Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions
01 Dec 2011-Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management (Pergamon)-Vol. 17, Iss: 4, pp 207-221
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a seven-step approach to collusion detection in procurement auctions, which comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios.
About: This article is published in Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management.The article was published on 2011-12-01. It has received 45 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Collusion & Unique bid auction.
TL;DR: This paper is one of the early studies that predict dimensions of technology readiness index (TRI) through the determinants of technology-organization-environment (TOE) framework and among the first attempts to link prominent technology adoption models to e-maintenance technology as a novel form of enterprise innovations.
TL;DR: In this article, a cross-case analysis of eight first-tier (FT) suppliers and an integration of resource dependency theory (RDT) was performed to explore the drivers and mechanisms of FT supplier engagement in sustainable supply chain management.
Abstract: Mounting pressure for sustainable business practices has led to a greatly increased focus on highlighting sustainability drivers throughout the supply chain. While the literature has concentrated on why downstream original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and retailers become �sustainable,� much less is known regarding why and how upstream suppliers implement sustainability practices. Based on findings from a cross-case analysis of eight first-tier (FT) suppliers and an integration of resource dependency theory (RDT), this study explores the drivers and mechanisms of FT supplier engagement in sustainable supply chain management. Suppliers need to understand the sustainability priorities of customers and stakeholders to derive the effective focus and depth of further upstream integration with subsuppliers. Therefore, the integration between the two functions that manage the relevant external interfaces, namely marketing (downstream and stakeholder communication) and procurement (upstream), appears to be the essential cornerstone to move beyond FT supplier compliance to actual commitment to sustainability practices. We present findings on how (1) stakeholder-related, (2) process-related, and (3) product-related drivers influence the choice and effectiveness of the procurement�marketing integration (PM integration) mechanisms. Stakeholder pressures are considered to be the principal drivers of sustainability efforts. However, on their own, they rarely provide sufficient grounds for permanent and embedded PM integration initiatives at FT suppliers. Evidence suggests that suppliers' commitment to PM integration is motivated by the opportunity to leverage sustainability initiatives in their product offerings and sustainability certificates recognizable by customers and secondary stakeholders.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a composite indicator of high-level institutionalised corruption through a novel "Big Data" approach using publicly available electronic public procurement records in Hungary and link them to restricted competition and recurrent contract award to the same company.
Abstract: In order to address the lack of reliable indicators of corruption, this article develops a composite indicator of high-level institutionalised corruption through a novel ‘Big Data’ approach. Using publicly available electronic public procurement records in Hungary, we identify “red flags” in the public procurement process and link them to restricted competition and recurrent contract award to the same company. We use this method to create a corruption indicator at contract level that can be aggregated to the level of individual organisations, sectors, regions and countries. Because electronic public procurement data is available in virtually all developed countries from about the mid-2000s, this method can generate a corruption index based on objective data that is consistent over time and across countries. We demonstrate the validity of the corruption risk index by showing that firms with higher corruption risk score had relatively higher profitability, higher ratio of contract value to initial estimated price, greater likelihood of politicians managing or owning them and greater likelihood of registration in tax havens, than firms with lower scores on the index. In the conclusion we discuss the uses of this data for academic research, investigative journalists, civil society groups and small and medium business.
TL;DR: In this paper, a survey was conducted with Thai public managers who are involved in e-government procurement, and the sample size is 169 professionals representing 67 government agencies, and five factors that enhance governance procurement were identified.
Abstract: Purpose – E‐government procurement (E‐GP) can improve the traditional government procurement process. E‐GP can help decrease corruption. This research aims to present the factors of E‐GP that can create good governance in government procurement through e‐auction.Design/methodology/approach – A survey was conducted with Thai public managers who are involved in e‐government procurement. The sample size is 169 professionals representing 67 government agencies.Findings – There are five factors that enhance governance procurement. These relate to the transparent e‐procurement process, committed public managers and political officials, honest vendors, and specific policies and regulations. A transparent e‐procurement process has a positive effect on good governance practice, increasing cost effectiveness and accountability, and decreasing collusion among vendors. Vendor honesty has a negative impact on collusion. Supportive policy and regulations requirements improve cost effectiveness, accountability, and law ...
TL;DR: In this article, a systematic literature review (SLR) has been conducted using deductive content analysis to provide an overview of the current state of sustainable construction research in India and provide directions for future research.
01 Dec 1981
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a simple linear regression model with variable selection and multicollinearity for robust regression, and validate the model using regression analysis and validation of regression models.
Abstract: Preface. Introduction. Simple Linear Regression. Multiple Linear Regression. Model Adequacy Checking. Transformations and Weighting to Correct Model Inadequacies. Diagnostics for Leverage and Influence. Polynomial Regression Models. Indicator Variables. Variable Selection and Model Building. Multicollinearity. Robust Regression. Introduction to Nonlinear Regression. Generalized Linear Models. Other Topics in the Use of Regression Analysis. Validation of Regression Models. Appendix A. Statistical Tables. Appendix B. Data Sets for Exercises. Appendix C. Supplemental Technical Material. References. Index.
01 Jan 1978
TL;DR: The authors presents a wide range of forecasting methods useful for undergraduate or graduate students majoring in business management, economics, or engineering, including decomposition, regression analysis, and econometrics.
Abstract: Presents a wide range of forecasting methods useful for undergraduate or graduate students majoring in business management, economics, or engineering. Develops skills for selecting the proper methodology. Integrates forecasting with the planning and decision-making activities within an organization. Methods of forecasting include: decomposition, regression analysis, and econometrics. Stresses the strengths and weaknesses of the individual methods in various types of organizational areas. Numerous examples are included.
TL;DR: The classification maximum likelihood approach is sufficiently general to encompass many current clustering algorithms, including those based on the sum of squares criterion and on the criterion of Friedman and Rubin (1967), but it is restricted to Gaussian distributions and it does not allow for noise.
Abstract: : The classification maximum likelihood approach is sufficiently general to encompass many current clustering algorithms, including those based on the sum of squares criterion and on the criterion of Friedman and Rubin (1967). However, as currently implemented, it does not allow the specification of which features (orientation, size and shape) are to be common to all clusters and which may differ between clusters. Also, it is restricted to Gaussian distributions and it does not allow for noise. We propose ways of overcoming these limitations. A reparameterization of the covariance matrix allows us to specify that some features, but not all, be the same for all clusters. A practical framework for non-Gaussian clustering is outlined, and a means of incorporating noise in the form of a Poisson process is described. An approximate Bayesian method for choosing the number of clusters is given. The performance of the proposed methods is studied by simulation, with encouraging results. The methods are applied to the analysis of a data set arising in the study of diabetes, and the results seem better than those of previous analyses. (RH)
•28 Nov 2006
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a game theory approach to the problem of estimating the revenue of a classroom game with the objective of maximizing the game's revenue, using the Harsanyi transformation and Bayesian games.
Abstract: List of Figures List of Tables List of Games Preface Contents and Purpose Changes in the Second Edition (1994) Changes in the Third Edition (2001) Changes in the Fourth Edition (2006) Using the Book The Level of Mathematics Other Books Contact Information Acknowledgements Introduction History Game Theory's Method Exemplifying Theory This Book's Style Notes PART 1: GAME THEORY 1 The Rules of the Game Definitions Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes and Ranked Coordination Focal Points Notes Problems Classroom Game 2 Information The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game Information Sets Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games Example: The Png Settlement Game Notes Problems Classroom Game 3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game Randomizing is not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutes Existence of Equilibrium Notes Problems Classroom Game 4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information Subgame Perfectness An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection Notes Problems Classroom Game 5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game Notes Problems Classroom Game 6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model The Axelrod Tournament Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model Notes Problems Classroom Game PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions Categories of Asymmetric Information Models A Principal-agent Model: The Production Game The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game Notes Problems Classroom Game 8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard Efficiency Wages Tournaments Institutions and Agency Problems Renegotiation: The Repossession Game State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model The Multitask Agency Problem Notes Problems Classroom Game 9 Adverse Selection Introduction: Production Game VI Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III Market Microstructure A Variety of Applications Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII Notes Problems Classroom Game 10 Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle Myerson Mechanism Design An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game The Groves Mechanism Price Discrimination Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement Notes Problems Classroom Game 11 Signalling The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling Variants on the Signalling Model of Education General Comments on Signalling in Education The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing Countersignalling Notes Problems Classroom Game PART 3: APPLICATIONS 12 Bargaining The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie The Nash Bargaining Solution Alternating Offers over Finite Time Alternating Offers over Infinite Time Incomplete Information Setting Up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Mechanism Notes Problems Classroom Game 13 Auctions Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Curse Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game Notes Problems Classroom Game 14 Pricing Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox Location Models Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games Vertical Differentiation Durable Monopoly Notes Problems Classroom Game Mathematical Appendix Notation The Greek Alphabet Glossary Formulas and Functions Probability Distributions Supermodularity Fixed Point Theorems Genericity Discounting Risk References and Name Index Subject Index
01 Jan 1989
TL;DR: Amir Aczel and Jayavel Sounderpandian as mentioned in this paper, Complete Business Statistics 6/e Table of Contents 0 Working with Templates1 Introduction and Descriptive Statistics2 Probability3 Random Variables4 The Normal Distribution5 Sampling and Sampling Distributions6 Confidence Intervals7 Hypothesis Testing8 The Comparison of Two Populations9 Analysis of Variance10 Simple Linear Regression and Correlation11 Multiple Regression
Abstract: Amir Aczel and Jayavel Sounderpandian, Complete Business Statistics 6/e Table of Contents0 Working with Templates1 Introduction and Descriptive Statistics2 Probability3 Random Variables4 The Normal Distribution5 Sampling and Sampling Distributions6 Confidence Intervals7 Hypothesis Testing8 The Comparison of Two Populations9 Analysis of Variance10 Simple Linear Regression and Correlation11 Multiple Regression and Correlation12 Time Series, Forecasting, and Index Numbers13 Quality Control and Improvement14 Nonparametric Methods and Chi-Square Test15 Bayesian Statistics and Decision AnalysisAppendicesA: ReferencesB: Answers to Most Odd-Numbered ProblemsC: Statistical TablesOn the CD16 Sampling Methods17 Multivariate Analysis
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