Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value, and find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to those that do not.
Abstract: I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.
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TL;DR: In this article, a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the exogenous variation in liquidity generated by regulatory changes was used to find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation.
Abstract: We aim to tackle the longstanding debate on whether stock liquidity enhances or impedes firm innovation This topic is of interest because innovation is crucial for firm- and national-level competitiveness and stock liquidity can be altered by financial market regulations Using a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the exogenous variation in liquidity generated by regulatory changes, we find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation We identify two possible mechanisms through which liquidity impedes innovation: increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of institutional investors who do not actively gather information or monitor
709 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology, and that the citation increase comes mainly from incremental patents in the middle of the citation distribution; the numbers of uncited and highly cited patents do not change significantly.
433 citations
405 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relation between innovation and a firm's financial dependence using a sample of privately held and publicly traded US firms and found that public firms in external finance dependent industries spend more on research and development and generate a better patent portfolio than their private counterparts.
283 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation and find that stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options.
274 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, how debt can substitute for dividends, why diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, and why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil.
Abstract: The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows—more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory developed here explains 1) the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, 2) how debt can substitute for dividends, 3) why “diversification” programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, 4) why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil, and 5) why bidders and some targets tend to perform abnormally well prior to takeover.
14,368 citations
TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
Abstract: This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor
10,954 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a method to improve the performance of the system by using the information of the user's interaction with the system and the system itself, including the interaction between the two parties.
Abstract: В статье производится анализ агрегированной производственной функции, вводится аппарат, позволяющий различать движение вдоль такой функции от ее сдвигов. На основании сделанных в статье предположений делаются выводы о характере технического прогресса и технологических изменений. Существенное внимание уделяется вариантам применения концепции агрегированной производственной функции.
10,850 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey and use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its "effect" as well as the standard error of this estimate.
Abstract: Most papers that employ Differences-in-Differences estimation (DD) use many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes but ignore that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its “effect” as well as the standard error of this estimate. These conventional DD standard errors severely understate the standard deviation of the estimators: we find an “effect” significant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo interventions. We use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how well existing methods help solve this problem. Econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form on the time-series process do not perform well. Bootstrap (taking into account the autocorrelation of the data) works well when the number of states is large enough. Two corrections based on asymptotic approximation of the variance-covariance matrix work well for moderate numbers of states and one correction that collapses the time series information into a “pre”- and “post”-period and explicitly takes into account the effective sample size works well even for small numbers of states.
9,397 citations