clinical science that focuses on constructs like, joy, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear, and in recent years empirical research on the emotion of interest has grown rapidly (Silvia, 2006). Also, she may have conflated the perception of a feeling and its motivational effects on cognition (and action) with the meaning of words and the conceptualization processes that she apparently conceives as the ultimate source of motivation. Her position stands in stark contrast to that epitomized by Tomkins’ (1962) axiom: cognition without emotion is impotent, emotion without cognition is blind. The recent findings of neuroscientists on the interaction of emotion and cognition as reviewed by Pessoa (2008) place some limitations on the veracity of Tomkins’ clever observation. Yet evidence of the efficacy of emotions to influence cognition and behavior in a wide variety of situations continues to mount. In a recent example, Harris (2010) found that disgust can direct social cognition that leads to dehumanized perception and subsequent disgust reactions to social outcasts....
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References
4,585 citations
"Defining Emotion: A Brief History:" refers background in this paper
...Reviews have failed to identify the scientific criteria that distinguish one emotion from the next, or even emotions from cognitions (see Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 2003)....
[...]
2,139 citations
"Defining Emotion: A Brief History:" refers background in this paper
...When Plutchik (1980) reviewed definitions of emotion throughout the history of psychology, he concluded that, “there is no sense of the definitions moving in a certain direction with time” (p. 80)....
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1,827 citations
"Defining Emotion: A Brief History:" refers background in this paper
...Reviews have failed to identify the scientific criteria that distinguish one emotion from the next, or even emotions from cognitions (see Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 2003)....
[...]
1,594 citations
"Defining Emotion: A Brief History:" refers background in this paper
...Reviews have failed to identify the scientific criteria that distinguish one emotion from the next, or even emotions from cognitions (see Barrett, 2006; Mauss & Robinson, 2009; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 2003)....
[...]
1,186 citations