Discretionary Accounting Accruals, Managers' Incentives, and Audit Fees*
TL;DR: The authors examined the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees and found that managers with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value-relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting-based compensation are opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation.
Abstract: This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value-relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting-based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting-based management compensation.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: This paper pointed out that the "quality" of earnings is a function of the firm's fundamental performance and suggested that the contribution of a firms fundamental performance to its earnings quality is suggested as one area for future work.
Abstract: Researchers have used various measures as indications of "earnings quality" including persistence, accruals, smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance, investor responsiveness, and external indicators such as restatements and SEC enforcement releases. For each measure, we discuss causes of variation in the measure as well as consequences. We reach no single conclusion on what earnings quality is because "quality" is contingent on the decision context. We also point out that the "quality" of earnings is a function of the firm's fundamental performance. The contribution of a firm's fundamental performance to its earnings quality is suggested as one area for future work.
2,633Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors point out that the quality of earnings is a function of the firm's fundamental performance and suggest that the contribution of a firms fundamental performance to its earnings quality is suggested as one area for future work.
2,140Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting quality, and they provide a framework for systematically evaluating their unique strengths and weaknesses, including the role of auditor and client competency in driving audit quality.
1,327Â citations
TL;DR: The authors evaluate and summarize the large body of audit fee research and use meta-analysis to test the combined effect of the most commonly used independent variables, such as loss by the client and leverage, which have become significant in comparatively recent studies.
Abstract: We evaluate and summarize the large body of audit fee research and use meta-analysis to test the combined effect of the most commonly used independent variables. The perspective provided by the meta-analysis allows us to reconsider the anomalies, mixed results, and gaps in audit fee research. We find that, although many independent variables have consistent results, several show no clear pattern to the results and others only show significant results in certain periods or particular countries. These variables include a loss by the client and leverage, which have become significant in comparatively recent studies; internal auditing and governance, both of which have mixed results; auditor specialization, regarding which there is still some uncertainty; and the audit opinion, which was a significant variable before 1990 but not in more recent studies.
1,005Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the linkages between board leadership structure in terms of CEO duality (CEOs who jointly serve as board chairs), the proportion of expert outside directors on the board (PENEDs) and voluntary corporate disclosures.
1,001Â citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666Â citations
TL;DR: This article investigated the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms, they found evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship.
7,523Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test whether firms that would benefit from import relief attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).
Abstract: This study tests whether firms that would benefit from import relief (eg, tariff increases and quota reductions) attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) The import relief determination made by the ITC is based on several factors that are specified in the federal trade acts, including the profitability of the industry Explicit use of accounting numbers in import relief regulation provides incentives for managers to manage earnings in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining import relief and/or increase the amount of relief granted While studies of earnings management typically examine situations in which all contracting parties have incentives to "perfectly" monitor (adjust) accounting numbers for such manipulation, import relief investigations provide a specific motive for earnings management that is not
7,362Â citations
TL;DR: The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit as mentioned in this paper, which is a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Abstract: Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
7,121Â citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the extent to which the earnings manipulations can be explained by earnings management hypotheses and the relation between earnings manipulation and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures, and the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulation are made public.
Abstract: . This study investigates firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We investigate: (i) the extent to which the alleged earnings manipulations can be explained by extant earnings management hypotheses; (ii) the relation between earnings manipulations and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures; and (iii) the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulations are made public. We find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. We show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. We also find that firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management; (ii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who is also the firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. Finally, we document that firms manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are made public.
Resume. Les auteurs analysent les entreprises assujetties aux mesures d'execution prises par la Securities and Exchange Commission dans les cas de presomption de transgression des principes comptables generalement reconnus. Ils s'interessent aux aspects suivants de la question: i) la mesure dans laquelle les presomptions de manipulations des benefices peuvent etre expliquees par les hypotheses existantes de gestion des benefices; ii) la relation entre les manipulations de benefices et les faiblesses des structures de regie interne des entreprises; et iii) la reaction du marche financier a l'endroit des entreprises au sujet desquelles les presomptions de manipulation des benefices sont rendues publiques. Les auteurs constatent qu'un incitatif majeur a la manipulation des benefices est le desir d'obtenir du financement externe a moindre cout. Ils demontrent que cet incitatif demeure important meme apres le controle des motifs contractuels que mettent de l'avant les travaux theoriques. Ils constatent egalement que les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices sont: i) davantage susceptibles d'avoir des conseils d'administration domines par la direction; ii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui joue simultanement le role de president du conseil; iii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui est egalement le fondateur de l'entreprise; iv) moins susceptibles d'avoir un comite de verification; et v) moins susceptibles d'avoir un bloc de titres detenus par un actionnaire exterieur. Enfin, les auteurs etablissent le fait que le cout du capital, pour les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices, enregistre des hausses appreciables lorsque ces manipulations sont rendues publiques.
4,081Â citations