Do IFRS convergence affects firm performance? Picturing Indian-listed manufacturing firms
06 Jun 2023-Rajagiri Management Journal-
TL;DR: In this paper , the effect of the converged version of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the performance of the Indian-listed manufacturing firms has been investigated and the results indicated that full adoption rather than convergence could reap the benefits of the IFRS.
Abstract: PurposeThe study has endeavored to assay the nexus between the converged version of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the performance of the Indian-listed manufacturing firms.Design/methodology/approachThe study has randomly accessed the data of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed Indian manufacturing firms using the Prowess IQ database. It has covered 2014–2016 as pre-IFRS and 2017–2020 as the post-IFRS convergence period. Moreover, the study has followed a longitudinal research design with cross-sectional time-series data and has used the difference-in-difference (DiD) technique to assess the effect of the IFRS convergence on firm performance (FP).FindingsThe results have indicated that the adoption of the Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) has unlikely reported better FP. It has concurred policy implications as full adoption rather than convergence could reap the benefits of the IFRS.Originality/valueIt has contributed to the existing body of knowledge by assaying the effect of the IFRS convergence on FP in developing economies like India using the DiD methodology. The study is an original piece of research and is free from plagiarism.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model in which signaling is implicitly defined and explains its usefulness, in which the employer is not sure of the productive capabilities of an individual at the time he/she hires him.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses job market signaling. The term market signaling is not exactly a part of the well-defined, technical vocabulary of the economist. The chapter presents a model in which signaling is implicitly defined and explains its usefulness. In most job markets, the employer is not sure of the productive capabilities of an individual at the time he hires him. The fact that it takes time to learn an individual's productive capabilities means that hiring is an investment decision. On the basis of previous experience in the market, the employer has conditional probability assessments over productive capacity with various combinations of signals and indices. This chapter presents an introduction to Spence's more extensive analysis of market signaling.
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss points of convergence and disagreement with institutionally oriented research in economics and political science, and locate the "institutional" approach in relation to major developments in contemporary sociological theory.
Abstract: Long a fruitful area of scrutiny for students of organizations, the study of institutions is undergoing a renaissance in contemporary social science This volume offers, for the first time, both often-cited foundation works and the latest writings of scholars associated with the "institutional" approach to organization analysis In their introduction, the editors discuss points of convergence and disagreement with institutionally oriented research in economics and political science, and locate the "institutional" approach in relation to major developments in contemporary sociological theory Several chapters consolidate the theoretical advances of the past decade, identify and clarify the paradigm's key ambiguities, and push the theoretical agenda in novel ways by developing sophisticated arguments about the linkage between institutional patterns and forms of social structure The empirical studies that follow--involving such diverse topics as mental health clinics, art museums, large corporations, civil-service systems, and national polities--illustrate the explanatory power of institutional theory in the analysis of organizational change Required reading for anyone interested in the sociology of organizations, the volume should appeal to scholars concerned with culture, political institutions, and social change
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors, arguing that purposeful behavior requires a single-valued objective function.
Abstract: This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single-valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value. The main contender to value maximization as the corporate objective is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm, including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors. In clarifying the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, the author introduces a somewhat new corporate objective called “enlightened value maximization.” Enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory—notably the need to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders—while continuing to posit maximization of long-run firm value as the criterion for making the necessary tradeoffs among stakeholders. The paper comes to similar conclusions about the Balanced Scorecard, which is described as the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. Although the Balanced Scorecard can add value by helping managers better understand the drivers of shareholder value, it should not be used as a performance measurement and incentive compensation system because it fails to provide a single valued score, a clear way of distinguishing superior from substandard performance.
TL;DR: In this article, the extent of financial information disclosure on the Internet by the largest companies in the UK in 1998 was examined and a statistically significant positive relationship between the size of a company and the use and extent of disclosure was found.
Abstract: This paper examines the extent of financial information disclosure on the Internet by the largest companies in the UK in 1998. Companies were surveyed to establish whether they had a website and if so whether financial information was available. We also investigated whether that information was in summary form or whether the full annual report was available. This study finds a statistically significant positive relationship between the size of a company and the use and extent of disclosure on the Internet. There was no significant association between industry type and disclosure.